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2015 - December - Theme Read - The Ardennes Offensive 1944
From Peter Caddick-Adams'
Snow and Steel: The Battle of the Bulge, 1944-45The innocent civilians of Belgium paid a heavy price during the Ardennes offensive. According to Caddick-Adams, after the German soldiers moved through, next came Gestapo detachments. In Bourcy, they beat to death one resident in his cellar, executed the family that ran the village bar, then moved to nearby Norville where they shot eight men including the schoolmaster and the village priest.
Bastogne, with a population swollen by refugees, suffered 127 civilians killed and wounded. Forty died later from unexploded ordnance. Of the town's 1,250 homes, 700 were destroyed or rendered uninhabitable. Within a six mile radius of Bastogne, 350 civilians died, 3,556 homes, stables and stone barns were gutted and 1,300 seriously damaged.
A passage from the book I am reading now. Do you think General Manteuffel had the best German staff on the Western front?“The battle plans and tactics of the Fifth Panzer Army, more than those of any other German army that took part in the Ardennes counteroffensive, bore the very strong personal imprint of its commander, General Manteuffel. As a junior officer in the prewar panzer troops, Manteuffel had made a mark as an armored specialist. His record in North Africa and Russia, where he achieved a reputation for energetic leadership and personal bravery, brought him to Hitler's attention and promotion directly from a division to an army command. Despite the failure of his Fifth Panzer Army in the Lorraine campaign against Patton's Third Army, Manteuffel was listed by Hitler for command in the Ardennes. His staff, carefully selected and personally devoted to the little general, was probably the best German staff on the Western Front.”
― Hugh M. Cole, The Ardennes - Battle of the Bulge
Hasso von Manteuffel was also one of only 27 recipients of the Diamonds to the Knight's Cross, and was my great grandmother's 3rd cousin on my mother's side.
Pretty amazing relative Colin!
From Peter Caddick-Adams' Snow and Steel: The Battle of the Bulge, 1944-45 --After the war, U.S. Army historian, Major Ken Hechler, interviewed SS Obersturmbannführer Joachim Peiper about his failure to take Stavelot on 17 Dec. '44. Caddick-Adams wrote:
It is an instructive lesson in the use of source documents -- for here, Peiper demonstrably lied to Major Hechler. There was no SS assault on Stavelot that evening (despite Peiper's tale to the contrary), nor were there any recorded American counter-attacks...Peiper invented a dramatic evening attack on Stavelot to conceal the fact that he was asleep...In short, Peiper was devious and manipulative, if on occasion charming.
Just finished the intelligence chapters in Snow and Steel. Nobody tells it better, including Beevor & MacDonald! In sum, the G-2's from VIII corps up to SHAEF weren't blind, 6th Panzerarmee was in the spotlight, but interpreted the German build-up as either part of the Westwall defense in anticipation of planned US attacks on the Ruhr & Saar area, or as a rational 'small solution" under the auspices of Rundstedt to eliminate salients as the line stood in december '44. Either way, the Ardennes were the zone under the least threat and reinforcing it would've sapped the American offensive strength.
By this time, they should've known that Hitler and rational military logic rarely went together. Wolves in the misty woods are unpredictable, especially when they need to reassert their dominance over the pack.
...don't be surprised if that tableau shows up in my review.
Detailed observations:
- the veteran 2nd ID being mistaken for the green 99th is the only example of German intelligence faillure so far, even tough it is generally stated that intelligence officers or reconnaissance patrols weren't allowed to explore the ground once posted in an assembly area. This forced ignorance will no doubt rear its head with disastrous results during the battle, but does anyone know of any other examples prior to hostilities ?
- Shooting up battle-fatigued soldiers of the Hürtgen with sodium amytal to make them sleep for 3 days, excluding meals & toilet trips. Was this an established practice? The guys Patton slapped seemed clean.
Dimitri wrote: "Just finished the intelligence chapters in Snow and Steel. Nobody tells it better, including Beevor & MacDonald! In sum, the G-2's from VIII corps up to SHAEF weren't blind, 6th Panzerarmee was i..."
Excellent comments, Dimitri. Later in the book you'll come across more intelligence failures of the Germans. Two which jumped out at me were: Joachim Peiper's failure to know the U.S. Army had three million gallons of gasoline in depot one mile north of Stavelot. He came within a few hundred yards of stumbling upon it. Secondly, the Germans were heavily dependent on captured American maps. The German maps were Michelin-produced 1:200,000 scale. The American were 1:25,000 and 1:50,000.
I was surprised about the gasoline issue too when I read the Macdonald book. So near and yet so far. Wonder what Peiper thought when he finally heard about it?
Honestly, even if Peiper had captured that fuel stock, would it have made any real difference? Maybe the Germans could have pushed a little further west and crossed the Meuse. But what then? The whole basis of the offensive was flawed. The British-American alliance was not going to fray, and capturing Antwerp would have not been decisive enough to tip the strategic balance in the west. At best, they would have bough the Reich a few extra weeks in the spring--and the Russians a little more time to advance westward.My 2 cents. :)
John Bruning
Betsy wrote: "I was surprised about the gasoline issue too when I read the Macdonald book. So near and yet so far. Wonder what Peiper thought when he finally heard about it?"Betsy: According to Caddick-Adams when Army historian Major Ken Hechler informed Peiper he had come within "300 yards of a three-million gallon gasoline dump..." Peiper replied "I am sorry." He had no idea the dump was there.
John wrote: "Honestly, even if Peiper had captured that fuel stock, would it have made any real difference? Maybe the Germans could have pushed a little further west and crossed the Meuse. But what then? The wh..."John: You may be correct. Caddick-Adams makes a strong case the entire operational concept was fatally flawed from the start. Hitler drove it and he was delusional.
Probably wouldn't have made a major difference to the final outcome, but how much more damage, death and destruction could it had led to I wonder?
Manray9 wrote: "Betsy wrote: "I was surprised about the gasoline issue too when I read the Macdonald book. So near and yet so far. Wonder what Peiper thought when he finally heard about it?"Betsy: According to C..."
Thanks for that info. I wonder just how much of three million gallons they could have carried way, used, etc. or would they have had to destroy much of it since it wasn't exactly your friendly, neighborhood petrol station.
'Aussie Rick' wrote: "Well I've started my book for this theme; Ardennes 1944 by Antony Beevor. So far it has been quite good with the first few chapters building up towards December 1944.[bookcover:Ardennes 1944: Hit..."
Mrs Happy brought this home for me from the library today. it will probably be the first read of the new year.
I hope it's a good book to start the new year Happy :)
Into Snow & Steel up to the SHAEF Conference. - His myth-busting is well-argued. For example, the author meeting Hans Hennecke in the '80s, whom privately had no confidence in the outcome of Herfstnebel. It is understandable (serving in Russia, an astute commander could read the tea leaves) yet surprising (given SS fanaticism).The throwaway sentence "this meant a thin line of nervous GI's freezing in half-dug foxholes staring through the trees at hordes of indistinct figures rushing towards them", while correspondent with the bottom-level experiences of youngsters like Vincent Speranza who emptied a clip at 5 figures or a .30 into three tangled waves of German uniforms when not dodging rounds while relieving himself, is something straight out of the "many histories of the Ardennes campaign have alleged the Germans were better-equipped and trained than the opposing U.S. troops. Here is evidence that suggests a different overall trend". The inadequate amount of infantry training for the combed-out Luftwaffe & Kriegsmarine personnel, the so-called hero-snatching for the Volksgrenadier units count as much. Not enough men had made it out of Falaise alive to inject everyone with much-needed know-how about US infantry tactics and the impact of air suppremacy.
(this is where we all picture George C. Scott under the table...)
This I could phantom: fancy nomenclature often hid inherent weaknesses in Nazi military units. More surprising was the 1: 40 ratio of horses versus vehicles. This is something fairly well-established when demolishing the old-fashioned "mailed fist" view on the 1940 campaign, but in the Ardennes I expect everyone to have wheels. Once established, this ratio was (together with bad roads, traffic congestion and depots situated too far to the rear of the assembly areas and too close to the Rhine) a root cause of the logistic shambles and fuel shortage that drained the German spearheads of their attack strength; this was plain visible even for American POW's being escorted to the rear.
I want to credit Caddick-Adams on the peer reviews. Not only does he dimolish the myth of German qualitative superiority, he slashes through to the 1st SS Panzer Division, which the Official History by Hugh Cole claimed had no dilution by untrained replacements (p.252) . As invaluable as the older historians are, with their wealth of interviews and not seldom personal service in WWII, we'll be uncovering new truths about this war for another generation at least. I cherish my copy of Cross Channel Attack for its fabulous fold-out maps and OOB's, but the secrecy around ULTRA prohibits it from being the Gospel, just like any writer who relied too much on the memoirs of the Allied High Command. Reading Ike, Monty and Bradley is best done after an innoculation with The Battle for the Rhine: The Battle of the Bulge and the Ardennes Campaign, 1944 for example.
There are a few dense but highly interesting pages devoted to the maluse of the Luftwaffe, with Hitler literally having the air force resources pooled "without telling them WHY" ; the Luftwaffe commanders drew their own conclusions based on their usual job description, i.e. interfering with the bombing raids of the Mighty Eight and the nightly millenials of the RAF. They expected large-scale air-to-air combat. In reality, what was expected of them was a throwback to 1940, assisting the panzer spearheads with tactical air-to-ground support. Few of the avaliable pilots had relevant experience. What experience there was left, was squandered on New Year's Day in straffing raids on Allied airfields with easily replaced planes instead of less easily replaced human pilots being the main target.
Even knowing the clue to the story, this calls for a reading of To Win The Winter Sky: The Air War Over The Ardennes, 1944 1945
as reviewed: http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/ai...
The Great War raises its head numerous times. Not only did the German army get something right by training its footsoldiers in forest fighting when time allowed based on their previous operations in the area in 1914, Eisenhower drew on (theoretical) knowledge of the Kaiserschlacht to correctly identify (with the help of Bedell-Smith and his two British counterparts) the goal of the attack east of Bastogne as a splitting action, to be countered by holding the flanks.
Allan W. Jones, commanding the 106th division, is similarly pardoned for placing the unfortunate 14th Cavalry Group in the Losheim gap, the traditional invasion route. Even the German fortress engineers had given up trying to erect a mutually supportive defence line in this area, but there were enough roads for a nimble patrol to keep an eye out & race to the rear to raise the alert if needed. ( He is still not forgiven for not withdrawing his other units, tough; John Toland had it right the first time)
Personally, I also spy on page 269-270 echoes of the all-American preference for the attack as shown at Belleau Wood a in the "cursory defence" set up by the units of the 1st & 3rd armies stationed in the Ardennes under the command of agressive generals. I certainly don't agree with an order of Bradley dating back to september having a reinforcing effect.
To keep the reading experience fun, Adams can be Beevoresque at times. Just watch out whenever Hemmingway appears. More heartfelt vignettes about drafted Alsacians, army rations and tank-flattened GI corpses also interweave. Grand don Charles MacDonald is present with engaging passages from Trumpets and the 18 men of the I&R Platoon of the 394th get a hagiography that would make Alex Kershaw proud. The common memory of The Cold is brought to life by looking at the deficiency of U.S. Army clothing.
This theme is reprised in the context of Skorenzy's activities, with an uncomfortable hig number of friendly casualties due to the subsequent spy paranoia. Wearing a pair of winter-proof German boots was the perfect way to push the mistrust of a checkpoint beyond the limit.Caddick-Adams suggests four figures, counting Belgian civilans, and omits any tongue-in-cheek in listing a series of tell-tale incidents.
I want to make special mention of p. 367: many books on the Bulge state the execution by trail of a few captured Greifcommandos, but not often in this much detail. Combine this alinea with the unrivaled sèries of photos in Battle of the Bulge: Then and Now for the full story brought to life.
Manray9 wrote: "Betsy: According to Caddick-Adams when Army historian Major Ken Hechler informed Peiper he had come within "300 yards of a three-million gallon gasoline dump..." Peiper replied "I am sorry." He had no idea the dump was there. .."I wouldn't necessarily believe Peiper didn't know the dump was there. Admitting foreknowledge would have made him appear an even bigger failure.
It sounds like you are enjoying the book Dimitri :)Thank you for taking the time to post such a detailed comment on the book, its bound to interest quite a few group members and sure to promote some comments.
I think Peter Caddick-Adams has produced the best single volume account on the Battle of the Bulge to date. I found it easy to read, full of interesting information and well researched.
Manray9 wrote: "Excellent comments, Dimitri. Later in the book you'll come across more intelligence failures of the Germans.... Joachim Peiper's failure to know the U.S. Army had three million gallons of gasoline in depot one mile north of Stavelot. He came within a few hundred yards of stumbling upon it....."I mention this depot in passing as part of Appendix B of my novel. I had no idea the Germans got that close. My source said, "within a few miles," a far cry from "a few hundred yards" or "300 yards," as Betsy says. I'll tweak that paragraph of the appendix and maybe add an entry to my bibliography. [Yes, I've put appendices and a bibilography in a novel. It's an alternate history thing.]
Dimitri wrote: "Into Snow & Steel up to the SHAEF Conference. - His myth-busting is well-argued. For example, the author meeting Hans Hennecke in the '80s, whom privately had no confidence in the outcome of Herfst..."Dimitri: Great comment!
Dimitri wrote: "Into Snow & Steel up to the SHAEF Conference. - His myth-busting is well-argued. For example, the author meeting Hans Hennecke in the '80s, whom privately had no confidence in the outcome of Herfst..."I was also quite surprised with the information in regards to the level of forced enrolment of Luftwaffe and Kreigsmarine personal into the combat forces assigned to this offensive. Also the details of the level of mechanisation of the forces was very interesting. You always get the impression that the German forces were made up of King Tigers and half tracks motoring through the Ardennes when in fact they were still dragging their artillery pieces with horses. Overall a very good account and a well written history. I think you will find the book gets better the further you get into it. I will look forward to your final thoughts on the book.
Manray9 wrote: "John wrote: "Honestly, even if Peiper had captured that fuel stock, would it have made any real difference...?" John: You may be correct. Caddick-Adams makes a strong case the entire operational concept was fatally flawed from the start. Hitler drove it and he was delusional.
You're both probably correct. Still, taking away several million gallons of gasoline from the Allies would have been a tremendous morale booster for Germany, especially given their own gas shortage. I suspect you've underestimated the potential effect somewhat.
On the other hand, taking the depot wouldn't have come easy and the Allies might have just bombed the hell out of it, limiting the net gain by German forces, at an equal cost to their own. If I understand rightly, that was then the biggest depot in Europe.
And, on the other, other hand, according to Rochus Misch, Germany expected their atomic bomb would be ready before the US version. They also allegedly shipped a quantity of uranium to Japan in 1945, indicating that fissionables were not the gating item. Prolonging the war by weeks probably wouldn't have mattered much. But a few months may have been all that was needed for Germany to force a nuclear stalemate in the West, at a minimum. All very unlikely, though, as you say.
Dimitri wrote: "...I'm a 100 pages in . . . luckily he doesn't linger too long in the period August to October '44. ..."Any mention of the fact that the OSS was ordered to shut down their intelligence gathering system about three weeks prior to start of the Battle of the Bulge?
J. wrote: "Dimitri wrote: "...I'm a 100 pages in . . . luckily he doesn't linger too long in the period August to October '44. ..."Any mention of the fact that the OSS was ordered to shut down their intelli..."
Yes, thanks for reminding me: p. 147-149. Hodges of First Army harboured a traditionalist dislike for the unconventional OSS and ended the cooperation. I think that is what you refer to. Patton had a more favourable opinion (of all people!) Either way, deep penetration of enemy lines by OSS German speaking agents 'slowed down to a trickle' after october because they relied on Maquis & Belgian resistance networks for their infiltration, which were absent inside Germany. Even if a single cell unearthed the secrets of impending Herstnebel on time, "the brass" wouldn't have believed it without cross-reference proof. It is not mentioned if OSS found out anything.
Dimitri wrote: "Hodges of First Army harboured a traditionalist dislike for the unconventional OSS and ended the cooperation...."I got the impression from my ex-OSS radio man that Hodges and others didn't like the broad spectrum of politics that characterized the OSS brass. Donovan welcomed just about anybody who could be useful to them. I'll ask my friend what he recalls, if anything, about traffic just prior to shutdown.
Dimitri wrote: "Into Snow & Steel up to the SHAEF Conference. - His myth-busting is well-argued. For example, the author meeting Hans Hennecke in the '80s, whom privately had no confidence in the outcome of Herfst..."Be kind to Cole, he was writing right after the war and there were still a lot of things that were unknown. After all the Germans themselves tried to play up the SS on a number of counts and titles still held a mystique.
Many people, even now, don't want to hear about things like horse drawn artillery in the mighty German Army or that they barely had anyone that could drive.
They would rather hear of the might that is the German Army on the Blitzkrieg. The German Army 1933-1945
This is a good book to read to get a more balanced view of the German Army through out the war. Interesting break down on the tanks used. The thing that reading books like Snow and Steel and The German Army show is it wasn't the equipment that made the German Army different it was the Operational Awareness.
Very valid points Dj and an excellent book you referred to, one of my favourites from the 1980's!
FYI, my on-line commentary re Beevor's "Ardennes 1944":Robert Hays It is nothing short of stunning to see anyone "surprised" by the revelation that the leadership of Eisenhower and, especially, Bradley, was sorely imperfect relative to the Bulge. This has been well documented. My friend, Gen. Oscar Koch, Patton's G-2, provided detailed evidence of the Germans' preparations for an offensive but this went unheeded at higher headquarters. Koch himself, with whom I collaborated on a book, "G-2: Intelligence for Patton," published in 1971 and still in print, blamed Ike's and Bradley's intelligence staffs for leading their respective commanders to believe that the Germans were no longer capable of serious resistance. I made an effort to give due credit to Koch for his pre-Bulge intelligence performance--still seen as a model of combat intelligence efficiency--in my book on him, "Patton's Oracle," published in 2013. I recommend it not because it is my book, but because Oscar Koch is one of the most important and least recognized heroes of World War II and especially the Bulge.
Robert wrote: "FYI, my on-line commentary re Beevor's "Ardennes 1944":Robert Hays It is nothing short of stunning to see anyone "surprised" by the revelation that the leadership of Eisenhower and, especially, B..."
then may we please have the link for it here on GR ?
Dimitri wrote: "Robert wrote: "FYI, my on-line commentary re Beevor's "Ardennes 1944":Robert Hays It is nothing short of stunning to see anyone "surprised" by the revelation that the leadership of Eisenhower and..."
Of course:
http://goo.gl/KE4L8c
Really enjoying the discussion. Starting to waver in terms of whether to read Beevor or Caddick-Adams.The failure to anticipate the attack is fascinating.
Bevan wrote: "Really enjoying the discussion. Starting to waver in terms of whether to read Beevor or Caddick-Adams.The failure to anticipate the attack is fascinating."
Bevan - I recently finished Snow and Steel: The Battle of the Bulge, 1944-45 . It earned a strong Four Stars from me. According to Caddick-Adams, there wasn't a failure to anticipate the attack. There was a failure to appreciate varied sources of intelligence of the impending attack, coupled with an over-reliance on SIGINT, and a touch of willful blindness. People often see and hear just what they want to see and hear. Too many at SHAEF considered the war all but over.
Bevan wrote: "Really enjoying the discussion. Starting to waver in terms of whether to read Beevor or Caddick-Adams.The failure to anticipate the attack is fascinating."
I'm a great fan of Antony Beevor but in this case I think Caddick-Adams trumps him with his book on the Ardennes Offensive. If you were going to read just one book on this battle I would recommend Snow and Steel.
Manray9 wrote: "Bevan wrote: "Really enjoying the discussion. Starting to waver in terms of whether to read Beevor or Caddick-Adams.The failure to anticipate the attack is fascinating."
Bevan - I recently finish..."
Oscar Koch was acutely aware of the Germans' radio silence and accurately interpreted what it meant. Although he was masterful in his use of SIGNIT, he used it more to supplement traditional sources of intelligence and relied heavily on POW interrogation and, weather permitting, aerial photography. He not only knew of the German buildup in the Ardennes but actually had identified many if not most of the units massed there. Some time after the war, Bradley wrote that Koch had made a strong case "but I didn't see it."
Caddick-Adams told me in an e-mail that he used "Patton's Oracle" as a source, and it's clear that he did. A factor often overlooked is that, unlike the Brits, American SOP was for the intelligence staff to present the commander its view of enemy CAPABILITIES, not intent. Both Strong and Sibert, respective intelligence chiefs for Ike and Bradley, believed that the German forces were spent and not a threat to launch a serious offensive. And that was that.
One more brief but interesting note is that when Beetle Smith, Ike's chief of staff, became CIA director after the war, he called on Koch to help him. I believe this is a clear acknowledgment of his appreciation--after the fact--of Koch's success in the gathering and interpretation of all-source intelligence.
Robert Hays
Robert wrote: "Manray9 wrote: "Bevan wrote: "Really enjoying the discussion. Starting to waver in terms of whether to read Beevor or Caddick-Adams.The failure to anticipate the attack is fascinating."
Bevan - I..."
Having spent an entire career in naval intelligence, I may vouch for the fact that "intent" is the golden calf. Operational leaders always want "intent," while intel gathering sources and methods are geared toward capabilities and dispositions. Many times an admiral, strike commander, or squadron commodore has said to me: Why can you tell me all about ships, aircraft, subs, missiles, guns, industrial facilities, ports, op areas and so on and so on, but you can't tell me what's just over the horizon and what they're about to do? My response: That's the difference between intelligence and reconnaissance.
Manray9 wrote: "Robert wrote: "Manray9 wrote: "Bevan wrote: "Really enjoying the discussion. Starting to waver in terms of whether to read Beevor or Caddick-Adams.The failure to anticipate the attack is fascinati..."
Or, you might have said, "Hey, that's your job. I've done mine!" Or maybe not.
Robert wrote: "Manray9 wrote: "Robert wrote: "Manray9 wrote: "Bevan wrote: "Really enjoying the discussion. Starting to waver in terms of whether to read Beevor or Caddick-Adams.The failure to anticipate the att..."
Probably not. I might have said it -- once.
Getting a late start with this one:
To Win The Winter Sky: The Air War Over The Ardennes, 1944 1945. I blame Dimitri in post #117, he provided a link to a review which got me interested.
'Aussie Rick' wrote: "Bevan wrote: "Really enjoying the discussion. Starting to waver in terms of whether to read Beevor or Caddick-Adams.The failure to anticipate the attack is fascinating."
I'm a great fan of Antony..."
I haven't read Beevor's book yet (it on the bookshelf), but Caddick-Adams' book is the best I've read.
Mike wrote: "Getting a late start with this one: To Win The Winter Sky: The Air War Over The Ardennes, 1944 1945. ..."One I've got to read as well Mike, let me know your thoughts.
I had lunch with my ex-OSS radioman friend today. He said words to the effect that the biggest detriment to their spies' effectiveness was Patton, who moved so fast, he left most of them in the rear, obsolete. Station Victor was shut down in January of '45, and much of the staff was moved to China, instead of France, as originally planned.
'Aussie Rick' wrote: "Mike wrote: "Getting a late start with this one: [book:To Win The Winter Sky: The Air War Over The Ardennes, 1944 1..."I have this one as well. Have had it for a few years now because I have this rare disease. I have to buy interesting books even though my TBR stack is years long. Perhaps this one would be good for a group read.
I think most of here have that disease - maybe it isn't so rare :)
I have that disease as well, geez it's catching!
Based on the excellent information here, I looked up Peiper in Wankerpedia* for my book, in order to ascertain his exact rank [Colonel] during the Ardennes Offensive. He barely avoided being hung as a war criminal. Released in 1956, he was assassinated in 1976 at his home in France, very likely by communists, after several death threats. I must say he was a brave man.According to the article, "Peiper's unit had only a quarter of the fuel that it needed. The plan counted on the capture of Allied fuel depots and keeping to an ambitious timetable..." I'm even more skeptical re Peiper's implication that he didn't know how close he came to the depot at Stavelot.
* far from the best source of information, definitely best taken cum sacco salis.
To Win The Winter Sky: The Air War Over The Ardennes, 1944 1945 is pretty decent reading so far. Parker takes you through the air war up to the Ardennes offensive in good but not overwhelming detail. Good recounting of the problems facing both sides and the opposing leadership decisions. If you like AOB (air order of battle) and maps of airfield and target locations--which I do--you will be pleased. Plenty of great photos too! Here is an excerpt with Speer talking about the impact of the Oil Campaign--one of the allies' concentrated air campaigns:With the oil refineries under a withering assault, the free fall continued. Only 35,000 tons dribbled out in July and barely 16,000 in August. Speer gave Hitler an honest appraisal:
“The enemy has struck us at one of our weakest points. If they persist at it this time, we will soon no longer have any fuel production worth mentioning. Our hope is that the other side has an air force general staff as scatter-brained as ours!”
Sounds good so far Mike, I might have to consider it for one of this years theme reads. Keep us posted.
Here's an item of info upon which I stumbled today. Recently I finished Peter Caddick-Adams' --
Snow and Steel: The Battle of the Bulge, 1944-45Several times in the book, the war correspondent and photographer Lee Miller makes appearances. What I learned today was Lee Miller had been a renowned fashion model who went to Paris in 1929 as model and protégé of Man Ray. Miller appeared in a number of Man Ray's most well-known surrealist photos. Here are links to some examples:
http://blogs-images.forbes.com/jonath...
https://a.1stdibscdn.com/archivesE/up...
http://modearte.com/wp-content/upload...
Miller appeared in Jean Cocteau's movie The Blood of the Poet.
message 150:
by
Geevee, Assisting Moderator British & Commonwealth Forces
(new)
Here's a good article on Lee Miller from the Daily Telegraph (London): http://www.telegraph.co.uk/culture/ph...
THE WORLD WAR TWO GROUP
Books mentioned in this topic
To Win The Winter Sky: The Air War Over The Ardennes 1944-45 (other topics)Patton: Ordeal and Triumph (other topics)
To Win The Winter Sky: The Air War Over The Ardennes 1944-45 (other topics)
To Win The Winter Sky: The Air War Over The Ardennes 1944-45 (other topics)
The Wages of Destruction: The Making and Breaking of the Nazi Economy (other topics)
More...
Authors mentioned in this topic
Robert Hays (other topics)Antony Beevor (other topics)
William Cavanagh (other topics)
Gottlob Herbert Bidermann (other topics)
Robert F. Phillips (other topics)
More...
search for "operation last stand" on Facebook, all the professional photographers are posting their galleries & video links in the Belgian press are also shared. Naturally, Helen Patton was handing out posters & Vince Speranza being interviewed.
We overheard one funny remark of his : "charging the Germans head-on like that & going to ground that slow, if we'd done that, we'd all been dead in 5 seconds !"
Anyway...postponing the peer pressure to read Snow and Steel: The Battle of the Bulge, 1944-45 paid off, since the fair at the Barracks yielded a pristine HC copy.
I'm a 100 pages in. No reference to Von Rundstedt being a boozer, that's Beevor info only, but Caddick-Adams attributes an awful lot to Hitler's mental state & Westwall fixation in the genesis of the Herbstnebel plan. Like Beevor, he doesn't spare Montgomery and luckily he doesn't linger too long in the period August to October '44.