Boyd: The Fighter Pilot Who Changed the Art of War

by Robert Coram

In 1982, Boyd and Wass de Czege ran into each other at a West Point symposium on the military reform movement. Wass de Czege told Boyd the new doctrine was about to be announced and that it stressed four tenets: initiative, agility, depth of operations, and synchronization. Boyd though the first three were splendid, a sign that the Army was indeed serious about discarding the old heavy fire-power theories in favor of maneuver warfare. But what the hell was synchronization doing in the new Army doctrine? Synchronization is evening up the front line; it means an Army moves at the speed of its slowest unit. Synchronization is a fundamental part of the old doctrine of attrition warfare, and it obviates all the other changes. An army that relies on synchronization is not an army that practices maneuver warfare. “You synchronize watches,” Boyd shouted, “not people.” Wass de Czege agreed. But he said his bosses had insisted that synchronization be part of the doctrine. Boyd pointed his finger at Wass de Czege and said, “Don’t ever again let them do that to you.” The Army had to change its ways, Boyd said. “They still believe in high diddle diddle, straight up the middle.”