Classics and the Western Canon discussion
Lucretius, De rerum natura
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Lucretius, Book 2
Patrice wrote: "And he's very flexible. Yes we must observe, but then, when we can't, we canjust figure it out in our heads:Line 715
We can not observe all things with our eyes, yet you may be sure that they ne..."
In regards to could we use this to argue for ghosts I do not believe that to be the case. He conjectures about things that he cannot see based upon what he can. He deduces the existence of atoms which are "devoid ... of some or even all perceptible sensible qualities" using his senses.
Nothing observable exists that renders us capable of deducing such things as ghosts, or Russell's teapot.
Everyman wrote: "Patrice wrote: "This blows me away..Objects fall at an equal speed although they are of an unequal weight through an un resisting void.
How did he know this?"
That also struck me when I read it..."
I agree. I always thought it was Galileo who originated this but the idea obviously existed much earlier. He also wrote Newton's First Law of motion 1800 years before Newton. Astounding.
On the swerve, we're talked about it in terms of free will, but as I read him, its more important aspect is that it allows for the creation of material. All the atoms are, for him, falling down at a constant rate (as Patrice says, how on earth did he know this?), so unless they swerve, no atom can ever touch another atom, and so they cannot join make objects. It's only because they swerve from time to time that they can hit and join up with other atoms to create matter. Sort of like a big bang in reverse -- in the big bang, atoms fly apart. The swerve brings atoms together. (Okay, that's not scientifically very precise, but it's a big picture thing!)
Everyman wrote: "Nemo wrote: "One more note on movement....for movement to exist, there must be rest. "Why?"
Why did you omit the middle part where I gave the explanation?
Patrice wrote: "By this rule wouldn't ghosts be real?."I interpret Lucretius' principle stating only matter and void exist as ruling out the existence of ghosts.
Patrice wrote: "By this rule wouldn't ghosts be real? ."In the next chapter L. talks about the particles that compose the mind and soul and what happens to them when a person dies. The image of mind and soul particles streaming from a body makes me think of a ghost. Why not? As long as there is some natural principle that keeps the soul particles organized outside the body (this is the rub, I think) we could call that a ghost.
Additionally, I have it on good authority (TV) that ghosts are made of particles that can be detected with special ghost-hunting equipment. So Lucretius is vindicated once again!
The idea of "other worlds", anthropic principle and fine-tuning reminded me of NASA's Voyager Program and the search for extraterrestrial intelligence. If ETs exist, why haven't they contacted us in an intelligible manner?
Well, if the beauty and intelligibility of the universe cannot persuade earthlings of the existence of a creator, it is highly unlikely that any displays or messages from ETs will persuade us of their existence.
David wrote: "Did the beginning of the Book II remind anyone of Theoreau's Walden?And so we see that the nature of the body is such that it needs few things, namely those that banish pain and, in so doing, succe..."Yes, I had also been thinking about Thoreau. In fact, even in reading in my edition's intro that reviewed some of the Epicurean philosophy, I felt that it matched up in many ways with Transcendentalism.
Thomas wrote: Additionally, I have it on good authority (TV) that ghosts are made of particles that can be detected with special ghost-hunting equipment. So Lucretius is vindicated once again! LOL!!
Patrice wrote: "I came upon something interesting while reading The Rise of Rome by Everitt.The Romans were deeply religious, but their religion, much influenced by the Etruscans, was little more than a complex ..."
How does Everitt define superstition? The catholic church before the reformation had some complicated ideas about how to get saved with the purchase of indulgences. Observers usually focus on the power and corruption of the institution of the church in this regard, but behind it were beliefs (or superstitions if you prefer).
Nemo wrote: "Everyman wrote: "Nemo wrote: "One more note on movement....for movement to exist, there must be rest. "Why?"
Why did you omit the middle part where I gave the explanation?
Well, you said "movement can only be known or observed from a reference point that doesn't move.," but that's not an explanation, just an assumption. If I'm in an airplane going East and look out the window at your airplane going West, there's no non-moving reference point (I can't see the sun, which might, even though it's not, seem to be a non-moving reference point), but I certainly see you as being in motion.
Fair enough. The non-moving reference in your case would be the airplane you're in. You can argue that the plane itself is also moving, but you can't observe its movement when you're moving along with it. You only know it is going East by using another non-moving reference point. To rephrase my original statement: for relative motion to exist, there must be relative rest; absolute motion, absolute rest
Is that better?
Patrice wrote: "Yes, that's a good question as I'm sure to the Romans they weren't superstitions. The Etruscans were experts at augury, foretelling the future by studying the flight patterns of birds."When I think about it, the Romans are no more "superstitious" than moderns. If the forces that direct the patterns in the human brain are the same natural (or supernatural) forces that direct the flight patterns of birds, we have about an equal chance of getting anything useful out of them.
Nemo wrote: "Fair enough. The non-moving reference in your case would be the airplane you're in. You can argue that the plane itself is also moving, but you can't observe its movement when you're moving along..."
That's better, except that I question whether in the actual world (as opposed to theoretical analysis) there exists such a thing as absolute rest. Lucretius would say there isn't, wouldn't he? What would modern physics and mechanics say?
I'm not asserting absolute rest, but that, if Lucretius posits absolute or relative motion, then there must be the corresponding rest. Motion by definition is a change from one position to another, which implies that positions themselves don't change. In classical physics, the positions can be represented by two data points in a three-dimensional Cartesian coordinate system; in modern physics, the two points represent events in a four-dimensional spacetime coordinate system. Here again, one cannot describe motion without reference to the coordinate system.
Nemo wrote: "Here again, one cannot describe motion without reference to the coordinate system. "But what if the coordinate system itself is moving? We can, for example, describe earth's motion with respect to the sun, but the sun itself is moving. We can describe our location on earth in terms of latitude and longitude, but those too are moving relative to the sun.
I get your point that motion humans viewing motion generally (always?) have to relate it to something that we perceive as being motionless at the time of the observation (even if is itself in motion, as in the airplane), but that's quite a different thing from your original assertion in post 35 that "If everything are in perpetual motion, then there is no motion, because movement can only be known or observed from a reference point that doesn't move."
I think the distinction is useful, because Lucretius, as I read him, doesn't believe in absolute rest, but believes that everything is always in motion.
Everyman wrote: "I think the distinction is useful, because Lucretius, as I read him, doesn't believe in absolute rest, but believes that everything is always in motion. "It's not clear to me what you think the distinction is.
Lucretius believes in motion because he observes the Brownian motion of the dust in the sunbeams. He is using a non-moving reference for his observation. That's quite different from absolute motion.
If you're thinking of absolute and abstract motion apart from human observations, then we can approach the idea from definition. Motion is a change from one position to another, which implies that the positions themselves must be at rest. Otherwise, the definition is invalid --including in itself the thing being defined.
Nemo wrote: "Motion is a change from one position to another, which implies that the positions themselves must be at rest."I think you're in danger of getting into Zeno's paradox here.
Although I do see an issue here -- absolute rest with respect to what?
Everyman wrote: "Nemo wrote: "Motion is a change from one position to another, which implies that the positions themselves must be at rest."I think you're in danger of getting into Zeno's paradox here."
Let me be clearer about this. If you say that before it can move every object must first be at rest, then before it can move from point A to point B it must be at rest at point A. And once it gets to point B, before it can move to point C it must be at rest at point B. So keep diminishing the distance between point A and B and C to zero, a body must be perpetually both at rest and moving.
Is there anything in the universe that is not moving?
Everyman wrote: "Everyman wrote: "Nemo wrote: "Motion is a change from one position to another, which implies that the positions themselves must be at rest."I think you're in danger of getting into Zeno's paradox..."
Zeno's fascinating paradoxes are based on the idea that space is infinitely divisible. If the space between two neighbouring points is infinitely divisible, it is impossible for an object to cross that infinitesimal and yet infinite space. Therefore, motion is impossible.
I would say that motion is possible, if we assume that time is also infinitely divisible. The time it takes to cover the space between two neighbouring points is also infinitesimal and yet infinite. The two infinities of time and space match each other to make motion possible.
David wrote: "Is there anything in the universe that is not moving?"For one thing, the laws that government its movement.
A more relevant question: Is there anything in the world that doesn't change with time and space?
I think we all believe to some extent that there are such things. After all, isn't that why we're here studying classics written 2000 years ago?
Nemo wrote: "For one thing, the laws that government its movement.."Let me rephrase: Does there exist a physical object that is not in motion? I cannot think of one.
David wrote: "Nemo wrote: "For one thing, the laws that government its movement.."Let me rephrase: Does there exist a physical object that is not in motion? I cannot think of one."
Again, do you know every object in the universe?
If you ever meet a non-moving object, how do you, a moving object, know the other is not moving?
Nemo wrote: "Again, do you know every object in the universe?If you ever meet a non-moving object, how do you, a moving object, know the other is not moving? ."
It is true that the best we can do here is discuss relative motion. I did not mean to imply that because I personally could not think of any object that was not moving that there were none. However, there seems a strong case that everything in the universe is indeed moving. (see below)
Nemo wrote: "A more relevant question: Is there anything in the world that doesn't change with time and space?"
If by world you mean earth, probably not. It has been calculated that the entire milky way galaxy, with respect to the Cosmic Microwave Background is moving at 550 km/s or 1.2 million mph.
If by world you mean universe, the answer again must be probably not. Hubble's law demonstrates an the universe is expanding. Furthermore, the universe does not appear to have a center that could be stationary.
I agree time is a required component of motion, but I don't understand the assertion that "positions" must be at rest per your definition of motion. Did you mean to say positions are at a fixed distance apart (relative to each other)?
My dad used to joke with me and say he had to drive stakes to see if I was moving. After some back and forth someone eventually had to admit that it was all relative. Maybe we could just agree to that and the Lucretius continues his trend of being right for not quite the right reasons?
Nemo wrote: "I would say that motion is possible, if we assume that time is also infinitely divisible. The time it takes to cover the space between two neighbouring points is also infinitesimal and yet infinite. The two infinities of time and space match each other to make motion possible.."
My head hurts.
:)
Nemo wrote: "A more relevant question: Is there anything in the world that doesn't change with time and space?I think we all believe to some extent that there are such things. After all, isn't that why we're here studying classics written 2000 years ago? ."
Oh, goodness, but those works have changed very much over the past 2000 years even as they've remained unchanged.
Amen, Everyman! Thus the moniker of being a Classic. Although these ancient writers might not have had the technological savvy of 21st century "Enlightened" thinkers, their mental faculties, awareness and acuity were still top notch. Genius is still genius - despite not having a smart phone. Lucretius' logic and the foundation upon which he builds his world view is sound. He must be forgiven for not having the benefit of the electron microscope and other tools.
David@94,The movements of the objects in the universe as derived from CMB and Hubb's Law are all relative. They demonstrate again the necessity of a frame of reference in observing motion, and in no way prove "everything" is in motion. When Lucretius claims the latter, he unwittingly adopts a static frame of reference already.
Many physical constants of the universe, such as Planck constant, the speed of light in vacuum, don't change. These constants define the physical properties of the universe, which also don't change.
I don't understand the assertion that "positions" must be at rest per your definition of motion.
I borrowed the idea from Aristotle, viz, what constitutes a correct definition, arguing from the epistemological perspective rather than the physical. You're welcome to come up with your own definition. :)
Oh the swerve, Bertram Russell in "The History of Western Philosophy, pg. 264," footnotes this comment about it: "An analogous view is urged in our day by Eddington, in his interpretation of the principle of indeterminacy."
Einstein famously said that God doesn't play dice. As I understand it, uncertainty principle is throwing a dice and not knowing which number between 1 and 6 will turn up each time, whereas the swerve is throwing the dice and getting the number 7. IOW, the swerve is not indeterminacy, it is a miracle.
@Everyman99: I second Everyman's great idea of reading Russell's review of Epicurus and Lucretius in "The History of Western Philosphy".@Nemo100: If the swerve is a miracle, it was not meant to be a divine one. Remember there is an agenda here:
Epicurus has no interest in science on its own account; he values it solely as providing naturalistic explanations of phenomena which superstition attributes to the agency of the gods. When there are several possible naturalistic explanations, he holds that there is no point in trying to decide between them.
Russell, Bertrand (2004-02-24). History of Western Philosophy (Routledge Classics) (p. 236). Taylor and Francis. Kindle Edition.
The swerve is not a naturalistic explanation, for it is not derived from the laws of nature. It is an artificial explanation, a "god from the machine" to help Lucretius escape from his logical quandaries.It is unfortunate for Epicurus and Lucretius that Aristotle anticipated their argument against the gods from natural cause with his definition of the Four Causes.
Nemo wrote: "The swerve is not a naturalistic explanation, for it is not derived from the laws of nature. It is an artificial explanation, a "god from the machine" to help Lucretius escape from his logical quan..."I think Lucretius would say it a "naturalistic" explanation insofar as he understands nature, which for him is composed of particles and void and nothing else. This seems to be the only law he has to work with, which is why some of his explanations seem rather impoverished, but he doesn't fare too badly given the narrow parameters of a purely materialistic theory. He has to explain free will somehow, and he has to explain it like he explains everything else, in terms of particles. It doesn't work very well, but does neuroscience offer any better explanation?
Lucretius introduced the swerve to reconcile his idea that objects fall at an equal speed through void and the existence of complex structures. But if objects swerve on their own, they cannot fall at equal speed in the first place, there goes the laws of nature;; if the swerve is so small that it cannot be observed, then neither is "free will" observable, there goes free will.
Nemo wrote: "But if objects swerve on their own, they cannot fall at equal speed in the first place"I don't know why not. Why can't they keep falling down at the same rate while moving sideways? Their total combined speed might be more, but Lucretius never says otherwise, does he? He talks about falling speed, and that could be unchanged.
Nemo wrote: "Lucretius introduced the swerve to reconcile his idea that objects fall at an equal speed through void and the existence of complex structures. But if objects swerve on their own, they cannot fall ..."Are you trying to judge Lucretius as a physicist? He never pretended to be that, did he? He's explaining why we don't need the gods; isn't that what he says his goal is? If so, shouldn't you be challenging him on the basis that what he says doesn't eliminate the need for gods rather than on whether his physics matches up with modern physics?
Although as has been noted, he gets an awful lot right considering the constraints he was working under.
Everyman wrote: "Are you trying to judge Lucretius as a physicist? "Not at all, I'm judging his arguments as an educated and rational being, much as his contemporaries might have done. I only made comments about modern physics when others brought it up. Although I disagree with his stated goal, I enjoyed his treatise immensely, here is my review to prove it.:)
In getting to the swerve he describes a principle of inertia that sounds a lot like Descartes' laws of motion, but he lacks a principle of attraction like gravity or magnetism or nuclear forces to explain why particles "swerve." So he says they swerve on their own. What happens if instead of a "swerve" we read the result of "fundamental forces"? He also says that the first particles move on their own, another enigmatic comment, but what else can he say? He could say a god moved them, but that would be just as mysterious and unknowable as the swerve.
Everyman wrote: "Nemo wrote: "But if objects swerve on their own, they cannot fall at equal speed in the first place"I don't know why not. Why can't they keep falling down at the same rate while moving sideways? ..."
Lucretius says that they move sideways on their own, if that is the case, there is nothing to keep them from moving upward on their own, and thereby decrease, if not reverse, their downward motion.
shouldn't you be challenging him on the basis that what he says doesn't eliminate the need for gods
Aristotle anticipated Lucretius argument, and Plato before Aristotle. This may be one of the main reasons why his theories were not well received. Do you really think I should rehash their arguments here? :)
Today’s spooky science is often called 'counter-intuitive', but should it not be 'counter-rational'? After all, our intuition has a long enough track record of inventing weird stories. It’s our rationality that has problems handling this kind of information (for instance), so that - after checking the publication date isn’t April 1 - most of us can only store it somewhere 'for later consideration'. But if some scientist could demonstrate and make us understand that the swerve theory is 'correct' after all (in so far as things can be correct for the wrong reasons), would that change our evaluation of the Epicureans? Not a bit. In a way all these specific theories are (for us) mainly a distraction: what is important here is not this or that theory, but the Epicureans' radical materialism. And maybe the ethics based on it.
I see parallels between the acceptance of the atomic theory of the Epicureans then and today's string theory as science.From Jerry Coyne's website, Why Evolution is True
Is falsifiability essential to science?
That, more or less, is the current position of string theory and multiverse theory in physics. They are elegant, can explain some phenomena . . .but neither can yet be tested.
Does this mean we can call the atomic theory presented in De Rerum Natura science then or now because we have since falsified or corrected many of the details?
I remember watching a documentary a while back that had interviews with several prominent theoretical physicists. It was pointed out that many of them had spent the last twenty or thirty years of their lives (or more) honing some theory. Currently there are a number of complicated "everything" theories being put forward with no way to decide between them. At some point, our experimental equipment will develop to the point of being able to test at least some of these theories, and then quite a few physicists' life work will get tossed out the window.The situation isn't exactly the same with ancient philosophers and didactic poets. There would have been no reason for them to believe that someday we would develop equipment for hard-testing theories, whereas today we are so confident in our growing technological reach, we assume any idea that logically can be tested will be tested. The pre-Christian West didn't see history in the framework of an arrow of progress.
David wrote:"Is falsifiability essential to science?"Falsifiability is ultimately based on the law of non-contradiction. To put it simply, a thing is proven false if it condradicts what is known to be true. It must assume something as true in the first place, like an axiom in mathematics, which is not falsifiable.
Wendel wrote: "what is important here is not this or that theory, but the Epicureans' radical materialism. And maybe the ethics based on it.."Well, if the Epicureans have an agenda, we cannot argue against it, for they are free to act as they please, but, if they assert that it is important for all of us, that is something arguable, that's where logic and reason come into play.
You are not suggesting that we accept radical materialism unconditionally, are you? :)
Nemo wrote: "Wendel wrote: "what is important here.." Well, if the Epicureans have an agenda, we cannot arg..."That post was not about my way of saving the world, but what is in my opinion the essence of Lucretius' work.
Not atomism or evolution, but radical materialism. I'm not sure we should call it an 'agenda' - Lucretius could not be much clearer about his aims than he is.
I also think that this radical materialism was the reason the Epicureans were so hated and slandered. And that it must have been their most important contribution to our culture - for good or for worse, that is another debate.
Thomas wrote: "He also says that the first particles move on their own, another enigmatic comment, but what else can he say? He could say a god moved them, but that would be just as mysterious and unknowable as the swerve."Yes, I was very surprised by this: "Atoms first / Move of themselves . . ." (Melville, 133).
He also admits that the swerve is meant as an explanation of free will: "If atoms never swerve and make beginning / Of motions that can break the bonds of fate, / And foil the infinite chain of cause and effect, / What is the origin of this free will / Possessed by living creatures throughout the earth?" (Melville, 253-7).
This is why Bertrand Russell says in his section on Epicurus in History of Western Philosophy that "Epicurus was a materialist, but not a determinist," which I think distinguishes him and Lucretius from other materialists (I'm thinking of Spinoza here).
Wendel wrote: "I also think that this radical materialism was the reason the Epicureans were so hated and slandered."I'm not sure that they were "hated and slandered" for their materialism. They were one of many schools of thoughts in ancient Greece and Rome, and the debates between the different schools were done in a mostly civic and rational manner, as far as I can gather from reading materials written in that period. If anything, it is their unabashed praise of pleasure that is repellent to many people, including the levelheaded Cicero and Plutarch.
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Objects fall at an equal speed although they are of an unequal weight through an un resisting void.
How did he know this?"
That also struck me when I read it. He had no way of testing anything in a vacuum, but he says it not as a question or theory but as reality. Which, as we now know, it is.
I continue to be amazed at how much he got right. Not everything, and not all the details, but it's pretty astonishing.