Classics and the Western Canon discussion
Divine Comedy, Dante
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Paradiso 5: Vows/Approaching Mercury
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I liked the analogy of the fish."As in the clear, still water of a pond the fish are lured toward something fallen in, as if they knew it was their food..."
I can visualize that.
I can visualize that.
I wonder if even in Dante's time fish were a symbol for Christians.
Yes! Is nice.
http://www.christianitytoday.com/ch/a...
Yes! Is nice.
http://www.christianitytoday.com/ch/a...
Adelle wrote: "I wonder if even in Dante's time fish were a symbol for Christians.""According to tradition, ancient Christians, during their persecution by the Roman Empire in the first few centuries after Christ, used the fish symbol to mark meeting places and tombs, or to distinguish friends from foes...."
For more, including a neat picture of a 3rd century funerary stele:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ichthys
There do seem to be a lot of food metaphors in Paradise. Hunger for knowledge is a major theme, and Dante is not on a diet.
Thomas wrote: "There do seem to be a lot of food metaphors in Paradise. Hunger for knowledge is a major theme, and Dante is not on a diet."
But I like, too,the thought that the spirits in the fish analogy aren't gathering there for food or knowledge---'though Dante uses that image ... needing an image that we can understand ... like in the last canto as Beatrice explained that "the hand of God," etc... are only images given to us to aid our human understanding.
I like that the spirits AREN'T gathering for foor or knowledge...but to embrace the addition of new love they believe is entering their sphere.
If I read Canto 5 rightly.
Dante certainly seems to be there for knowledge.
LOL, as you note, Dante is not on a diet!
But I like, too,the thought that the spirits in the fish analogy aren't gathering there for food or knowledge---'though Dante uses that image ... needing an image that we can understand ... like in the last canto as Beatrice explained that "the hand of God," etc... are only images given to us to aid our human understanding.
I like that the spirits AREN'T gathering for foor or knowledge...but to embrace the addition of new love they believe is entering their sphere.
If I read Canto 5 rightly.
Dante certainly seems to be there for knowledge.
LOL, as you note, Dante is not on a diet!
http://etcweb.princeton.edu/dante/pdp...
Amos Nattini, Paradiso Canto 5. "S'io ti fiammeggio nel caldo d'amore. 1923.
"If in the heat of love I flame on you"
(Some men here, Roger. Anyone who can translate the Italian to English for us? I'll edit this to include if anyone can help us out.) Thank you, Thomas. See @9 below.
http://www.lockportstreetgallery.com/...
Salvador Dali: Paradiso Canto 5. “In the Heaven of Mercury.”
Lily wrote: Amos Nattini, Paradiso Canto 5. "S'io ti fiammeggio nel caldo d'amore.
This is the first line of Canto 5, "If in the heat of love I flame on you" .
http://www.worldofdante.org/media/ima...
Gustave Doré: Paradiso Canto V.103. “Host of Myriad Glowing Souls.” c.1868. Engraving.
Is this any different? (I think not, unless there is something I have overlooked, but it was listed with same name, different line (100), and different jpg.) :
http://www.worldofdante.org/media/ima...
Paradiso Canto 5.100-114. (Hollander) (view spoiler)
http://www.worldofdante.org/media/ima...
Sandro Botticelli: Paradiso Canto V.1. “First Planetary Sphere (Heaven of the Moon); Beatrice Explains to Dante the Principles of Ecclesiastical Dispensation from Vows; Ascent to the Sphere of Mercury.” c.1480 - c.1495. Drawing.
http://www.worldofdante.org/media/ima...
John Flaxman: Paradiso Canto V.103. “Dante Sees the Approach of More than a Thousand Splendors.” 1793. Engraving.
I love the art for this canto. Thanks, Lily!
Laurele wrote: "I love the art for this canto. Thanks, Lily!"Both Nattini and Doré seem appropriately ethereal for Paradise, don't they? And then there are the flowing robes Botticelli gives Beatrice and even Dali's soft pastels.
Here's Yates:
(Larger image:) http://www.worldofdante.org/media/ima...
Giovanni di Paolo: Paradiso Canto 5.100. “Dante and Beatrice Ascend to the Heaven of Mercury and See a Host of Splendors.” c.1450. Manuscript illumination. Yates Thompson 36. British Library.
Unless something exciting shows up, this will conclude the images for Canto 5:For Paradiso Canto V images from the Bodleian Library 14th century manuscript try these:
http://www.bodley.ox.ac.uk/dept/scwms...
Paradiso Canto V. "Dante and Beatrice and Dante." (Slightly different than image for Canto IV. Note Dante’s calmer, folded hands.)
http://www.bodley.ox.ac.uk/dept/scwms...
Paradiso Canto V. “Beatrice, Behind Dante, Looks Back to Mercury, Who Is Seated Beside a Star and His Domiciles Gemini and Virgo.”
Just for fun: 20-21st century images of Mercury from NASA:
http://photojournal.jpl.nasa.gov/targ...
http://apod.nasa.gov/apod/ap980906.html (1974-'75)
I was interested in the theology of the vow, that when you vow you sacrifice free will that is the primary gift of God, and that as the Hebrews could substitute one sacrifice for another, you can redeem your free will by substituting something else for your vow. But I'm frankly unpersuaded by the logic. Because if you have sacrificed your free will, how can you then make the choice to desert your vow? By what force of will can you make that choice? Seems to me you need free will to make that decision, but you don't get the free will back until you have made the decision.
Everyman wrote: "I was interested in the theology of the vow, that when you vow you sacrifice free will that is the primary gift of God, and that as the Hebrews could substitute one sacrifice for another, you can r..."That didn't convince me, either, Everyman.
I don't think you can. Does Dante/Beatrice say that one can get their free will back? If so, I missed that. That, I think, is about the only thing one can't take back.
The essense of this sacrifice lies in
two necessary things: the first is what
you sacrifice, the second is the pact.
The second's never canceled if it's not fulfilled (Canto 5.43+)
And it can only be fulfilled by sacrificing what one offered OR by sacrificing something much more valuable that what was originally offered.
And Beatrice has said that God's greatest gift to man is free will.
Therefore, one can get one's free will back once one has vowed it away.
Mmm. Maybe that is why Celestine V is in Inferno. (If he is the Great Evader.) Maybe when he took vows to be the pope, he was vowing to turn his free will, his self, over to God. And then he wanted out of that vow. But that was a vow that could not be reclaimed by any greater sacrifice. So he broke a most sacred vow. So he's in Hell.
The essense of this sacrifice lies in
two necessary things: the first is what
you sacrifice, the second is the pact.
The second's never canceled if it's not fulfilled (Canto 5.43+)
And it can only be fulfilled by sacrificing what one offered OR by sacrificing something much more valuable that what was originally offered.
And Beatrice has said that God's greatest gift to man is free will.
Therefore, one can get one's free will back once one has vowed it away.
Mmm. Maybe that is why Celestine V is in Inferno. (If he is the Great Evader.) Maybe when he took vows to be the pope, he was vowing to turn his free will, his self, over to God. And then he wanted out of that vow. But that was a vow that could not be reclaimed by any greater sacrifice. So he broke a most sacred vow. So he's in Hell.
The heaven of Mercury is associated with the art of dialectics, and the problem of absolute and qualified will is a great example of this!In Canto IV Beatrice says,
"Absolute will does not consent to the wrong, but the will consents thereto in so far as it fears, by drawing back, to fall into greater trouble. Therefore, when Piccarda says this, she means it of the absolute will, and I of the other; so that we both speak truth together."
In Canto V it seems that the vow as covenant is absolute, but the matter of the vow is not. The covenant corresponds to absolute will -- it cannot be broken, and the Church cannot offer dispensation for the act of the covenant. But the matter of the vow can be modified, as long as the compensation is greater than the original matter of the vow.
Otherwise there is the problem of Jephthah. Jephthah cannot simply cancel his promise, but in fulfilling his promise he falls "into even greater trouble." This is the problem of the categorical imperative.
The terminology is confusing -- I think the "treasure" of free will is lost insofar as the vow is irrevocable. But it doesn't mean that one loses the ability to make decisions or act willfully.
Thanks, Thomas. I was glad to hear that Jephthah was wrong to sacrifice his daughter.
If Jephthah was wrong, what about Abraham?To me it seems that our free will is the one thing we can't "vow away". Neither in the literal, nor in an abstract sense.There is no way to dodge responsibility. Slavery is perverse, even if it is our own choice.
As I read it, Piccarda's problem is her meekness. Compare her case to that of Francesca, another woman forced into a marriage she didn't want.
Adelle wrote: "I don't think you can. Does Dante/Beatrice say that one can get their free will back? If so, I missed that. "That's how I read it. But if the vow is undone, fulfilled in some way, over and done with, if you don't get your free will back, what do you have then? You have neither the security of the vow nor the power and right of free will. How under those circumstances can you function as human? What are you? How can you decide what to do?
If Picarda had gone all the way in keeping her vow, she would have been willing to be slain, as we're many martyrs before her time (and today.)
Precisely, and that would have earned her a place somewhere higher up in Dante's heaven.
Everyman wrote: "I was interested in the theology of the vow, that when you vow you sacrifice free will that is the primary gift of God, and that as the Hebrews could substitute one sacrifice for another, you can redeem your free will by substituting something else for your vow.But I'm frankly unpersuaded by the logic. Because if you have sacrificed your free will, how can you then make the choice to desert your vow? By what force of will can you make that choice? Seems to me you need free will to make that decision, but you don't get the free will back until you have made the decision
You may well have a better understanding of the Canto than I. I will admit, I find it difficult to read and understand theology in verse form.
As I read it, when one makes a vow, one hasn't given up one's free will in all regards. Certainly someone who makes a vow of chastity still has free will over other choices in life.
As I read it, when one makes a vow, through free will, that person has surrendered his free will ONLY vis-a-vis whatever he vowed to sacrifice---say, only in regards to his chastity, or only in regards to his sacred promise to never swear, or whatever the promise act was.
And THAT---the particular act of sacrifice--CAN be altered...with approval of the church...IF the promised sacrifice is replaced with a sacrifice of much greater value.
But that while the item/the act/the sacrifice can in some cases be altered, the absolute fact that there IS a vow CANNOT be altered. In other words, that there MAY be a degree of free will to change the terms (the act promised), still, there is no degree of free will in play any more in regards to doing away with the fact that there WAS a vow.
In regards to Celestine, my thinking is that since his vow was (I suppose) to turn his life, his free will in it's entireity over to God....then there is nothing of greater value that he could substitute...his vow/ his promise I would view as irrevocable.
(Spelling??)
SO...on reading...MAYBE I do agree with you. Yes, it does read as though once a vow is fulfilled or "altered with the church's approval"...one's free will in regards to that act... is returned.
But for those who have vowed vows for which no greater substitution is available...never will the vower be absolved...never will the vower have free will again vis-a-vis whatever he promised.
Ha. Well, anyway... an attempt to understand Canto 5!
You may well have a better understanding of the Canto than I. I will admit, I find it difficult to read and understand theology in verse form.
As I read it, when one makes a vow, one hasn't given up one's free will in all regards. Certainly someone who makes a vow of chastity still has free will over other choices in life.
As I read it, when one makes a vow, through free will, that person has surrendered his free will ONLY vis-a-vis whatever he vowed to sacrifice---say, only in regards to his chastity, or only in regards to his sacred promise to never swear, or whatever the promise act was.
And THAT---the particular act of sacrifice--CAN be altered...with approval of the church...IF the promised sacrifice is replaced with a sacrifice of much greater value.
But that while the item/the act/the sacrifice can in some cases be altered, the absolute fact that there IS a vow CANNOT be altered. In other words, that there MAY be a degree of free will to change the terms (the act promised), still, there is no degree of free will in play any more in regards to doing away with the fact that there WAS a vow.
In regards to Celestine, my thinking is that since his vow was (I suppose) to turn his life, his free will in it's entireity over to God....then there is nothing of greater value that he could substitute...his vow/ his promise I would view as irrevocable.
(Spelling??)
SO...on reading...MAYBE I do agree with you. Yes, it does read as though once a vow is fulfilled or "altered with the church's approval"...one's free will in regards to that act... is returned.
But for those who have vowed vows for which no greater substitution is available...never will the vower be absolved...never will the vower have free will again vis-a-vis whatever he promised.
Ha. Well, anyway... an attempt to understand Canto 5!
Wendelman wrote: "If Jephthah was wrong, what about Abraham? ..."I asked that same question recently. The response I got was that the sacrifice of Isaac was a request made of God; Jephthah's vow was his own.
Now, I'm not sure that resolves everything at stake in comparing instances of child sacrifice.
Lily wrote: "Wendelman wrote: "If Jephthah was wrong, what about Abraham? ..."I asked that same question recently. The response I got was that the sacrifice of Isaac was a request made of God; Jephthah's vo..."
Yes. I think the purpose of the account of Abraham and Isaac is to show that child sacrifice, which was practiced in the lands around Abraham, is not acceptable to God.
Thanks Lily, that is indeed an important difference. It seems I missed that part of your discussions. I have to admit I find it difficult to follow Dante in these esoteric canto's. But the story of Abraham is even interesting for a poor sceptic like me.
Wendelman wrote: "...It seems I missed that part of your discussions...."That particular discussion wasn't here; I had it with another friend, that one in my f2f community.
"I have to admit I find it difficult to follow Dante in these esoteric canto's."
I quite agree -- but at moments it seems almost like time-travel into the past and how certain modes of thinking came to be, or just awareness they existed and may have impacted the world -- then it often slips away since I haven't either the interest or the background to probe deeper.
"But the story of Abraham is even interesting for a poor skeptic like me."
For me, that is a large part of the richness of a (sacred) text like the Bible -- the stories. When I think about how often across a lifetime I have heard some of them examined again and again and yet again, often with new insights for living, ofttimes in community, each time.... (And I have had significant swaths of my life w/o regular church attendance, so I'm not particularly referring to weekly listening to a sermon.)
Most recently the discussions I have listened to about Isaac have asked about what happened to him afterwards.
Adelle wrote: "As I read it, when one makes a vow, one hasn't given up one's free will in all regards. Certainly someone who makes a vow of chastity still has free will over other choices in life.As I read it, when one makes a vow, through free will, that person has surrendered his free will ONLY vis-a-vis whatever he vowed to sacrifice---say, only in regards to his chastity, or only in regards to his sacred promise to never swear, or whatever the promise act was. "
That's a distinction I hadn't picked up on. Very interesting. It makes a lot of sense.
But even then, does it change the basic point I made, that giving up the vow restores free will? When you have vowed to remain chaste, and give up the free will to choose otherwise, when you then surrender the vow, don't you than regain the free will to decide whether to be unchaste?
Everyman wrote: "But even then, does it change the basic point I made, that giving up the vow restores free will? When you have vowed to remain chaste, and give up the free will to choose otherwise, when you then surrender the vow, don't you than regain the free will to decide whether to be unchaste?
..."
Out on a limb here. Just my take.
I'm thinking that ONLY fulfilling the vow [or fulfilling the vow with a church-approved, more valuable substition of the original act/sacrifice promised][the vow is commuted] can put paid to the vow, and as a result, restore free will ... ie, one now has the free will to make yet another vow in the same category.
But, as I see it, a person can NEVER simply give up the vow. They can never legitimately renounce the vow. But...it seems to me that under some circumstances...although the individual himself cannot give up or renounce the vow---he hasn't the free will to do so...the Church can do it for him [dispensation].I would guess that if the Church gives one dispensation, that then the individual would again have free will to make decisions in the category at stake.
LOL. And then it gets complicated.
Somehow, I don't think that without commutation or dispensation a person ever gets their free will back.
Let's stick with chastity. If a person has made a vow of chastity (let's say for 1 year), and has either fulfilled the vow, or substitued something more valuable, or has obtained dispensation from the Church, then, yes, one get's free will there back.
But, if none of those conditions have been met, then the person doesn't regain free will in that category.
They may, nonetheless, be unchaste. Just as a person who marries and vows to be faithful can be unfaithful.
The vows were made with an appeal to some high ideal. When the person now engages in unchaste activities, it is not now the ideal that pulls him towards such action. The vow doesn't physcially stop the action. It makes the action immoral. To engage in such action in violation of one's oath is a sin against oneself. It tarnishes one's soul.
Mmm...well, I thought I knew where the train was going to go..thought I could find a way to put it in clear words....but it seems the fog came in and I can't find the station. Guess I'll leave it there.
..."
Out on a limb here. Just my take.
I'm thinking that ONLY fulfilling the vow [or fulfilling the vow with a church-approved, more valuable substition of the original act/sacrifice promised][the vow is commuted] can put paid to the vow, and as a result, restore free will ... ie, one now has the free will to make yet another vow in the same category.
But, as I see it, a person can NEVER simply give up the vow. They can never legitimately renounce the vow. But...it seems to me that under some circumstances...although the individual himself cannot give up or renounce the vow---he hasn't the free will to do so...the Church can do it for him [dispensation].I would guess that if the Church gives one dispensation, that then the individual would again have free will to make decisions in the category at stake.
LOL. And then it gets complicated.
Somehow, I don't think that without commutation or dispensation a person ever gets their free will back.
Let's stick with chastity. If a person has made a vow of chastity (let's say for 1 year), and has either fulfilled the vow, or substitued something more valuable, or has obtained dispensation from the Church, then, yes, one get's free will there back.
But, if none of those conditions have been met, then the person doesn't regain free will in that category.
They may, nonetheless, be unchaste. Just as a person who marries and vows to be faithful can be unfaithful.
The vows were made with an appeal to some high ideal. When the person now engages in unchaste activities, it is not now the ideal that pulls him towards such action. The vow doesn't physcially stop the action. It makes the action immoral. To engage in such action in violation of one's oath is a sin against oneself. It tarnishes one's soul.
Mmm...well, I thought I knew where the train was going to go..thought I could find a way to put it in clear words....but it seems the fog came in and I can't find the station. Guess I'll leave it there.
Adelle wrote: "Mmm...well, I thought I knew where the train was going to go..thought I could find a way to put it in clear words....but it seems the fog came in and I can't find the station.I followed you fine and thought you made a good case for your position. Maybe I'm just too ignorant to have found the fog bank you did."
Thank you, Everyman. That's nice of you to say. It's just that I had thought I was going to have a strong closer...and then couldn't, in the end, remember what it was going to be.
Sigh. I've fallen behind in the reading, too. WILL catch up.
Sigh. I've fallen behind in the reading, too. WILL catch up.
Beatrice rejoices in the progress of Dante’s mind towards the light of truth and explains that every vow consists of two conditions: (1) the thing pledged; and (2) the covenant made with God of the abdication of one’s own will. The second condition must in every case be fulfilled, but the content of the vow may, under due authority, be substituted by some other pledge, provided that the exchange involves the sacrifice of something of still greater value. In no case, therefore, can vows of self-dedication (e.g. monastic vows) be substituted by anything else. Hence it behoves men not to take vows lightly. They now ascend swift as an arrow to the second heaven, where they enter the planet Mercury. Thousands of souls, swathed in light, draw near. One offers converse and, at the urgent bidding of Beatrice, Dante puts to it questions which are answered in the next canto.
Mercury: The second planet is the place of meeting between Dante and “full many a thousand souls” whose great gifts had enabled them on earth to assume positions of leadership and responsibility. Their relatively lowly status in the hierarchy of bliss is explained (in the following canto) by the admixture of pride and delight in fame which marred their service to mankind. In the natural universe, and, thus, in the story, Mercury is so near the sun that it is seldom visible from earth. Allegorically this is seen to be appropriate to the souls who congregate in this planet, since beside the glory of God their own is invisible.