How Terrorism Ends: Understanding the Decline and Demise of Terrorist Campaigns

by Audrey Kurth Cronin

Terrorism often fails in its aims because its shocking nature provokes popular revulsion and sweeping retaliatory force.

Yet even these brutal government reactions and moves toward repression must be put into perspective when analyzing the viability of terrorism: states may be gravely weakened by terrorist violence over the long run, but terrorist groups are weakened even more. States often move toward their primal natures, particularly the use of force and, all else being equal, are far more effective at it than terrorists. When the objectives of terrorist groups are achieved, it is often not from the use of terrorist attacks (an inherently weak tactic) but as the result of a transition into more traditional means of political coercion, such as insurgent attacks on military forces. (See chapter 6.) Even in such cases, campaigns employing terrorism succeed more despite the use of violence against innocent civilians than because of it; there is far more evidence supporting the efficacy of insurgent attacks on armed forces, for example, than of terrorist attacks on civilian targets.34 Yet attacks on military targets by virtually any commonly accepted rigorous definition do not constitute terrorism. In killing noncombatants, terrorism can attract attention, provoke tactical responses, lead a state to undermine itself, and create a cause celebre; but it almost never installs new rulers, inspires ideological change, takes over territory, or constructs new institutions of governance (as terrorist leaders typically claim). Historically, by virtually any standard of measurement, terrorist success st...

Often, the “success” of terrorism is a sidebar in a movement also characterized by other methods of pursuing political change, and to the extent that terrorist attacks were employed, they were engaged in by a minority and may actually have set back the broader cause.

at the heart of Irgun’s efforts was its popular propaganda war, what one prominent member labeled the “campaign of enlightenment.”

The ANC became a legal political actor in 1990, having achieved its objective of ending the apartheid regime, and Nelson Mandela, imprisoned for terrorist acts from 1964 to 1990, was elected first president of postapartheid South Africa. The armed struggle was an important element in this success, but it was not the only factor. It may not even have been the most important. The extensive pressures that led to the end of apartheid, including economic, sporting, and cultural sanctions by the international community, a revolt among white English- and Afrikaner-speaking youth, a political revolt among members of the South African National Party, widespread, grassroots frustration and violence within the black community, and overreaction and violence by the Afrikaner regime, all undermined the legitimacy of the policy of apartheid and were more important than terrorist attacks.60 Also crucial was the ending of the Cold War, a key development that rendered long-standing cooperation between the ANC-MK and the Communist Party instantly irrelevant. Indeed, while it is never possible to prove the counterfactual, in the broad context of the ending of the bipolar contest, the decaying political legitimacy of the Afrikaner regime, and the eruption of widespread ethnic violence, it is just as easy to argue that MK attacks on civilian targets held back the ANC’s cause as it is to find evidence that they advanced it.

In the end, the French concluded that, as long as the FLN could rely on support from outside Algeria, they would never stop fighting. Terrorism drew international attention to the cause and undermined the national political consensus that saw Algeria as an integral part of France, but the process of independence might well have occurred without it.64

First, they have succeeded when the goals of the group involved were well-defined and attainable.

Second, campaigns tend to succeed when their goals comport with broader historical, economic, and political changes that are occurring anyway in the international system.

Third, campaigns succeed when terrorism is one part of a broader effort, soon supplemented or replaced by more legitimate uses of force.

Fourth, terrorist campaigns succeed when groups can convince more powerful actors of the legitimacy of their cause, especially if it means external funding, arms, and other support—as well as external political pressure, sanctions, and moral opprobrium against the targeted state.

Terrorism is not a very promising vocation. The research detailed here demonstrates that the average life-span of a group is only about eight years, and the vast majority of campaigns fail. Only a small minority, less than 5 percent, have by their own standards fully succeeded in achieving their aims. Killing civilians in terrorist attacks is not a promising means of achieving political ends. Terrorist attacks are as often retrogressive and undermining of a political cause as they are a successful means of achieving it. Rarely do terrorist assaults guide the world along the novel path the terrorists seek—be it the surrender of control over territory, the establishment of a new form of government, or the institution of a new social or religious system. They are most often successful when their cause comports with what is happening anyway in the broader international context. Terrorist leaders seldom choose to conclude a campaign on the grounds that their fundamental long-term political objectives have been achieved, because they very rarely are. Yet sometimes terrorist attacks do play a role in bringing about political change. This is particularly the case when terrorist campaigns are in the service of very well-defined aims and complement the broader flow of history. Even then, however, groups that kill noncombatants must either transition to other more legitimate forms of violence, such as insurgency or conventional war, or acquire state sponsors, who often have their own...

Thus, it is impossible for terrorism alone to lead to success. It succeeds only in combination with other tools of political coercion and military force. There are countless short-term aims that keep a terrorist campaign under way, but terrorist campaigns in the modern era only succeed and end when they achieve the legitimacy of a state—or prod a state to concede legitimacy on its own.

TERRORISM CAN BE SELF-DEFEATING. Most terrorism ends because the group employing the tactic fails and eventually disintegrates. The short life-span and limited success of most groups that use terrorism demonstrate that violence deliberately targeted against civilians repels rather than attracts popular support.

Frequently the most powerful forces of decay operate within the group itself and are only indirectly affected by the policies of governments.

It is extraordinarily difficult to maintain the momentum of a terrorist campaign. More often than not, terrorism ends because the group implodes or loses its constituency, nudged along by pressure from the police or security services. Implosion happens when there is in-fighting over the mission, operations, competition for dominance, differences of ideology, loss of interest among members—even simple exhaustion or burnout.

Four typical scenarios for group implosion are failing to navigate the transition between generations, succumbing to in-fighting among members, losing operational control, and accepting amnesties or other exit pathways offered by the government.

Groups that use terrorism face vulnerable passages, milestones that, if not reached and passed, quicken their demise. A particularly sensitive time is the point when an organization is transitioning from one generation to the next. Some groups have more staying power than others; certain characteristics may affect whether or not a group persists over numerous generations. As has been demonstrated here (and discussed in the last chapter) appealing to issues of identity such as religion or nationality, particularly when attached to a piece of territory, helps to lock in a connection to a constituency and promote the longevity of a group. But in general, terrorist organizations appear to be at their most susceptible when they are handing authority from one leader or cadre to another—a reason why governments may be attracted to the targeted killing tactics examined in chapter 1

right-wing groups exhibit a unique cyclical pattern. Being driven by grievances that are specific to a cultural group, members are directed against “enemy” segments of the population defined by who they are—by race, religion, sexual preference, ethnicity, and other traits—not by what they do. A government that defends the target population also becomes a legitimate target.

The more highly developed literature on social movements posits, for example, that terrorism may appear at the end of a cycle of the rise and fall of movements of mass protest.6 From this perspective, the best way to understand the life span of a particular group is to study the broader movement of which it is a part. But social movements are rarely oriented mainly toward violence, and may just as easily be drawn toward more idealistic means. Understanding the pattern of mobilization may be important for dissecting the origins of an established group, but may not be as revealing of its likely end. While it is important, research into social movements on the whole gives more insight into the origins of terrorist groups than it does into their decline.

Finally, David Rapoport poses the broadest, historically based hypothesis on the life cycles of terrorist groups. He argues that over the course of modern history waves of international terrorist activity last about a generation (by which he means approximately 40 years). These waves are characterized by expansion and contraction and have an international character, with similar activities in several countries driven by a common ideology. Two factors are critical to Rapoport’s waves: a transformation in communication or transportation patterns, and a new doctrine or culture. Using this perspective, the best way to predict or understand a group’s demise is to study its relationship to broader generational patterns. When a wave of international terrorism reaches its peak and then declines, individual groups will find it more difficult to persist.7

The nature of a group’s ideology seems to affect its cross-generational staying power. The left-wing and anarchistic groups of the 1970s, for example, were notorious for their inability to articulate a clear vision of their goals that could be handed down to successive generations after the first group of radical leaders departed or were destroyed.

The fates of the convict and his intrepid rescuer quickly became a source of popular intrigue, especially as the image of daring countercultural revolutionaries had broad appeal among disaffected students.

Right-wing groups, which draw their inspiration from fascist or racist concepts, can also have difficulty persisting over generations, though, as Martha Crenshaw observes, this phenomenon may reflect the challenges of tracking them rather than the actual disintegration of the group.14

Still, the racist causes of many of these groups can persist long after the vanishing of the group itself; their disappearance underground,16 or their reemergence under a different name or structure is common.

Extensive examinations by academic experts and the FBI of right-wing groups in the United States during the 1990s, especially after the 1995 Oklahoma City bombing, revealed a tendency to operate according to a common modus operandi, ideology, or intent, especially so-called leaderless resistance, which involves individual operatives or small cells functioning independently in pursuit of an understood purpose.18 Such organizational decentralization complicates conclusions about beginnings and endings of right-wing groups; but it also may militate against truly effective generational transition.

Numerous right-wing groups in Europe demonstrate similar decentralized structures and episodic violence.

On the one hand, operatives may be hard to preempt or catch when they operate according to individual initiative; on the other, they are difficult to control, lack staying power and are unlikely to groom successors.

Admittedly, staying power may not be their primary interest. Their objective may not be mobilization but provocation:

Along with its splinter group White Wolves, Combat 18 urged members to kill nonwhites (so-called “aliens”) so as to provoke a race war. “If this is done regularly, effectively and brutally, the aliens will respond by attacking the whites at random, forcing them off the fence and into self-defence,” their declarative document read.

How is self-defense viewed by others? How is this different when the target of terror is an ethno-religious-racial group vs. a state? What about when it's both (Israel)?

Outside observers, especially those unwilling or unable to analyze individual groups in depth, often miss evidence of infighting and fractionalization among members. This is hardly surprising: the public image of a terrorist group is crafted so as to be a clear and uncomplicated expression of the group’s ideological aims. An image of unity is essential. But it is a mistake to accept such a picture whole and uncritically, as it often papers over serious divergences of view that can lead to a group’s end.

Terrorist attacks are designed to satisfy the requirements of a broader campaign; however, individuals or constituencies within that campaign may have different philosophies about the level and type of violence that occurs. Sometimes radicalized members want an attack so as to maintain morale at just a time when the broader population of active or passive supporters may be alienated by one.

much higher levels of violence than their public constituenci...

Alienation may occur within a group;

At other times, individual members may be anxious to carry out attacks simply because they have a compulsive need for

action, want to impress their colleagues, or are personally wedded to the idea of acting violently.

Although individuals who join terrorist organizations are psychologically comparable to the general population, their socialization in the group may bring out a lust for violence that gets out of control, becomes counterproductive, and harms the cause of the group.

I wonder how common this is?

Ambitious individuals may struggle for predominance within a group hierarchy,

Or factions may compete for favor with a particular constituency,

Or individuals may be at the mercy of outside actors, intervening and manipulating factions of a movement for their own purposes; state sponsors and groups often follow that pattern,

All of these behaviors may undermine the viability of the group as a whole, particularly if the leadership is in hiding or on the run, less able to control members and out of contact with the real world.

Members of organizations may also disagree about their operations, style, assets...

Bickering within a group can have deadly consequences, not only for individual members but also for the viability of the group, especially if revenge killing...

Another source of internal dissent may be the general purpose of the violence, rather than its nature: historically, one of the most common sources of factional in-fighting is the interpretation of the group’s ideology. Because of their relative weakness, terrorist groups are almost uniquely depending on their driving narrative or vision and may turn their violence on one another:

Relations with “the people” are likewise a typical source of contention. Members of the RAF sometimes criticized the leadership for its elitist attitude, placing the “commando” at the forefront of the movement,

making decisions without consulting others, and ignoring the views of followers.

Groups may also decline because they lose a competition for members or support with other groups. Intergroup competition occurs quite apart from the counterterrorism activities of states. At the end of a social movement, groups often find themselves vying for the same potential followers and begin to jockey with each other for position.

Another classic scenario for internecine violence is when disaffected members try to leave the group. Much seems to depend upon the degree to which the surrounding population supports or expects the violence: according to a former operative, members of the Red Brigades moved in and out of the group with relative ease, probably because left-wing violence in Italy was almost endemic.35 Groups operating in more hostile contexts or with more bizarre ideologies may demand unquestioning fealty from their members.

Departures of the faithful can lead to ruthless internal violence and can easily destroy a group, especially if it is operating clandestinely and under pressure from the police: such struggles expose the group to potential betrayal by former insiders, cast doubt on those who were close to the dissident, and undercut its ideology by demonstrating that some adherents have turned against it. Maintaining the loyalty of members becomes a top priority, since a clash of legitimacies may be hindered by any evidence of loss of faith.

Control over operations is another classic problem for groups. There is a reverse correlation between the nature of an organization and the nature of its planning of operations. Networked organizations may more easily carry out attacks, compartmentalize information, and keep themselves safe from detection, but whether they actually work toward the achievement of the cause is another question. Security and efficiency are always at odds, a dilemma that has been recognized by terrorist groups since the nineteenth century. Under pressure from state counterterrorism, targeting becomes more difficult and groups often progressively lose control over their operatives, resulting in a widening of acceptable targets to include more easy-to-hit “soft” targets. Meanwhile, the security imperative that leads to the compartmentalization of information and the limiting of communications

among cells increases inefficiencies and mistakes.37 Amateurish operations may become counterproductive as a lack of discrimination prompts a backlash among potential constituents. Even with the best of training and intentions, groups may find that heightened police pressure reduces their ability to reconnoiter potential targets, leading to more haphazard targeting and greater potential for a popular backlash, mistakes, and unintended consequences. Sometimes individuals are recruited because of their skills but they then become unmanageable. A lack of operational control can lead different parts of an organization to work against each other, carrying out activities that are counterproductive to their strategic aims.