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April 11 - December 23, 2019
There is one other fundamental difference between the major revolutions in Europe and the Meiji Restoration. The French Revolution was, amongst other things, a response to an internal development – the rise of the bourgeoisie – whereas the Meiji Restoration was a response to an external threat, that of an expansionist West. This was the fundamental geopolitical difference between Europe and the rest of the world: Europe was the leader and, therefore, the predator, while the rest of the world was, in response, obliged to find a way of dealing with Europe’s power and expansionist intent. This
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merchant class but the external threat from the West.
The distinctiveness of Japan is thus defined and maintained in two ways: firstly in the notion of the Japanese realm as described, consisting of those elements regarded as exclusively and authentically Japanese; and secondly in the unique amalgam of the various foreign influences combined with those elements regarded as distinctively Japanese.
China’s equilibrium state has been that of a unified agrarian empire in contrast to Europe, which for two millennia has been an agglomeration of states.38 From this follows a fundamental difference in contemporary Chinese and European attitudes: while the Chinese attach greater importance to unity than literally anything else, the Europeans overwhelmingly believe in the nation-state rather than European-wide sovereignty, the European Union notwithstanding.
The Chinese commitment to unity has three dimensions: the fundamental priority attached to unity by both the state and the people; the central role expected of the state in ensuring that this unity is maintained; and a powerful sense of a common Chinese identity that underpins this overarching popular commitment to unity.
A further difference between the Chinese state and the various European states was that for over a millennium the former has not faced competition from rival elites seeking to limit its power.
The Chinese state was thus not constrained by independent power elites in the manner of Europe: it enjoyed universal and unchallenged authority. While the boundaries between the state and society in Europe were clearly delineated and constantly contested, this was not the case in China, where the frontiers remained blurred and fuzzy, as they still are today: there has been no need to define them because there were no competing social groups. Given the non-conflictual nature of state–elite relations, the boundaries between state and society were instead determined by practical issues of
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Whereas the contest between state and elites in Europe was intimately bound up with both Church and class, in China the functional differentiation into scholars, peasants, merchants and tradesmen did not translate into independent bases of power or institutionalized voices.
The Chinese state saw moral instruction, amongst both the common people and the elites, as both desirable in itself and also as a means of exercising social control.
This notion of good governance was intimately linked to the Confucian tradition, with its stress on the moral responsibility of the rulers: a continuing feature of imperial rule, for example, was a recognition that taxes needed to be kept low so that peasants would prosper, harmony would be promoted, resistance and rebellion avoided.51
the Chinese state acquired many of the
characteristics of a modern state, not least a large-scale bureaucracy, long before, on a European time-map, it should have done.
The dynamics of state-creation in China and Europe were profoundly different in almost every major respect.56 It is hardly surprising, therefore, that the modern Chinese state should differ so markedly from the European state and enjoy such a different relationship with society, as
The fact, moreover, that prior to 1800 China was an advanced agrarian economy, with widespread rural industrialization, considerable commercialization and sophisticated markets, meant that once foreign occupation came to an end, China could draw on this culture, knowledge and tradition for its industrialization.
The Chinese remained bitterly hostile towards the presence of the Western powers and the Japanese, and felt deeply humiliated by the concessions they were forced to make; this was quite different from India, for example, which learnt to accommodate the presence of the British.85 Despite everything, the Chinese never lost their inner sense of self-confidence – or feeling of superiority – about their own history and civilization.86
The key to the support enjoyed by the Communist regime after 1949 – and, indeed, even until this day – lies, above all else, in the fact that it restored the independence and unity of China.90 It was Mao’s greatest single achievement.
it could develop new institutions, drawing on foreign examples where appropriate as well as on the past.91 The last, in effect, became the Communist project, with inspiration being sought in part from the Soviet Union, although Maoism was overwhelmingly a home-grown product rather than a foreign import.92
while the overt differences between Confucian and Communist ideology are clear – hierarchy versus equality, conservatism versus radicalism, harmony versus conflict – there are also important similarities between the two traditions.
The absence of a civil society and an autonomous public realm in Communist China is not a new phenomenon: China has never had either.
A Chinese nation-state was forged under the leadership of the Communist Party and the guidance of Marxism. However, it had far more to do with Chinese nationalism, with the reassertion of China’s former glory and future modernization, than with the universal principles of communism.
The price paid for these advances, in terms of the absence or loss of personal freedoms and the death and destruction which resulted from some of Mao’s policies, was great, but they undoubtedly helped to sustain popular support for the government.
Since we got there first, we think we have the inside track on the modern condition, and our natural tendency is to universalize from our own experience.
A significant proportion of Westerners who live in East Asia are based in Singapore or Hong Kong, city-states which have gone out of their way to make themselves attractive to Western expats.
The fact that large-scale agrarian employment has been such a recent experience for the Asian tigers means that the past is heavily imprinted on the present and the legacy of tradition remains a living force in the era of mass modernity.
In contrast to Europe and the United States, these countries are characterized by a form of hyper-modernity: an addiction to change, an infatuation with technology, enormous flexibility, and a huge capacity for adaptation.
Whereas European cities for the most part change relatively little from one decade to the next, Asian cities are constantly being turned upside down. You can rest assured that your favourite landmark in a European city – be it a cinema, a square, a building or an underground station – will still be there when you next visit; the only certainty in many Asian cities is that the furniture will once again have been rearranged so that you won’t even be able to recognize the place, let alone find the landmark.21
Chinese civilization has been so different from Western societies in so many ways that it is impossible to comprehend it, and its modernity, simply by the use of Western concepts. ‘Is it not a question of whether the concepts/theories are far away from Chinese reality? China’s own practice,’ he concludes, ‘is capable of generating alternative concepts, theories, and more convincing frameworks.’30
More fundamentally, it is a mistake to believe that cultural difference does not have a far-reaching impact on the nature of modernity.
The same can be said of China. Its path towards and through modernity has been entirely different from the route followed by the West. The state is constructed in a different way and plays a different kind of role. The relationship between the present and the past is distinct, not simply because of the way in which the past bears on the process of modernization but also because, more than any other society, China is deeply aware of and influenced by its history.33
The recognition that the Chinese exhibit certain cultural traits which can be explained by their history does not imply cultural essentialism, the idea that all nations and ethnic groups have a bundle of characteristics which remain fixed and unchanged over time.
Middle-class Malaysians in their thirties and forties are far more likely to have visited Europe or Australia than Japan and China.
The sheer power and dynamism of Western modernity has set, and reset, the agenda for East Asia for almost two centuries.
The constant imperative, both past and present, for Asian nations to negotiate with Western power, influence and presence – first in the era of colonialism (with every East Asian country colonized apart from Japan and Thailand) and then in the post-war era of American hegemony – constitutes a fundamental difference between East Asian and Western modernity.
Finally, as the vehicle for the promotion and transmission of the values and norms of a culture, the Anglo-Saxon world has a major vested interest in ensuring the perpetuation of English as the lingua franca, which provides it with considerable economic, political and cultural benefits.50
The position of English as the global lingua franca, which is a very recent development, could therefore prove to be a relatively transient phenomenon.
It seems entirely possible, even likely, that in fifty years’ time Chinese will have replaced, or at least joined, English as an interlocutor language in the region. If that happens, it will be the first time in China’s modern history that the most widely spoken language in the world will also have acquired the status of a major second language outside its own borders.
The old imperial European languages, with the exception of English, are now of only marginal significance. The region’s main languages remain as influential as ever in their homelands. English has, and is, greatly strengthening its position as the dominant second language, but there are reasons to doubt whether this will continue indefinitely, especially given the decline of the United States and the rise of China, with its implications for the popularity of Mandarin.
The Western form – above all, skin colour, the defining signifier, but also other Caucasian features such as fair hair, large eyes and height – has had a profound and enduring impact on East Asian societies over the last two hundred years. It is something that is rarely commented upon and yet it is more pervasive, more psychologically far-reaching, and more fundamental in terms of identity, than most questions normally discussed in this context.
There is also a view, based on a belief in the universal relevance of Western history, experience and practice, that power is exercised, or should be exercised, in broadly the same way everywhere.
There is a profound difference between the nature of power in Western societies and East Asian societies. In the former, it is driven by the quest for individual autonomy and identity. At the centre of East Asian culture – both North-East Asian (in other words Confucian-based culture) and South-East Asian – is the individual’s desire for a group, and especially family, identity: the individual finds affirmation and recognition not in their own individual
Western governance rests, in theory at least, on the notion of utility: that government is required to deliver certain benefits to the electorate in return for their support. East Asian polities are different. Historically the function of government in East Asia has been more opaque, with, in contrast to the West, a separation between the concepts of power and responsibility: it was believed that there were limits to what a government could achieve, that other forces largely beyond human control determined outcomes, and that the relationship between cause and effect was complex and elusive.
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Although, under the pressures of modernization and economic growth, societies have been obliged to become more utilitarian – as the idea of the developmental state suggests – the traditional ways of thinking about government remain very strong.104
Unlike Western societies, which, historically at least, have tended to rely on guilt through Christian teaching as a means of constraining and directing individual behaviour, Confucian societies rest on shame and ‘loss of face’.
It is difficult for Westerners to appreciate and grasp the nature of Confucian political culture because it is so different from what they are familiar with; moreover, Westerners, accustomed to running the world for so long, are not well versed in understanding and recognizing difference.
The downside of East Asian societies might be seen as a tendency, given the strength of dependency and the paternalistic conception of government, towards authoritarianism and
one-party government. On the other hand, such paternalistic leadership also has certain strengths. Because government and leaders enjoy a different kind of trust, they are given much more latitude to change direction and policies.
First, if the impact of Westernization is limited, then it follows that these societies – and their modernities – remain individual and distinctive, rooted in and shaped by their own histories and cultures. It also follows that their modernization has depended not simply or even mainly upon borrowing from the West, but on their ability to transform and modernize themselves: the taproots of modernization, in other words, are native rather than foreign.
This must be a further reason – in addition to the fact that colonial powers deliberately sought to prevent their colonies from competing with their own products – why, during the era of colonialism, no colonial societies succeeded in achieving economic take-off.
A mistake that Western countries make, especially the United States, is to want to transplant their systems and institutions to other countries. It’s wrong because it ignores the cultural core of a country. I always like to focus on the cultural core: to transform or remove the cultural core is impossible.
Economic prosperity serves to transform the self-confidence and self-image of societies, thereby enabling them to project their political and cultural values on a broader canvas.
