West Asia At War: Repression, Resistance and Great Power Games

by Talmiz Ahmad

This positive trend seems to have continued through to early 2009: former US diplomat and commentator on Iraqi affairs, Joel Rayburn has noted that at this time, Iraqis in general seemed to be ‘rejecting militancy and embracing nationalism’, and notes that violence had reduced from a thousand attacks per week in mid-2007 to less than 200 per week in January 2009.43 Gerges, however, is more cautious: he points out that, while violence was plummeting in the rest of the country, it was rising in the Sunni-dominated Nineveh province, indicating that Islamic State of Iraq forces had retreated to this area and were consolidating their base there.44 By late 2008, with the Sahwa having successfully ended the Islamic State of Iraq menace, the US forces called on the Nouri al-Maliki government to employ these Sunni fighters in the national army or in the administration. Nouri al-Maliki, however, based his power on sectarian support – from the Shia militia and the Shia community in general. Given the record of military interventions in national politics, the last thing he wanted to see was a strong army that would accommodate all of Iraq’s communities as officers and soldiers. Hence, he rejected the US proposal and refused to accommodate the Sunnis in his army or administration. This was a serious mistake. The Sahwa fighters, now deeply disgruntled and frustrated, joined the Islamic State of Iraq insurgency, being welcomed back after repenting for their ‘collaboration’ with the Ameri...