Classics and the Western Canon discussion
Lucretius, De rerum natura
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Lucretius, Book 6 and the work as a whole
I had previously read through parts of books 5 (I forget the wherefore), and these remained of the most interest to me, but the book as a whole doesn't fail to impress. Whether or not Lucretius's observations and insights are his own, and however eccentric he was in regard to his time and place, DRN is a window into a well-developed antique worldview that certainly seems (retrospectively) to want to be scientific. Certainly, I think Lucretius's role as an inspiration during the early modern period cements his work among the classics of western thought.Here's something that may be worth pondering: notice how Lucretius argues against attributing divine agency to inexplicable phenomena. For us today, the most effective argument would probably be from the necessities of the scientific method. To posit nonempirical or spiritual forces behind empirical phenomena is to halt scientific inquiry, to assert that science has said all it can, when in fact we will never know whether science has said all it can until it has exhausted all possible empirical explanations (and we cannot know when we have reached that point). But Lucretius argues most fundamentally that supernatural explanations of phenomena distort our perceptions of the gods and so disturb our peace of mind. He more or less starts from the Epicurean perspective on the "good life," and argues from there to a naturalistic and empirical approach to the world. Particles line the path to happiness.
Though my footnotes observe a lot of textual corruption and possible gaps in this last book, and he rambles a bit, I don't see anything that makes me think Lucretius was mentally deteriorating as he finished his work. Sure, St Jerome claimed he went mad from a love potion, but that was probably just a story people passed around to explain the odd duck, like Thales and the well. It's also possible, of course, that Lucretius had editors to smoothe out the parts he left rough or incoherent.
The accusations that Lucretius went mad may have been made for political reasons of some kind (possibly of Christian writers upset by his atheistic world view?), in much the say way that More(Morton?) falsely trashed the reputation and record of Richard III for political reasons.
Epicurus also seems to have been accused of various indecencies and licentious behaviour and other misinterpretations of his 'hedonistic' lifestyles. I read book 6 before and although it seemed incomplete (possibly due to corruption or losses), it didn't seem to have any suggestions of madness. I may have overlooked that possibility, but it didn't seem to part too much from his previous books.
Seeing that [I have ventured] to mount the splendid chariot of the Muses, I will now describe how raging storms of winds arise, and how they are appeased so that, once their fury is allayed, everything returns to normality.Does Lucretius' chariot of the muses remind anyone else of the "spaceship of the imagination" from Cosmos?
Rex wrote: "To posit nonempirical or spiritual forces behind empirical phenomena is to halt scientific inquiry, to assert that science has said all it can, when in fact we will never know whether science has said all it can until it has exhausted all possible empirical explanations (and we cannot know when we have reached that point)." This certainly was Lucretius' argument, and it may have been true of his time period and culture, but overall, not true. If anything, the opposite would logically be true.
If I am only matter, just a bunch of atoms and nothing else, what makes me think that my senses are trustworthy, that my mind is able to reach any real and objective truth? It's just as likely that everything I perceive and think to be true are just atoms sending screwy signals to my head....
On the other hand, if I believe in a God who is logical and creates an orderly world, who creates us with a supernatural self, a mind that can understand truth, there is every reason to believe that I can come to understand that truth more and more fully. Look at the large number of scientist-priests that there were in the middle ages leading until today. Heck, even Pope Francis has a background in chemistry.
Personally, I hate science... but I recognize that a flaw in myself, not because of the inherent worth of the scientific endeavor.... something comparable to the fact that some people hate babies or small children, or that other people can't stand puppies. It has nothing to do with me being a theist.
I have not finished book 6 yet, so I cannot speak about whether or not I think he was mad (although, if he was mad, it happened pretty quickly in book 6 be ause until now he seems to be pretty lucid).For my overall, first-time read of this, I feel I failed to read it well. I would read the book for the week, post a few thoughts, then move on to other reading material that kept me fully occupied in mind the rest of the week. So, I think I am going to go back and reread it to give it better attention before rating it.
The issue I haven't gotten over is I feel that he wasn't consistent. This is similar to other observations already made. He wants to convince us of the existence of atoms and the reliability of our sense perception. He wants us to view our logic as more faulty as compared with the senses. But his arguments are all from reasoning?? And I still don't understand why/how he came to the conclusion that the senses were more reliable than reasoning? (If this was covered in an earlier book or thread and someone can point me to it, I would appreciate it.)
Kenneth, I don't disagree with your point. But it really doesn't make the case for science to adopt a God-of-the-gaps approach, which is the position under critique by the argument I cited. I have no truck with philosophical naturalism--I am a theist--but modern science, for its integrity and efficacy, depends on methodological naturalism. You can believe that an empirically available phenomenon is supernaturally caused, but science as a method cannot, or it limits its inquiry, because it is by its own self-limitations incapable of confirming supernatural causation. This is only a problem for theists if they assume science has totally comprehensive explanatory powers or that empirical knowledge is the only kind available.
Kenneth wrote: ". . .it may have been true of his time period and culture, but overall, not true. If anything, the opposite would logically be true."Are you syaing it was true during Lucretius' time and not now? What changed, and when?
Kenneth wrote: "If I am only matter, just a bunch of atoms and nothing else, what makes me think that my senses are trustworthy, that my mind is able to reach any real and objective truth?
I would not be too hasty in dismissing the possiblity that perhaps a mind that is self-aware and made only of matter would be thoroughly qualified to understand any real and objective truths?
Kenneth wrote: ". . .if I believe in a God who is logical and creates an orderly world, who creates us with a supernatural self, a mind that can understand truth, there is every reason to believe that I can come to understand that truth more and more fully."
This is begging the question. Ie., if I were created with the capability to understand the universe, I should be able to understand the universe". Your premise has built in solution for the answer. If your argument was indeed the case, whether you believe or not is irrelevant, one could ask why we do not understand the truth more fully by now. Unfortunately any answers to that are mere personal conjecture.
At least you recognize your dislike of science as a flaw. :) I would also note this sounds like the recent rash of politicians who begin sentences with, "I am no scientist, but. . ." Contrary to what they would like you to believe, this claim is not a virtue.
It is also important to understand Lucretius is not doing "science" here. The true fact that much of the natural philosophy he argues has been refuted, backed up, expanded upon, or corrected by modern science is wondrous, but not the point. The point is are you more comfortable accepting Lucretius' natural explanation of thunder and lightening, or in believing Zeus is going to hurl lightening bolts your way either out of caprice or punishment?
Genni wrote: "For my overall, first-time read of this, I feel I failed to read it well. I would read the book for the week, post a few thoughts, then move on to other reading material that kept me fully occupied in mind the rest of the week. "I found it difficult to read as well, but much easier when broken into parts. The first time I read Lucretius I dismissed much of it as simply wrong, but this time I was able to go through it more slowly and look for his methodology. In the process I also came to appreciate his poetry.
As far as his methodology goes, it seems to be based on analogy. The first and most important impression that the world makes on us as observers is sensual. Once we have the basic information that the senses provide then we can extrapolate using reason. Everything he says about the world on an atomic level is based on how he sees matter behave on a visible level. How he can assume that there is an atomic level to begin with is a little mysterious to me, but assuming there is one, he argues by analogy that it must behave just like matter in the observable world. So reason is not necessarily more faulty than the senses, it just needs to be applied correctly, i.e. it must be grounded on the correct premises.
Thomas wrote: "I found it difficult to read as well, but much easier when broken into parts. The first time I read Lucretius I dismissed much of it as simply wrong, but this time I was able to go through it more slowly and look for his methodology. In the process I also came to appreciate his poetry."I feel like I lost a sense of unity. But I Got the Great Courses History of Science:From Antiquity to 1700 so hopefully I can understand more the scientific context he is speaking in.
As far as his methodology goes, it seems to be based on analogy. The first and most important impression that the world makes on us as observers is sensual. Once we have the basic information that the senses provide then we can extrapolate using reason. Everything he says about the world on an atomic level is based on how he sees matter behave on a visible level. How he can assume that there is an atomic level to begin with is a little mysterious to me, but assuming there is one, he argues by analogy that it must behave just like matter in the observable world. So reason is not necessarily more faulty than the senses, it just needs to be applied correctly, i.e. it must be grounded on the correct premises."
This is helpful, Thomas. Thanks! I was reading the Stanford Encyclopedia entry on Presocratics, looking specifically for the atomists and their views. It seems that the main proponent of atomism was Democritus, and he viewed the senses as unreliable. So it is interesting that Lucretius kind of melds the two views (atomism and the reliability of the senses) together.
In most ways, Lucretius seems to not really bring anything new to the science of his day, or to religion for that matter (since Epicurus had already expounded his theories). So I am wondering about the true significance of Lucretius. Is it just that he brought attention to these worldviews?
It is like, now that I am at the end of the book, I am finally getting really interested in it. :p
That point about analogy is indeed helpful, Thomas.Regarding Lucretius's significance: to his contemporaries, I believe it would be primarily as a poet. Even people who thought his physics was nonsense admired his didactic-poetic skill. But like I said more briefly above, I think what truly makes him a part of the western canon is the influence he had on early modernity. Especially during the seventeenth century, Lucretius was read widely by poets, dramatists, philosophers, scientists, politicians, social critics, and even theologians. Not all these people approved of Lucretius, but they entered into dialogue with him.
To take a random for instance, some scholars have argued that Shakespeare's play Measure for Measure represents a clash between Lucretian and Calvinist philosophies, favoring the former.
Rex wrote: "Regarding Lucretius's significance: to his contemporaries, I believe it would be primarily as a poet. Even people who thought his physics was nonsense admired his didactic-poetic skill. "I can see that. To argue well is one thing, to do it in poetry is a marvel.
But like I said more briefly above, I think what truly makes him a part of the western canon is the influence he had on early modernity. Especially during the seventeenth century, Lucretius was read widely by poets, dramatists, philosophers, scientists, politicians, social critics, and even theologians. Not all these people approved of Lucretius, but they entered into dialogue with him.
Any suggested readings on the influence of Lucretius on modernity other than The Swerve?
"To take a random for instance, some scholars have argued that Shakespeare's play Measure for Measure represents a clash between Lucretian and Calvinist philosophies, favoring the former."
This seems speculative to me??
David wrote: "Are you syaing it was true during Lucretius' time and not now? What changed, and when? "Yes, and since you asked.... Jesus came. He founded the Catholic Church which is based on faith AND reason. This is why the great universities were founded by the Church... they were seeking truth because they knew that God had made the world in an ordered fashion. They didn't always get correct where the line was between faith and reason, no doubt, but insofar as something was considered to be in the realm of reason, which included the scientific endeavor, they based their ability to know on the fact that God created the world through the Logos, Jesus, in an ordered fashion. Pre-Christian paganism was merely superstition and had no basis in reason.
David wrote: "I would not be too hasty in dismissing the possiblity that perhaps a mind that is self-aware and made only of matter would be thoroughly qualified to understand any real and objective truths? "
Why the heck not? I don't trust carbon atoms or nitrogen atoms or oxygen atoms to think on their own... why would some merely material combination of them have any ability to make legitimate sense of the world?
David wrote: "This is begging the question. Ie., if I were created with the capability to understand the universe, I should be able to understand the universe". Your premise has built in solution for the answer. If your argument was indeed the case, whether you believe or not is irrelevant, one could ask why we do not understand the truth more fully by now. Unfortunately any answers to that are mere personal conjecture. "
I don't think I'm fully understanding your point here, but I don't think I'm begging the question. I haven't quite worked out what my argument would be, but it would be something like this in multiple steps:
1. God created the world such that each effect has a definable cause or set of causes.
2. The scientific endeavor is based on the universe being at least partially orderly (not totally random); in other words, the scientific endeavor is based on the idea that we can know and understand cause and effect (at least some of the time).
3. The ability to abstract in an intelligent way is necessary to recognize the order (especially cause and effect) in the universe.
4. God created human beings as both material and spiritual creatures with both free will and intelligence.
5. Therefore human beings have the ability to know the order of the universe.
6. Therefore human beings have the ability to perform the scientific endeavor.
I can see some potential places where that argument could be tightened, but I think that is it in a nutshell. I don't believe I have begged the question anywhere.
David wrote: "The point is are you more comfortable accepting Lucretius' natural explanation of thunder and lightening, or in believing Zeus is going to hurl lightening bolts your way either out of caprice or punishment? "
Of course I don't believe in Zeus but in God. The answer to this question can't be answered simply.
God is the primary cause of everything in the world, but has created the universe in such a way that under certain conditions, certain things become secondary causes that effect the changes necessary for thunder and lightning to happen. However, in some circumstances, God, as primary cause, could make it so that lightning and thunder happen without any of those secondary causes if He so chooses so that His will is done. I don't know whether He HAS ever done that, but that is also a potential source of thunder and lightning.
Genni, it's not my field, but I am aware of a book on the subject published by Oxford titled Lucretius and the Early Modern. There is another collection called Lucretius and Modernity. Either would probably be a good place to start. The essay on Lucretian v. Calvinist themes in Measure for Measure is by Adrian Streete and can be found in the volume Shakespeare and Early Modern Religion.Kenneth: Like I said, I'm a theist. In fact, I broadly agree with you that theism provides the strongest possible basis for rationality. But your argument comes across as a little confused--or beside the point--to me. A "Lucretian" preference for naturalistic explanations, even in the absence of hard evidence, has many advantages, and these are clearly shown by the technical efficacy of modern science.
But I don't think this remotely threatens theism, unless you actually do think that belief in God depends on supernatural interpretations of ordinary phenomena. But if God is indeed the primary cause (to use your term) of the whole causal system, we arrive at his existence through the sort of "vertical" philosophical logic that need take no particular phenomenon in evidence, as if he existed as a cause within the system, but rather considers the system as a whole and its contingency on a transcendent absolute. In other words, God as understood by classical theists (including the great Catholic theologians) is not and logically cannot be a scientific hypothesis.
I see Lucretius making no actual arguments against the kind of unmoved-mover God proposed by Aristotle. His rejection of God in this sense is simply an implication of his hard empiricism. Rather, his attacks are launched against pantheons populated by contingent causal forces interacting within the cause-effect system--superpowered, undetectable personalities behind empirical phenomena. As such, Lucretius's point that such beings fill in gaps in knowledge that we may reason are occupied by purely material causes is well taken, even if it does spring from Epicurean ethical and physical theory rather than direct observation or anything we would today regard as science.
Genni wrote: "It is like, now that I am at the end of the book, I am finally getting really interested in it. :p "
That's why the classics reward rereading so greatly! There's always a lot more in them than is apparent at first reading. (It has been said that you can't read the Republic for the first time until you have already read it at least once.)
Patrice wrote: "I. feel somehow dissatisfied. I understand the general points he's making and his reasoning seems generally good, but every now and again he swerves! ."Haha!
Patrice wrote: "Genni wrote: "I have not finished book 6 yet, so I cannot speak about whether or not I think he was mad (although, if he was mad, it happened pretty quickly in book 6 be ause until now he seems to ..."Touche! Maybe his 'swerves' are partly intended. :-)
Patrice wrote: "."I once asked him about something in the universe, I forget what, his take on it was that God doesn't want us to find out. "I find this response a little strange and I don't know many who would answer in such a way in response to a lack of scientific knowledge. Scientific discoveries are amazing and fun, partly because of the process of discovery, imo. But I wouldn't go so far as to say that because we don't know something, God doesn't WANT us to know. I mean, how could one know such a thing about God's wants?
For what it is worth, I also see no conflict between religion and science, even evolution.
Borum wrote: ""Maybe his 'swerves' are partly intended. :-) "I don't know. I thought his "swerves" supposed to be random. Maybe he is keeping true to form? :p
Patrice wrote: "I'm wondering if his influence was great because he wrote in Latin. Epicurious was Greek. Piety was very important to Romans. I'm thinking that he popularized epicuious in Rome, and then later, in ..."Maybe. But after reading Epicurus' scant remnants of writing, I had a newfound appreciation for Lucretius. Epicurus' style is very turgid. Lucretius reminds me of my teacher who explained the theory of relativity and quantum theory as if he was explaining the mechanics of basketball or his favorite video game. He tried to convey complex concepts in images/language that was more conducive to the reader and himself, while making it both a social commentary and celebratory hymn at the same time.
Patrice wrote: "Everyman wrote: "We come to the final book. We start again with praise of Epicurus. Lucretius then wants to find natural origins for natural phenomena to show that these can be explained logically ..."You know, it's odd, because I too, at first thought he was a complete materialist and atheist like Dawkins, but on second reading, I'm getting the impression that he didn't use the references to gods or Venus or Jove as just simple poetic metaphors. It seemed that he didn't completely exclude the possibility of Gods, as he didn't exclude any various theories on the celestial bodies that we cannot perceive fully as they are too far from our reach. I think that just as he thought that the soul does exist, but in a different form (that is, material and mortal), Epicurus and Lucretius never denied or refuted the very 'existence' of Gods. Perhaps they held that the Gods do exist in their far-off, blessed and neutral being kind of way, but just not in the meddling, involved and impassioned or fickle way the conventional belief system held. So, yes, the soul exists but it's material and is destroyed along with the body. Yes, the Gods exist but they have nothing to do with the natural phenomena or human lives (here or after, since the soul dies after death).
Lucretius is sounding more and more like Carl Sagan than Richard Dawkins to me, because like Sagan, he has his basis of scientific (well, at least according to his time) theories and reasoning, but he always opens his possibilities as he does for the celestial bodies and the possiblity of human will with the theory of the 'swerve'. Like Sagan, he seemed to be a sort of a dreamer or romanticist with some ulterior motive that goes beyond the present scientific knowledge.
Everyman wrote: "The accusations that Lucretius went mad may have been made for political reasons of some kind (possibly of Christian writers upset by his atheistic world view?)"Or it may simply have been a historical fact that Lucretius went mad. Unless one considers madness a moral fault (or sin), there is no accusation in stating the fact. Madness didn't have the kind of stigma attached to it as it does in modern days. The ancient Greeks and Romans believed inspiration to be a form of "divine madness". Heracles killed his own wife and children in a fit of madness, and was killed by poison mistaken by his lover as love potion. Lucretius was in elite company here.
As for his atheistic worldview, it seems unfair to presume automatically that people with an opposite world view would stoop to ad hominem tactics. I'm not familiar with St. Jerome, but it seems unlikely that a historian and theologian of his intellect and stature would do such a thing --if nothing else, against Lucretius, he didn't need to.
I first read Lucretius years ago, and there are two things I remember the most: one is how much I enjoyed it, and the other is how much the last books are inferior to first in terms of clarity of logic and thought -- it is almost as if two different people wrote it.
Lucretius was very ambitious in the scope of his book, but ultimately he wasn't able to accomplish what he had purposed. It was still a wonderful work, but it could have been much more.
Rex wrote in response to Kenneth: " if God is indeed the primary cause (to use your term) of the whole causal system, we arrive at his existence through the sort of "vertical" philosophical logic that need take no particular phenomenon in evidence, as if he existed as a cause within the system, but rather considers the system as a whole and its contingency on a transcendent absolute.."Just out of curiosity and for the sake of clarity, how is the transcendent absolute different from the blind watchmaker?
If God is the cause of the whole system, doesn't it necessarily make Him the cause of every part of the system as well?
Borum wrote: "You know, it's odd, because I too, at first thought he was a complete materialist and atheist like Dawkins, but on second reading, I'm getting the impression that he didn't use the references to gods or Venus or Jove as just simple poetic metaphors. It seemed that he didn't completely exclude the possibility of Gods, as he didn't exclude any various theories on the celestial bodies that we cannot perceive fully as they are too far from our reach. I think that just as he thought that the soul does exist, but in a different form (that is, material and mortal), Epicurus and Lucretius never denied or refuted the very 'existence' of Gods."That's a very useful post. Drawing from it, it would seem then that his position might be that there are gods, but that they didn't create the earth or man, and they don't cause natural phenomena, like earthquakes and floods. Exactly what their role would be, if I'm right so far, isn't clear to me, but is there anything in the work which absolutely denies the existence of any gods period?
According to my research, the Epicureans believed:1. The gods exist.
2. The gods were not supernatural or divine
3. The gods were materially made of very fine atoms that were continuously refreshed/replaced and were thus immortal.
4. The gods are made of atoms too fine for our senses to detect, except by the mind in visions and dreams, which is proof they exist.
5. The homes of the gods were located in the spaces between the worlds (Greek: metakosmia, Latin: intermundia,
6. The gods neither created or govern the world and punish or reward people for their actions nor possess the ability, power, desire, motive, or need to. They do not need the hassle. If they had created the world, it would be a much better place than it is.
7. The gods are not influenced by prayer, sacrifice, or other rites. However, the gods should be worshipped because they were perfect and we benefit by showing deference to them, as role models perhaps, as long as we do not fall for any of the fearful misconceptions of them.
Unless you expel such notions from your mind and put far from you all thoughts unworthy of the gods and incompatible with their peace, their [6.70] sacred persons, thus disparaged by you, will often do you harm. I do not mean that the supreme might of the gods can be offended and angrily seek to exact cruel vengeance; rather I mean this: you will fancy that those calm beings blessed with placid peace set in commotion mighty waves of wrath; you will be unable to approach their shrines with an untroubled breast; and you will be impotent to receive in peace and tranquillity the images that emanate from their sacred bodies and enter human minds with news of divine beauty. So you can see what kind of a life must result from such misconceptions.
Lucretius; Ferguson Smith, Martin (2001-03-01). On the Nature of Things (Kindle Locations 4697-4702). Hackett Publishing. Kindle Edition.
My research agrees with David's. Again, I think it's important to remember that the starting-point is the Epicurean good life. "Interventionist" gods who are vengeful and demanding disturb peace of mind and prevent the good life. But moral exemplar gods actually support it.---
Nemo wrote: "Just out of curiosity and for the sake of clarity, how is the transcendent absolute different from the blind watchmaker?"
The Paley watchmaker thesis ("blind" is a Dawkins critique) posits a very different relationship between creator and cosmos than classical theism. In the former, the world exists as a mechanical whole whose laws are designed and imposed externally by a being called God. This world could in theory continue as a self-regulating system of cause and effect even in the absence of its creator; this is why the early modern reconceptualization of the universe as self-contained mechanism first made possible deistic thought. In other words, Being 1 (God) acts on (produces) Being 2 (cosmos). God is simply the chronologically first cause. It leaves no necessary metaphysical connection between God and cosmos and offers a univocal understanding of causation. The watchmaker thesis also implies a demiurgic anthropomorphic God better described by theistic personalism than classical theism. Such a God is attested to largely by apparent design features in creation and (if applicable) evidence from historical intervention.
But the traditional arguments of classical theism do not arrive at such a God. The God of, say, Aquinas is not a cosmic architect who fashions some external artifact but is the ground of being, being itself, or above being (each term has its own descriptive advantages and disadvantages). Here there is a different formula: that which is the simple act of existence grants being to the cosmos and continually directs its ends. Here, God is the immanent source of the causal system, without which nothing could at any moment exist, without which no cause could ever produce an effect. The existence of such a God cannot be demonstrated, at least not definitively, by particular design features or events within the system; such evidence might only indicate the whim of a superpowered alien intelligence, a mere actor within the causal system. Rather, God's existence is demonstrated through the logical contingency of the cosmos on an absolute source.
This is a dreadfully brief summary, and every variation of classical theism (pagan, Abrahamic, Hindu, etc.) would have a great deal more to say, but the point is that the logical space God occupies is discoverable by reason but not transparent to science. Science in principle cannot rise above the system of nature to its source.
One final point: the Abrahamic religions insist that God does "intervene" (though this may be a misleading term) in his creation. But there seem to me solid reasons why science could not verify such interventions. For instance, a miracle is unrepeatable and thus dependent on testimony, which science cannot adjudicate. If a purported miracle repeats itself mechanically, or even if it leaves clear empirical traces, there would be no compelling logical reason for us to assume (within a scientific framework) that there is no natural explanation, even if we have not yet discovered what this explanation is. In short, even if we conclude there is a very high probability that a given miracle occurred, it would remain outside the realm within which science is capable of rendering a verdict.
Thanks for the summary, Rex. I'm still not quite clear on a few points.First, one can argue for the existence of the watchmaker through the logical contingency of the watch on an absolute cause. I don't see how that is different from the theist argument for the "absolute source".
Second, you wrote that, in classical theism, "God is the immanent source of the causal system", but it is also "a transcendent absolute". Is it transcendent or immanent?
the logical space God occupies is discoverable by reason but not transparent to science. Science in principle cannot rise above the system of nature to its source.
There are logic and reason in science too. If God is discoverable by reason, why not by science? I don't know how it can be done in practice, but I'm not convinced that it is impossible in principle.
I would agree that science cannot verify miracles in the sense of proving supernatural agency, because anything that occurs in nature is "natural", and necessarily has a natural "explanation", regardless whether the miracle is repeatable or not. OTOH, everything done by the agency of man has a natural explanation as well, yet that doesn't prevent us from discovering the human agent behind it. For example, in forensics, the poison that killed a man can be traced to the murderer. So it seems to me possible that, science, with the aid of logic and reason, can rise above the system of nature to its source.
These sorts of conversations can extend indefinitely, and I hope we're not getting too dreadfully off topic....Regarding your first point, I think we still end up with a dissonance between the two theo-logics of "watchmaker God" and classical theism.
When classical theists in the Western tradition talk about contingency, they mean it in a much deeper sense than Intelligent Design theorists. There is certainly a kind of contingency in the analogy of the watch; the form of the watch depends on the genius and creative activity of the watchmaker. But the watch is still a functionally complete and self-regulating object, and the watchmaker's contribution was original design and assembly. When the watchmaker goes for lunch or glances away, the watch will keep on ticking. Yet classical theistic proofs assert that the cosmos is no watch operating with mechanical independence, but inherently metaphysically dependent at all times on its creator. If God "glanced away" for a moment from creation, the cause-effect chain would instantly unravel and everything would cease to exist. This is because God is (to invoke other analogies) its ground, the inexhaustible fountain from which being springs, the sun that continuously illuminates existence.
To take issue with the watchmaker God is not simply obsessing over a metaphor, I think. The Aristotelian understanding of contingency is being which could in principle not exist, which contains no metaphysical reason for its own existence and thus requires a cause. Contingent being thus implies necessary being, i.e., that which cannot not exist, which does contain metaphysical reason for its own existence.
One could use these philosophical arguments to argue for a God who is also a watchmaker. But it does not necessarily follow. Ancient Platonists, for instance, distinguished between the demiurgic designer and the philosophical absolute. And many religions posit a similar distinction between the primordial absolute and the god or gods who did the business of creation. Classical theists additionally assert that the "watchmaker" notion provides a very misleading analogy for the actual constitution of the act of creation.
Conversely, there are those who will make use of probabilistic arguments from science to argue for the existence of a creator in the traditional theistic sense. I don't think there's anything inherently wrong with that. But there are several risks to this approach. (1) We verge toward a God-of-the-gaps construction in which we are simply using God to explain things we don't understand. A principled physicalist will not feel under any logical compulsion to capitulate to this line of reasoning. (2) These arguments do not necessarily point to an entity that occupies identical logical space with the God of the philosophers. There is nothing in the arguments themselves that requires us to look for an absolute reality instead of another being in the order of beings. And if God is this being in the order of beings, we are left with a metaphysically incomplete picture of reality that forces us to posit an absolute above God.
Nemo wrote: "Second, you wrote that, in classical theism, "God is the immanent source of the causal system", but it is also "a transcendent absolute". Is it transcendent or immanent?"
Both at once, emphatically. Transcendence does not mean physical separation any more than immanence means identity. We are speaking of two ontologically distinct levels of reality, and applying spatial metaphors to the metaphysics of immanence/transcendence can be misleading. The relationship of creator and cosmos is more analogous to thinker and thought than artisan and artifact. Are you your thoughts? No, your reality utterly transcends them. But your thoughts do not exist apart from you; you are, to repurpose a phrase from St Augustine, "closer to them than they are to themselves." The analogy isn't exact, because many theisms attribute some kind of freedom to creation, but it gets you closer.
So where does all this leave us in regard to the original question, whether God is available to scientific inquiry? I suppose it'd be best to briefly break down what that could mean.
(1) God is materially available. But God is spirit, so it is not possible to demonstrate his existence like one demonstrates the existence of a particle. Science cannot touch him directly.
(2) God leaves "fingerprints" in nature. This seems to be closer to what you mean. But if God is nature's transcendent source, continually generating it, then the notion that he can leave "fingerprints" is problematic. Does a musician leave evidence of himself in his song? Yes, in the sense that the existence of the song logically presupposes a musician. But it strikes me as incoherent to point to a particular note or passage and say, "There! Proof that someone is playing this." Again, working in analogies here....
See, if the classical theistic understanding of God is correct, then the creator-creature duality is not a sharp division between Being A and Being B, and we can find traces of A in B. Rather, B is the "trace," whose existence is intimately tied to unconditioned Reality. So the level on which we must approach God is more "meta" than science allows, because the scientific method (we are dealing with a method here, after all) consciously restricts itself to the physical interactions of beings for, among others, reasons I have already delineated. Science could, I gladly concede, be a jumping-off point to contemplation of God. It has been for many people, including many of the great scientists of our time. But I do not see how science as a method could ever make the necessary leap given its intrinsic commitment to pursuing causes in the natural order of causes.
I apologize for the lengthy treatise your points and questions prompted, but these are matters in which some precision of language is called for.
If you want to pursue these questions further, they are discussed recurrently and in detail on Ed Feser's blog ( http://edwardfeser.blogspot.com/ ). Be warned that he is a somewhat irascible Thomist, and that understandably turns some people off, but the guys who frequent his comboxes (largely but not exclusively theists) are for the most part quite gracious toward people who ask questions or challenge thoughtfully. David Bentley Hart's excellent book The Experience of God would give you a more unified and "ecumenical" treatment of classical theism that contains some passing (but not completely unsympathetic) criticism of the Intelligent Design movement.
Nemo wrote: "Just out of curiosity and for the sake of clarity, how is the transcendent absolute different from the blind watchmaker?."The former is presumed to be conscious and purposeful, the later is an analogous model that is neither conscious nor purposeful by definition.
Rex wrote: "Regarding your first point, I think we still end up with a dissonance between the two theo-logics of "watchmaker God" and classical theism.."Rex, thanks again for explaining the classical theist notion of God. You've persuaded me to read Aquinas' Summa Theologica. :) I don't see a logical connection between his notion of God (as you explained it) and Aristotle's Unmoved Mover, and now I'm curious how he incorporated Aristotle into his theology.
Both at once, emphatically. Transcendence does not mean physical separation any more than immanence means identity
I tend to think transcendence and immanence are contraries. Granted, the relationship between god and cosmos is difficult to conceive, let alone define, but there is a distinction between transcendence and immanence. Part of my question is trying to get some degree of clarity on what that is.
To use your analogy, thoughts, which originate from a thinker, can exist apart from the thinker. First, they can be materialized in the same way an artisan create an artifact, which started as a thought in his mind; Second, thoughts can also be communicated to others, and thereby exist independently of the original thinker.
Just to be clear, I'm not at all leaning toward Intelligent Design or "God of the gaps", in the sense of arguing for a supernatural agency by asserting the improbability of a natural agency. As I said wrt miracles, everything that happens in nature necessarily has a natural "explanation", or description to be precise, regardless whether the origin is supernatural. The ID approach is incoherent in that regard and ultimately futile.
However, I think the artist analogy is meaningful in the sense that one can trace a work of art to the artist by recognizing the characteristics of the artwork as a whole. This is done in the art world when connoisseurs try to determine whether an anonymous work was created by an old master, or made by a performing monkey.
David wrote: "According to my research, the Epicureans believed:1. The gods exist.
2. The gods were not supernatural or divine
3. The gods were materially made of very fine atoms that were continuously refreshe..."
Very useful. Thanks!
David wrote: "The former is presumed to be conscious and purposeful, the later is an analogous model that is neither conscious nor purposeful by definition. "Returning to Lucretius's argument against the purpose of nature.
Lucretius believes that human activities are purposeful whereas nature is not. If I understand him correctly, here is the reason: Whenever a man creates something, he already has some purpose in mind before he makes the thing; in nature, OTOH, a thing exists for no pre-determined purpose but only adapts to whatever environment it finds itself in.
Note the change of perspective in the argument: when Lucretius speaks of human activity, his focus is on mind, not matter, but when he speaks of nature, his focus is on matter, not mind.
Obviously, purpose can only be found where there is mind. If you preclude mind behind nature in your premise, the conclusion that nature is purposeless is already built in. Conversely, to be logically consistent, if one accepts the purposefulness of human artifacts, he must also accept the possibility of purpose of things in nature and nature as a whole.
Nemo wrote: "when Lucretius speaks of human activity, his focus is on mind, not matter, but when he speaks of nature, his focus is on matter, not mind."For Lucretius there is only matter and void so whether he is speaks of human activity or nature he is focusing exclusively on matter. Remember, he expressly argues that mind is matter.
Only matter and void, no room for mathematics. Is it any wonder that other philosophers didn't take him seriously? But I digress...For Lucretius, mind is made of special matter and capable of generating "offspring" after its own kind. It is not "matter" as is commonly understood. Either way, my point stands.
Everyman wrote: "Borum wrote: "You know, it's odd, because I too, at first thought he was a complete materialist and atheist like Dawkins, but on second reading, I'm getting the impression that he didn't use the re..."I don't think so.(and thanks, David for the summary!)
Another thing that reminded me of Carl Sagan:
Aliens are probably so remote that we can hardly dream of even getting in indirect contact with them, and probably we would destroy our own civilization before the aliens (if they had any idea we exist and decided to ever attack us) would reach our distant planet. I think the aliens are sort of like the Epicurean Gods, they're too far away to have any interest or the slightest influence in our lives, but it doesn't mean that we can completely refute their existence.
It seems to me there are two things that are most human: the desire for freedom and the desire for justice.Lucretius' materialism denies both. To the suffering innocent, it says, "Your suffering has nothing to do with the gods, it is all the atoms' doing". Hardly a liberating thought; To the guilty, it says, "Rest assured, you won't be punished by the gods." But will their conscience let them rest?
Nemo wrote: "Only matter and void, no room for mathematics. Is it any wonder that other philosophers didn't take him seriously? But I digress...For Lucretius, mind is made of special matter and capable of gen..."
First, I would agree that "some" philosophers may not have taken Lucretius seriously, but that would be a grievous mistake on their part. Many took Lucretius so seriously that they tried to suppress him. His contribution to and influence on the great conversation for many people of all disciplines, including philosophy and mathematics is undeniable. Your own posts here belie any assertion that you yourself do not take him seriously.
Second, while he does not address mathematics, I offer this note from my edition on language as analogous to mathematics:
The point is that neither the gods nor the inventors of language can have had a conception of what they wanted to create, if nature had not already created a world or language that they could use as a model.Also, as far as mathematics is concerned, not all philosophers will disagree. While a Platonist will tell you numbers are real (material) objects the Logicists probably come the closest to Lucretius by conceiving mathematics as a sort of "grammar". Also there is a Feynman quote about mathematics being the language of nature. The point here is that like language, Lucretius would not consider mathematics supernatural, so it would be wrong to dismiss him because of math.
Lucretius; Ferguson Smith, Martin (2001-03-01). On the Nature of Things (Kindle Locations 4452-4455). Hackett Publishing. Kindle Edition.
As for your other point, that it is somehow logically consistent to conclude the possibility a mind that conceived of nature with a purpose because humans create objects with a purpose. It does not stand. We might find some wiggle room for agreement, with some existential caveats, if what you meant to say was humans and their minds are part of nature in a Sagan-esque, "we are the way the cosmos knows itself" sort of way. But I do not think that is what you meant. What I think you meant was this:
When we conceive God as the Creator, He is generally thought of as a superior sort of artisan. . .and that when God creates He knows exactly what he is creating. Thus, the concept of man in the mind of God is comparable to the concept of a paper-cutter in the mind of the manufacturer, and, following certain techniques and a conception, God produces man, just as the artisan, following a definition and a technique, makes a paper-cutter. Thus, the individual man is the realization of a certain concept in the divine intelligence.If this is indeed what you meant it fails because, one, it does not follow and two, it is an analogy but it would be a false analogy fallacy to believe it to be true. It may be an interesting hypothesis for asking more questions but it also fails as a belief because it is so far outside the practical uniformity of nature that we are (or should be) morally prevented from inferring anything from it. To do so produces the very harm through misunderstandings that Lucretius argues against.
Sartre, Jean Paul, Existentialism and Human Emotions, Philosophical Library, 1957, pp. 9-16.
Patrice wrote: "Im not sure I understand how the gods are not divine."I think of it this way. Divinity requires the supernatural. Lucretius' gods are material and not supernatural, therefore they are not divine.
Patrice wrote: "I like what he says about innocent suffering and guilty going free. Too often people blame the victim, saying thAT God must be punishing him for misdeeds. I can see how he is setting people free."That appears to be Lucretius's argument in a nutshell: superstition causes harm to innocent people who believe they are guilty simply because they suffer. Remove the superstition, and its consequent suffering goes away. This does not serve as a palliative for suffering in general, but at least it eliminates the suffering caused by religion... unless that religion is institutionalized in the state, in which case the power of religion holds sway over all citizens regardless of personal belief. I read somewhere that Thomas Jefferson was fond of Lucretius. Easy to see why.
David wrote: "Your own posts here belie any assertion that you yourself do not take him seriously.."Who made that assertion? Certainly not I. :) I enjoyed Lucretius immensely, but then, I'm not a philosopher by training.
Mathematics is not material, it is abstract. It is nether matter nor void, and doesn't fit in Lucretius universe. By analogy, language is not material either. It is possible that language is abstracted from nature, conversely, it is also possible that nature is modelled on an abstract language. But the point is that matter and void are not all there is.
Could you clarify why my second point about the purpose in nature "does not stand"? Neither the Sagan nor the Sartre quote says anything about purpose, though interesting in themselves, they are quite beside the point.
Patrice wrote: "Genni wrote: "Patrice wrote: "."I once asked him about something in the universe, I forget what, his take on it was that God doesn't want us to find out. "I find this response a little strange an..."
I see. I guess I was taking it too literally. :-)
Nemo's post at #27 had me wondering exactly WHAT the reaction was to Lucretius. Was there a serious, severe reaction to him from Christian circles? Granted, I have not searched extensively, but I have not found any kind of extreme reaction?? I am also curious:there have been several people who have said throughout that Lucretius is "modern". I am curious exactly what you have in mind when you use the term. I mean, are you guys all using the term in the same way, to mean the same thing?
Nemo wrote: "It seems to me there are two things that are most human: the desire for freedom and the desire for justice.Lucretius' materialism denies both. To the suffering innocent, it says, "Your suffering has nothing to do with the gods, it is all the atoms' doing". Hardly a liberating thought; To the guilty, it says, "Rest assured, you won't be punished by the gods." But will their conscience let them rest? .."
I think you take too narrow a view of materialism. (You also seem to reject Aristotle, who contended that eudaimonia was the most important value for all humans. But I digress.)
After all, as an Epicurian, Lucretius clearly believed in happiness, and presumably also in love. If those values can be consistent with his view of materialism, so I would think could the desires for freedom and justice.
Genni wrote: I am also curious:there have been several people who have said throughout that Lucretius is "modern". I am curious exactly what you have in mind when you use the term. I mean, are you guys all using the term in the same way, to mean the same thing? ."Probably not! For me, what is modern about him is two basic things. One, his commitment to a pretty good approximation of the scientific method, not to the hypothesis/experiment/verification aspect so much, but to the concept of arguing from observation toward general principles of the way the world works. Two, because although he got many of the details wrong (at least based on our current understanding; our understanding today may seem just as far off to thinkers in 4000 AD as Lucretius seems off to us), he got a lot of things very close to right.
Nemo wrote: ". . .the Sartre quote says anything about purpose"It has everything to do with purpose, or more broadly essence. The analogy is that man creates a paper cutter for the purpose of cutting paper as God creates man for the purpose of X? It assumes man/creation is created for a purpose because man creates things for a purpose. If that is not your point then I will have to ask you to clarify your point because clearly I do not understand it.
Patrice wrote: "Genni wrote: "Patrice wrote: "."I once asked him about something in the universe, I forget what, his take on it was that God doesn't want us to find out. "I find this response a little strange an..."
I understand that. When I come to a limitation, I leave it for another day saying, maybe it's not for me to know...yet. ;-)
Nemo wrote: "It is possible that language is abstracted from nature, conversely, it is also possible that nature is modelled on an abstract language."That is very nicely put. I always wondered about that possiblity when I was learning biology.
Genni wrote: "Nemo's post at #27 had me wondering exactly WHAT the reaction was to Lucretius. Was there a serious, severe reaction to him from Christian circles? Granted, I have not searched extensively, but I h..."There isn't much to go on. From his contemporaries there are a couple of lines of praise for his poetry (Cicero in a letter to his brother and Virgil in the Georgics, though both were critical of Epicureanism) and then about four centuries later there's Jerome's dismissal of him as insane. (Jerome also says that Cicero edited Lucretius, which seems seems as unlikely as Lucretius going insane from a love potion.)
And then he disappears until the 15th century. The reaction of the renaissance church was similar to that of Cicero and Virgil, though church scholars who were aware of Lucretius took pains to keep quiet about it. They were appreciative of the work as poetry, but dismissive of its philosophy, and wary of its frank treatment of sexuality. It was never placed on the Index of Prohibited Books, which is somewhat surprising.
By "modern" I think of works from the Enlightenment forward, though I'm not sure if that is the generally accepted meaning. Montaigne was a huge fan of Lucretius.
More info about the re-emergence of L. in the Italian Renaissance here, if you want to go digging:
Cambridge Companion to Lucretius. Gillespie, Stuart and Hardie, Philip (eds.) [Cambridge; New York] , p.214-226.
Are there any explanations which you find particularly compelling, or particularly questionable?
Some commentators, including I understand some of his contemporaries, argued that he was gradually going mad during the writing of Book 6 especially, and that this shows in the Latin. I don't read Latin, so can't speak to that, and I wonder how much this is reflected or not reflected in the various translations. The book does seem to come to an abrupt end, suggesting that he died without being able to finish it as he had intended. But up to that point, the writing in my translation at least seems as straightforward and solid as ever. Do other readers find Lucretius trailing off?
The other question for our consideration is the overall scope and importance of the book. Does it deserve the accolades it has received over the centuries? Is it a work that continues to have a valuable place in the history of Western thought? What are your overall thoughts about the work?