West Asia At War: Repression, Resistance and Great Power Games

by Talmiz Ahmad

Recognizing that agricultural production needed to be boosted with increased water supply, the government decided to construct the Aswan Dam, which would increase acreage under cultivation from 6 million acres to about 9.5 million acres. Funding for this project brought the Egyptian revolution face-to-face with the realities of post-war global politics. In seeking funds for the dam and weapons to upgrade its armed forces, Egypt first turned to the US. The US insisted that Egypt join a regional defence pact – the Middle East Defence Organization (MEDO) – before military supplies could be considered. Nasser rejected this proposal, seeing it as another avenue for continued British presence in Egypt. Israel, on its part, viewed the British in the canal zone as a buffer between itself and Egypt, and was apprehensive about its end. McHugo points out that Israel’s prime minister, David Ben-Gurion, had long-term concerns as well: he thought that Nasser would modernize his country, unite the Arabs and finally destroy Israel. He, therefore, committed himself to destroying Nasser before he became too powerful.