260 books
—
85 voters
Leibniz Books
Showing 1-50 of 52

by (shelved 4 times as leibniz)
avg rating 4.03 — 200 ratings — published 1704

by (shelved 4 times as leibniz)
avg rating 3.91 — 4,987 ratings — published 1716

by (shelved 2 times as leibniz)
avg rating 4.18 — 11 ratings — published 1804

by (shelved 2 times as leibniz)
avg rating 3.88 — 1,708 ratings — published 1714

by (shelved 2 times as leibniz)
avg rating 4.17 — 596 ratings — published 1988

by (shelved 2 times as leibniz)
avg rating 3.89 — 1,626 ratings — published 1686

by (shelved 2 times as leibniz)
avg rating 3.60 — 302 ratings — published 1710

by (shelved 1 time as leibniz)
avg rating 0.0 — 0 ratings — published

by (shelved 1 time as leibniz)
avg rating 3.50 — 2 ratings — published

by (shelved 1 time as leibniz)
avg rating 0.0 — 0 ratings — published

by (shelved 1 time as leibniz)
avg rating 4.50 — 2 ratings — published

by (shelved 1 time as leibniz)
avg rating 5.00 — 1 rating — published

by (shelved 1 time as leibniz)
avg rating 4.50 — 2 ratings — published

by (shelved 1 time as leibniz)
avg rating 4.00 — 1 rating — published

by (shelved 1 time as leibniz)
avg rating 0.0 — 0 ratings — published 2010

by (shelved 1 time as leibniz)
avg rating 5.00 — 1 rating — published 2012

by (shelved 1 time as leibniz)
avg rating 3.40 — 10 ratings — published 2011

by (shelved 1 time as leibniz)
avg rating 3.67 — 3 ratings — published 2011

by (shelved 1 time as leibniz)
avg rating 4.00 — 4 ratings — published 2006

by (shelved 1 time as leibniz)
avg rating 3.50 — 4 ratings — published 2010

by (shelved 1 time as leibniz)
avg rating 4.00 — 1 rating — published 1987

by (shelved 1 time as leibniz)
avg rating 4.00 — 6 ratings — published 1995

by (shelved 1 time as leibniz)
avg rating 0.0 — 0 ratings — published 1998

by (shelved 1 time as leibniz)
avg rating 2.50 — 2 ratings — published 2007

by (shelved 1 time as leibniz)
avg rating 3.44 — 9 ratings — published 1986

by (shelved 1 time as leibniz)
avg rating 3.99 — 1,090 ratings — published 2005

by (shelved 1 time as leibniz)
avg rating 3.50 — 2 ratings — published 2005

by (shelved 1 time as leibniz)
avg rating 4.50 — 4 ratings — published 1995

by (shelved 1 time as leibniz)
avg rating 3.60 — 119 ratings — published 1982

by (shelved 1 time as leibniz)
avg rating 3.73 — 256 ratings — published 1992

by (shelved 1 time as leibniz)
avg rating 3.63 — 109 ratings — published

by (shelved 1 time as leibniz)
avg rating 4.17 — 52 ratings — published 2014

by (shelved 1 time as leibniz)
avg rating 3.66 — 68 ratings — published 1902

by (shelved 1 time as leibniz)
avg rating 3.78 — 9 ratings — published

by (shelved 1 time as leibniz)
avg rating 3.62 — 173 ratings — published 2000

by (shelved 1 time as leibniz)
avg rating 4.00 — 7 ratings — published 2007

by (shelved 1 time as leibniz)
avg rating 4.30 — 300 ratings — published 1968

by (shelved 1 time as leibniz)
avg rating 3.50 — 2 ratings — published

by (shelved 1 time as leibniz)
avg rating 3.75 — 59 ratings — published 1972

by (shelved 1 time as leibniz)
avg rating 0.0 — 0 ratings — published 2011

by (shelved 1 time as leibniz)
avg rating 4.14 — 7 ratings — published 1975

by (shelved 1 time as leibniz)
avg rating 4.00 — 1 rating — published 2007

by (shelved 1 time as leibniz)
avg rating 4.20 — 549 ratings — published 1949

by (shelved 1 time as leibniz)
avg rating 3.93 — 45 ratings — published 1994

by (shelved 1 time as leibniz)
avg rating 4.09 — 11 ratings — published 1920

by (shelved 1 time as leibniz)
avg rating 3.78 — 59 ratings — published 2012

by (shelved 1 time as leibniz)
avg rating 3.59 — 439 ratings — published 2006

by (shelved 1 time as leibniz)
avg rating 3.50 — 2 ratings — published

by (shelved 1 time as leibniz)
avg rating 3.92 — 43,072 ratings — published 2003

by (shelved 1 time as leibniz)
avg rating 4.36 — 14 ratings — published 1686
“SUBSTANCE (SUBSTANTIA/SUBSTANCE). A term deriving from Aristotle to refer to the subjects of predication and the objects of scientific inquiry. It became a key term of metaphysics because substances are the fundamental entities of which the universe is constituted. In René Descartes’s philosophy, there are three distinct kinds of substance: God, matter, and minds. In the pantheistic system of Spinoza, on the other hand, there is only one substance, which he refers to as “God-or-Nature.”
Leibniz’s considered view is that there are two fundamentally different kinds of substance: God, who is a pure spirit, and created substances, all of which have bodies. All substances must, according to Leibniz, be capable of action. Only God is pure activity, that is, lacking entirely in passivity; all creatures have some activity and are in varying degrees passive. There is, for Leibniz, a hierarchy of created substances, ranging from creatures close to God, such as angels, to animals that have senses but lack reason, to even more basic corpo-real substances. Humans—capable of reason and therefore made in the image of God—are above animals but lower than angels.
A substance must, according to Leibniz, be a real unity. At one time he seems to have held the view that the unity of corporeal substances was underwritten by their substantial forms. But his later view seems to have been that every substance must be some kind of living thing, with something like perception and something like appetition. He later referred to his simple substances as monads. However, Leibniz seemed also to want to admit complex substances as more than an aggregate of simple substances. He did this by saying that, although there is nothing more to a complex substance than its constituent monads, its unity arises because one of these is the dominant monad.
Leibniz’s theory of substance is the linchpin of his metaphysics.
Each substance, according to Leibniz, is quite unique. He thought that the complete concept of each individual substance contained within itself everything that is true of it. Correspondingly, the nature or essence of each substance was such as to give rise spontaneously to all its phenomena. No substance except God can act on any other substance, nor can it be acted upon by any other substance. The appearance of interaction between substances is to be explained in terms of a preestablished harmony that God has foreordained from the beginning of time.”
― Historical Dictionary of Leibniz's Philosophy
Leibniz’s considered view is that there are two fundamentally different kinds of substance: God, who is a pure spirit, and created substances, all of which have bodies. All substances must, according to Leibniz, be capable of action. Only God is pure activity, that is, lacking entirely in passivity; all creatures have some activity and are in varying degrees passive. There is, for Leibniz, a hierarchy of created substances, ranging from creatures close to God, such as angels, to animals that have senses but lack reason, to even more basic corpo-real substances. Humans—capable of reason and therefore made in the image of God—are above animals but lower than angels.
A substance must, according to Leibniz, be a real unity. At one time he seems to have held the view that the unity of corporeal substances was underwritten by their substantial forms. But his later view seems to have been that every substance must be some kind of living thing, with something like perception and something like appetition. He later referred to his simple substances as monads. However, Leibniz seemed also to want to admit complex substances as more than an aggregate of simple substances. He did this by saying that, although there is nothing more to a complex substance than its constituent monads, its unity arises because one of these is the dominant monad.
Leibniz’s theory of substance is the linchpin of his metaphysics.
Each substance, according to Leibniz, is quite unique. He thought that the complete concept of each individual substance contained within itself everything that is true of it. Correspondingly, the nature or essence of each substance was such as to give rise spontaneously to all its phenomena. No substance except God can act on any other substance, nor can it be acted upon by any other substance. The appearance of interaction between substances is to be explained in terms of a preestablished harmony that God has foreordained from the beginning of time.”
― Historical Dictionary of Leibniz's Philosophy

“Para mostrar a necessidade de se manterem as formas substanciais, Leibniz faz uma crítica à noção cartesiana de extensão, insuficiente para explicar a natureza do corpo. Certamente a extensão faz parte da natureza do corpo, mas, em primeiro lugar, não pode constituir a essência do corpo: Leibniz não desenvolve aqui, mas considera que a extensão não explica a inércia, nem o movimento dos corpos, e não pode constituir a unidade que define a realidade dos seres. Em segundo lugar, a extensão não pode ser considerada uma substância, já que não é uma noção distinta que possa ser conhecida através de seus elementos e, graças ao quê, se poderia atribuir uma independência a ela; daí Leibniz des-prezar a diferença que Descartes estabelecia entre qualidades tais como cor, calor etc. e a extensão. Todas essas qualidades são, para Leibniz, qualidades sensíveis e, portanto, relacionadas ao momentâneo que caracteriza a percepção; ao passo que a substância é da ordem do inteligível e deve garantir a unidade e a identidade através do tempo. Eis por que, para explicar a natureza dos corpos, é preciso reconhecer "algo relacionado com as almas e que vulgarmente se denomina forma substancial".”
― Discurso de metafísica e outros textos
― Discurso de metafísica e outros textos