Natopolitanism: The Atlantic Alliance since the Cold War

by Grey Anderson

If the US could be that accommodating then to the wishes of a country that had produced one of the most loathsome regimes in history but had lost its capacity to inflict injury, it is difficult to understand why Washington now has elected not to accommodate a country that has chosen to democratize itself, but still retains a considerable capacity to do harm.

'Cause it's easier for the US to accommodate fascists than former communists.

In 1963 the average left-wing French citizen hoped for a rosy future; his right-wing counterpart had reason to believe that France was key to the European project, and had cultural institutions, and nuclear bombs, too.3 In 2013 the average French citizen believes in nothing and no one, is frightened of the neighbors, is anxious about the future and regards the past with shame. Despite the gloom, this average person has a surprising resilience. Maintaining a capacity for reflection and foresight is vital. When the defense minister talks about “the fight against international terrorism”—an absurd expression that no longer has currency even in the US—to explain the intervention in Mali, we must accept that this is an advanced, and late, case of ideological takeover. When France categorizes Salafists, whom it hunts down in Mali, courts in Saudi Arabia and helps in Syria, within the catchall of “terrorism,” it is speaking the American language, and may well end up gibbering.

Belief in the rule of law and human goodness does not lead to virtù but to obedience to the law of the strongest.

think your argument to him, which you’ll need to make, I think that’s the next phone call you want to set up, is exactly the one you made to Yats [Yatsenyuk]. And I’m glad you sort of put him on the spot on where he fits in this scenario. And I’m very glad that

In the Ukraine war’s first month, the major US networks devoted 562 minutes of airtime to the conflict, over

Putin’s lurch to war, disastrous for Russia as well as for Ukraine, is unjustifiable. But it was not unprovoked. NATO enlargement has been an aggressive operation and Moscow has always been in its sights. In calling for a stable settlement of military borders, the Kremlin has a good case. From its foundation in 1949, NATO was always an offensive, not a defensive, enterprise, whose ultimate objective in American eyes was the restoration of a normal capitalism in the Soviet bloc.