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To pass for real in the world of the web she’d had to forget everything she’d ever known about grammar, wit, spelling, manners and literary criticism.
New information demanded at least as much action as discussion. It was Diana Taverner’s role to leave to see about the action, and everybody else’s to get the discussion under way. Or almost everybody’s. She was halfway to the lift when the Barrowboy caught her—almost literally: she turned to find him reaching for her arm. The look she bestowed upon him would have stuck six inches out the back of a more sensitive man. “Not a good time, Roger.” “When is it ever? Diana, this new information.” “You know as much as I do.” “I doubt that. But either way, it doesn’t change anything, does it?” “You
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For the next hour, it seemed breakfast was on River; there was almost no movement on the street, and none involving Hobden. The light at his window remained steady. An occasional shadow on the curtain proved he was still in there, or that someone was—perhaps River should knock on his door. That might provoke a reaction. But provocation was a no-no. It distorts the data. Spider Webb, speaking up during a seminar: It distorts the data to provoke the target into a course of action he might not otherwise adopt. No doubt Spider had been parroting somebody who knew what he was talking about. On the
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sangfroid
sangfroid /säNGˈfrwä/ I. noun composure or coolness, sometimes excessive, as shown in danger or under trying circumstances. – origin mid 18th cent.: from French sang-froid, literally ‘cold blood.’
solipsistic,
solipsism /ˈsäləpˌsizəm/ I. noun the view or theory that the self is all that can be known to exist. II. derivatives 1. solipsist /ˈsōləpsəst ˈsäləpsəst səˈlipsist / noun 2. solipsistic /ˌsäləpˈsistik / adjective 3. solipsistically /ˌsälipˈsistik(ə)lē / adverb – origin late 19th cent.: from Latin solus ‘alone’ + ipse ‘self’ + -ism.
Solipsism (/ˈsɒlɪpsɪzəm/ ⓘ SOLL-ip-siz-əm; from Latin solus 'alone' and ipse 'self')[1] is the philosophical idea that only one's mind is sure to exist. As an epistemological position, solipsism holds that knowledge of anything outside one's own mind is unsure; the external world and other minds cannot be known and might not exist outside the mind.
Varieties
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There are varying degrees of solipsism that parallel the varying degrees of skepticism:
Metaphysical
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Main article: Metaphysical solipsism
Metaphysical solipsism is a variety of solipsism based on a philosophy of subjective idealism. Metaphysical solipsists maintain that the self is the only existing reality and that all other realities, including the external world and other persons, are representations of that self, having no independent existence.[citation needed] There are several versions of metaphysical solipsism, such as Caspar Hare's egocentric presentism (or perspectival realism), in which other people are conscious, but their experiences are simply not present.
Epistemological
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Further information: Epistemological solipsism
Epistemological solipsism is the variety of idealism according to which only the directly accessible mental contents of the solipsistic philosopher can be known. The existence of an external world is regarded as an unresolvable question rather than actually false.[2] Further, one cannot also be certain as to what extent the external world exists independently of one's mind. For instance, it may be that a God-like being controls the sensations received by the mind, making it appear as if there is an external world when most of it (excluding the God-like being and oneself) is false. However, the point remains that epistemological solipsists consider this an "unresolvable" question.[2]
Methodological
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Main article: Methodological solipsism
Methodological solipsism is an agnostic variant of solipsism. It exists in opposition to the strict epistemological requirements for "knowledge" (e.g. the requirement that knowledge must be certain). It still entertains the points that any induction is fallible. Methodological solipsism sometimes goes even further to say that even what we perceive as the brain is actually part of the external world, for it is only through our senses that we can see or feel the mind. Only the existence of thoughts is known for certain.
Methodological solipsists do not intend to conclude that the stronger forms of solipsism are actually true. They simply emphasize that justifications of an external world must be founded on indisputable facts about their own consciousness. The methodological solipsist believes that subjective impressions (empiricism) or innate knowledge (rationalism) are the sole possible or proper starting point for philosophical construction.[3] Often methodological solipsism is not held as a belief system, but rather used as a thought experiment to assist skepticism (e.g. René Descartes' Cartesian skepticism).[citation needed]
Main points
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Mere denial of material existence, in itself, does not necessarily constitute solipsism.
Philosophers generally try to build knowledge on more than an inference or analogy. Well-known frameworks such as Descartes' epistemological enterprise brought to popularity the idea that all certain knowledge may go no further than "I think; therefore I exist."[4] However, Descartes' view does not provide any details about the nature of the "I" that has been proven to exist.
The theory of solipsism also merits close examination because it relates to three widely held philosophical presuppositions, each itself fundamental and wide-ranging in importance:[4]
One's most certain knowledge is the content of one's own mind—my thoughts, experiences, affects, etc.
There is no conceptual or logically necessary link between mental and physical—between, for example, the occurrence of certain conscious experience or mental states and the "possession" and behavioral dispositions of a "body" of a particular kind.
The experience of a given person is necessarily private to that person.
To expand on the second point, the conceptual problem is that the previous point assumes mind or consciousness (which are attributes) can exist independent of some entity having this attribute (a capability in this case), i.e., that an attribute of an existent can exist apart from the existent itself. If one admits to the existence of an independent entity (e.g., the brain) having that attribute, the door is open to an independent reality. (See Brain in a vat)
Some philosophers hold that, while it cannot be proven that anything independent of one's mind exists, the point that solipsism makes is irrelevant. This is because, whether the world as we perceive it exists independently or not, we cannot escape this perception, hence it is best to act assuming that the world is independent of our minds.[5]
History
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Origins of solipsist thought are found in Greece and later Enlightenment thinkers such as Thomas Hobbes[6][7] and Descartes.
Gorgias
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Solipsism was first recorded by the Greek presocratic sophist, Gorgias (c. 483–375 BC), who is quoted by the Roman sceptic Sextus Empiricus as having stated:[8]
Nothing exists.
Even if something exists, nothing can be known about it.
Even if something could be known about it, knowledge about it cannot be communicated to others.
Much of the point of the sophists was to show that objective knowledge was a literal impossibility.
René Descartes
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The foundations of solipsism are in turn the foundations of the view that the individual's understanding of any and all psychological concepts (thinking, willing, perceiving, etc.) is accomplished by making an analogy with their own mental states; i.e., by abstraction from inner experience. And this view, or some variant of it, has been influential in philosophy since René Descartes elevated the search for incontrovertible certainty to the status of the primary goal of epistemology, whilst also elevating epistemology to "first philosophy".[citation needed]
Berkeley
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Portrait of George Berkeley by John Smybert, 1727
George Berkeley's arguments against materialism in favour of idealism provide the solipsist with a number of arguments not found in Descartes. While Descartes defends ontological dualism, thus accepting the existence of a material world (res extensa) as well as immaterial minds (res cogitans) and God, Berkeley denies the existence of matter but not minds, of which God is one.[9]
Relation to other ideas
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Idealism and materialism
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One of the most fundamental debates in philosophy concerns the "true" nature of the world—whether it is some ethereal plane of ideas or a reality of atomic particles and energy. Materialism[10] posits a real "world out there", as well as in and through us, that can be sensed—seen, heard, tasted, touched and felt, sometimes with prosthetic technologies corresponding to human sensing organs. (Materialists do not claim that human senses or even their prosthetics can, even when collected, sense the totality of the universe; simply that they collectively cannot sense what cannot in any way be known to us.) Materialists do not find this a useful way of thinking about the ontology and ontogeny of ideas, but we might say that from a materialist perspective pushed to a logical extreme communicable to an idealist, ideas are ultimately reducible to a physically communicated, organically, socially and environmentally embedded 'brain state'. While reflexive existence is not considered by materialists to be experienced on the atomic level, the individual's physical and mental experiences are ultimately reducible to the unique tripartite combination of environmentally determined, genetically determined, and randomly determined interactions of firing neurons and atomic collisions.
For materialists, ideas have no primary reality as essences separate from our physical existence. From a materialist perspective, ideas are social (rather than purely biological), and formed and transmitted and modified through the interactions between social organisms and their social and physical environments. This materialist perspective informs scientific methodology, insofar as that methodology assumes that humans have no access to omniscience and that therefore human knowledge is an ongoing, collective enterprise that is best produced via scientific and logical conventions adjusted specifically for material human capacities and limitations.[citation needed]
Modern idealists believe that the mind and its thoughts are the only true things that exist. This is the reverse of what is sometimes called "classical idealism" or, somewhat confusingly, "Platonic idealism" due to the influence of Plato's theory of forms (εἶδος eidos or ἰδέα idea), which were not products of our thinking.[11] The material world is ephemeral, but a perfect triangle or "beauty" is eternal. Religious thinking tends to be some form of idealism, as God usually becomes the highest ideal (such as neoplatonism).[10][12][13] On this scale, solipsism can be classed as idealism. Thoughts and concepts are all that exist, and furthermore, only the solipsist's own thoughts and consciousness exist. The so-called "reality" is nothing more than an idea that the solipsist has (perhaps unconsciously) created.
Cartesian dualism
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There is another option: the belief that both ideals and "reality" exist. Dualists commonly argue that the distinction between the mind (or 'ideas') and matter can be proven by employing Leibniz's principle of the identity of indiscernibles, which states that if two things share exactly the same qualities, then they must be identical, as in indistinguishable from each other and therefore one and the same thing. Dualists then attempt to identify attributes of mind that are lacked by matter (such as privacy or intentionality) or vice versa (such as having a certain temperature or electrical charge).[14][15] One notable application of the identity of indiscernibles was by René Descartes in his Meditations on First Philosophy. Descartes concluded that he could not doubt the existence of himself (the famous cogito ergo sum argument), but that he could doubt the (separate) existence of his body. From this, he inferred that the person Descartes must not be identical to the Descartes body since one possessed a characteristic that the other did not: namely, it could be known to exist. Solipsism agrees with Descartes in this aspect, and goes further: only things that can be known to exist for sure should be considered to exist. The Descartes body could only exist as an idea in the mind of the person Descartes.[16][17] Descartes and dualism aim to prove the actual existence of reality as opposed to a phantom existence (as well as the existence of God in Descartes' case), using the realm of ideas merely as a starting point, but solipsism usually finds those further arguments unconvincing. The solipsist instead proposes that their own unconscious is the author of all seemingly "external" events from "reality".
Philosophy of Schopenhauer
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The World as Will and Representation is the central work of Arthur Schopenhauer. Schopenhauer saw the human will as our one window to the world behind the representation, the Kantian thing-in-itself. He believed, therefore, that we could gain knowledge about the thing-in-itself, something Kant said was impossible, since the rest of the relationship between representation and thing-in-itself could be understood by analogy as the relationship between human will and human body.
Idealism
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The idealist philosopher George Berkeley argued that physical objects do not exist independently of the mind that perceives them. An item truly exists only as long as it is observed; otherwise, it is not only meaningless but simply nonexistent. Berkeley does attempt to show things can and do exist apart from the human mind and our perception, but only because there is an all-encompassing Mind in which all "ideas" are perceived – in other words, God, who observes all. Solipsism agrees that nothing exists outside of perception, but would argue that Berkeley falls prey to the egocentric predicament – he can only make his own observations, and thus cannot be truly sure that this God or other people exist to observe "reality". The solipsist would say it is better to disregard the unreliable observations of alleged other people and rely upon the immediate certainty of one's own perceptions.[18]
Rationalism
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Rationalism is the philosophical position that truth is best discovered by the use of reasoning and logic rather than by the use of the senses (see Plato's theory of forms). Solipsism is also skeptical of sense-data.
Philosophical zombie
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The theory of solipsism crosses over with the theory of the philosophical zombie in that other seemingly conscious beings may actually lack true consciousness, instead they only display traits of consciousness to the observer, who may be the only conscious being there is.
Philosophy of identity
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Some philosophers have connected solipsistic ideas with the philosophy of personal identity, as well as Hellie's vertiginous question. Christian List argues that there exists a "quadrilemma" in metaphysics caused by the issues raised by the problem of other minds and Hellie's vertiginous question. He argues that the four metaphysical claims of first-person realism, non-solipsism, non-fragmentation, and one-world cannot all be simultaneously true, and thus believing in both the existence of first-personal facts and a single, unified reality must imply that metaphysical solipsism is true.[19] List has proposed a model he calls the "many-worlds theory of consciousness" as a possible alternative to solipsism.[20]
Caspar Hare has argued for a weak form of solipsism with the concept of egocentric presentism, in which other persons can be conscious, but their experiences are simply not present in the way one's own current experience is.[21][22] A related concept is perspectival realism, in which things within perceptual awareness have a defining intrinsic property that exists absolutely and not relative to anything,[23] of which several other philosophers have written reviews.[24][25] Vincent Conitzer has argued for similar ideas on the basis of there being a connection between the A-theory of time and the nature of the self. He argues that one's current perspective could be "metaphysically privileged" on the basis of arguments for A-theory being stronger as arguments for both A-theory and a metaphysically privileged self, and arguments against A-theory are ineffective against this combined position.[26]
Philosophy of time
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In the paper The Personalized A-Theory of Time and Perspective, Vincent Conitzer connects A series and B series theories of time with the metaphysics of first-person perspectives. Conitzer argues that if A-theory is correct, and a given moment of time, i.e. the present, is metaphysically privileged, this implies that a given "I" is also metaphysically privileged in the same way. He argues that arguments for A-theory are more effective as arguments for the combined position of both A-theory and first-person realism, but that arguments for B-theory are ineffective against the combined position.[27] Within Caspar Hare's theory of perspectival realism, Hare points out that arguments in favor of a certain first-person perspective being metaphysically privileged are similar to the arguments made in favor of presentism.[28][29] According to presentism, if Event A is happening on [insert today's date], A is simply happening (right now), not relative to anything. It could be argued that this is similar to solipsism, in which Experience A is simply present, not relative to anything, as opposed to only being present to you.
Falsifiability and testability
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Solipsism is not a falsifiable hypothesis as described by Karl Popper: there does not seem to be an imaginable disproof.[30] According to Popper: a hypothesis that cannot be falsified is not scientific, and a solipsist can observe "the success of sciences" (see also no miracles argument). One critical test is nevertheless to consider the induction from experience that the externally observable world does not seem, at first approach, to be directly manipulable purely by mental energies alone. One can indirectly manipulate the world through the medium of the physical body, but it seems impossible to do so through pure thought (psychokinesis). It might be argued that if the external world were merely a construct of a single consciousness, i.e. the self, it could then follow that the external world should be somehow directly manipulable by that consciousness, and if it is not, then solipsism is false. An argument against this states that this argument is circular and incoherent. It assumes at the beginning a "construct of a single consciousness" meaning something false, and then tries to manipulate the external world that it just assumed was false. Of course this is an impossible task, but it does not disprove solipsism. It is simply poor reasoning when considering pure idealized logic and that is why David Deutsch states that when other scientific methods are used also, (not only logic), solipsism is "indefensible", also when using the simplest explanations: "If, according to the simplest explanation, an entity is complex and autonomous, then that entity is real."[31]
The method of the typical scientist is naturalist: they first assume that the external world exists and can be known. But the scientific method, in the sense of a predict-observe-modify loop, does not require the assumption of an external world. A solipsist may perform a psychological test on themselves, to discern the nature of the reality in their mind – however Deutsch uses this fact to counter-argue: "outer parts" of solipsist, behave independently so they are independent for "narrowly" defined (conscious) self.[31] A solipsist's investigations may not be proper science however, since it would not include the co-operative and communitarian aspects of scientific inquiry that normally serve to diminish bias.
Minimalism
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Solipsism is a form of logical minimalism. Many people are intuitively unconvinced of the nonexistence of the external world from the basic arguments of solipsism, but a solid proof of its existence is not available at present. The central assertion of solipsism rests on the nonexistence of such a proof, and strong solipsism (as opposed to weak solipsism) asserts that no such proof can be made. In this sense, solipsism is logically related to agnosticism in religion: the distinction between believing you do not know, and believing you could not have known.
However, minimality (or parsimony) is not the only logical virtue. A common misapprehension of Occam's razor has it that the simpler theory is always the best. In fact, the principle is that the simpler of two theories of equal explanatory power is to be preferred. In other words: additional "entities" can pay their way with enhanced explanatory power. So the naturalist can claim that, while their world view is more complex, it is more satisfying as an explanation.
In infants
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Main article: Infant cognitive development
Some developmental psychologists believe that infants are solipsistic, and that eventually children infer that others have experiences much like theirs and reject solipsism.[32]
Hinduism
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The earliest reference to solipsism is found in the ideas in Hindu philosophy in the Brihadaranyaka Upanishad, dated to early 1st millennium BC.[33] The Upanishad holds the mind to be the only god and all actions in the universe are thought to be a result of the mind assuming infinite forms.[34] After the development of distinct schools of Indian philosophy, Advaita Vedanta and Samkhya schools are thought to have originated concepts similar to solipsism.[citation needed]
Advaita Vedanta
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Advaita is one of the six most known Hindu philosophical systems and literally means "non-duality". Its first great consolidator was Adi Shankaracharya, who continued the work of some of the Upanishadic teachers, and that of his teacher's teacher Gaudapada. By using various arguments, such as the analysis of the three states of experience—wakefulness, dream, and deep sleep, he established the singular reality of Brahman, in which Brahman, the universe and the Atman or the Self, were one and the same.
One who sees everything as nothing but the Self, and the Self in everything one sees, such a seer withdraws from nothing. For the enlightened, all that exists is nothing but the Self, so how could any suffering or delusion continue for those who know this oneness?
— Ishopanishad: sloka 6, 7
The concept of the Self in the philosophy of Advaita could be interpreted as solipsism. However, the theological definition of the Self in Advaita protect it from true solipsism as found in the west. Similarly, the Vedantic text Yogavasistha, escapes charge of solipsism because the real "I" is thought to be nothing but the absolute whole looked at through a particular unique point of interest.[35]
It is mentioned in Yoga Vasistha that “…..according to them (we can safely assume that them are present Solipsists) this world is mental in nature. There is no reality other than the ideas of one’s own mind. This view is incorrect, because the world cannot be the content of an individual’s mind. If it were so, an individual would have created and destroyed the world according to his whims. This theory is called atma khyati – the pervasion of the little self (intellect).[36] Yoga Vasistha - Nirvana Prakarana - Uttarardha (Volume - 6) Page 107 by Swami Jyotirmayananda
Samkhya and Yoga
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Samkhya philosophy, which is sometimes seen as the basis of Yogic thought,[37] adopts a view that matter exists independently of individual minds. Representation of an object in an individual mind is held to be a mental approximation of the object in the external world.[38] Therefore, Samkhya chooses representational realism over epistemological solipsism. Having established this distinction between the external world and the mind, Samkhya posits the existence of two metaphysical realities Prakriti (matter) and Purusha (consciousness).
Buddhism
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Some philosophical tenets of Buddhism assert that external reality is an illusion, and can be understood as metaphysical solipsism, but most tenets of Buddhist philosophy, generally hold that the mind and external phenomena are both transient, and that they arise from each other. The mind cannot exist without external phenomena, nor can external phenomena exist without the mind. This relation is known as "dependent arising" (pratityasamutpada).
The Buddha stated, "Within this fathom-long body is the world, the origin of the world, the cessation of the world, and the path leading to the cessation of the world."[39] Whilst not rejecting the occurrence of external phenomena, the Buddha focused on the illusion created within the mind of the perceiver by the process of ascribing permanence to impermanent phenomena, satisfaction to unsatisfying experiences, and a sense of reality to things that were effectively insubstantial.
Mahāyāna Buddhism also challenges the illusion of the idea that one can experience an 'objective' reality independent of individual perceiving minds.
From the standpoint of Prasangika (a branch of Madhyamaka thought), external objects do exist, but are devoid of any type of inherent identity: "Just as objects of mind do not exist [inherently], mind also does not exist [inherently]".[40] In other words, even though a chair may physically exist, individuals can only experience it through the medium of their own mind, each with their own literal point of view. Therefore, an independent, purely 'objective' reality could never be experienced, and exist because of imputation of a name upon a phenomenon, though the phenomenon can function.
The Yogacara (sometimes translated as "Mind only") school of Buddhist philosophy contends that all human experience is constructed by mind. Some later representatives of one Yogacara subschool (Prajñakaragupta, Ratnakīrti) propounded a form of idealism that has been interpreted as solipsism. A view of this sort is contained in the 11th-century treatise of Ratnakirti, "Refutation of the existence of other minds" (Santanantara dusana), which provides a philosophical refutation of external mind-streams from the Buddhist standpoint of ultimate truth (as distinct from the perspective of everyday reality).[41]
In addition to this, the Bardo Thodol, Tibet's famous book of the dead, repeatedly states that all of reality is a figment of one's perception, although this occurs within the "Bardo" realm (post-mortem). For instance, within the sixth part of the section titled "The Root Verses of the Six Bardos", there appears the following line: "May I recognize whatever appeareth as being mine own thought-forms";[42] there are many lines in similar ideal.
Criticism
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Solipsism as radical subjective idealism has been criticized by well-known philosophers ("solipsism can only succeed in a madhouse" — A. Schopenhauer, "solipsism is madness" — M. Gardner.)
Bertrand Russell wrote that it was "psychologically impossible" to believe, "I once received a letter from an eminent logician, Mrs. Christine Ladd-Franklin, saying that she was a solipsist, and was surprised that there were no others. Coming from a logician and a solipsist, her surprise surprised me".[43] He also argues that the logic of solipsism compels you to believe in 'solipsism of the moment' where only the presently existing moment can be said to exist.[44]
John Stuart Mill wrote that one can know of others' minds because "First, they have bodies like me, which I know in my own case, to be the antecedent condition of feelings; and because, secondly, they exhibit the acts, and outward signs, which in my own case I know by experience to be caused by feelings".[45]…
sibilants.
sibilant /ˈsibələnt/ I. adjective 1. [Phonetics] (of a speech sound) sounded with a hissing effect, for example s, sh. 2. [Phonetics] making or characterized by a hissing sound • his sibilant whisper. II. noun [Phonetics] a sibilant speech sound. III. derivatives sibilance /ˈsibələns / noun – origin mid 17th cent.: from Latin sibilant- ‘hissing,’ from the verb sibilare…
Sibilants (from Latin: sibilans 'hissing') are fricative and affricate consonants of higher amplitude and pitch, made by directing a stream of air with the tongue towards the teeth.[1] Examples of sibilants are the consonants at the beginning of the English words sip, zip, ship, and genre. The symbols in the International Phonetic Alphabet used to denote the sibilant sounds in these words are, respectively, [s] [z] [ʃ] [ʒ]. Sibilants have a characteristically intense sound, which accounts for their paralinguistic use in getting one's attention (e.g. calling someone using "psst!" or quieting someone using "shhhh!").
Sibilant
Ⓢ
Overview
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In the alveolar hissing sibilants [s] and [z], the back of the tongue forms a narrow channel (is grooved) to focus the stream of air more intensely, resulting in a high pitch. With the hushing sibilants (occasionally termed shibilants[2]), such as English [ʃ], [tʃ], [ʒ], and [dʒ], the tongue is flatter, and the resulting pitch lower.[3][4]
A broader category is stridents, which include more fricatives than sibilants such as uvulars. Sibilants are a higher pitched subset of the stridents. The English sibilants are:
Fricatives /s, z, ʃ, ʒ/
Affricates /tʃ, dʒ/
while the English stridents are:
/s, z, ʃ, ʒ, tʃ, dʒ, f, v/
as /f/ and /v/ are stridents but not sibilants because they are lower in pitch.[5][6]
Some linguistics use the terms "stridents" and "sibilants" interchangeably to refer to the greater amplitude and pitch compared to other fricatives.[7]
"Stridency" refers to the perceptual intensity of the sound of a sibilant consonant, or obstacle fricatives or affricates, which refers to the critical role of the teeth in producing the sound as an obstacle to the airstream. Non-sibilant fricatives and affricates produce their characteristic sound directly with the tongue or lips etc. and the place of contact in the mouth, without secondary involvement of the teeth.[citation needed]
The characteristic intensity of sibilants means that small variations in tongue shape and position are perceivable, with the result that there are many sibilant types that contrast in various languages.
Acoustics
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Sibilants are louder than their non-sibilant counterparts, and most of their acoustic energy occurs at higher frequencies than non-sibilant fricatives—usually around 8,000 Hz.[8]
Sibilant types
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All sibilants are coronal consonants (made with the tip or front part of the tongue). However, there is a great deal of variety among sibilants as to tongue shape, point of contact on the tongue, and point of contact on the upper side of the mouth.
The following variables affect sibilant sound quality, and, along with their possible values, are ordered from sharpest (highest-pitched) to dullest (lowest-pitched):
Tongue shape: grooved, alveolo-palatal, palato-alveolar, retroflex
Place of articulation (point of contact on the upper side of the mouth): dental or denti-alveolar, alveolar, postalveolar, palatal
Point of contact on the tongue: laminal "closed" (see below), laminal non-"closed", apical, subapical
Generally, the values of the different variables co-occur so as to produce an overall sharper or duller sound. For example, a laminal denti-alveolar grooved sibilant occurs in Polish, and a subapical palatal retroflex sibilant occurs in Toda.
Tongue shape
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The main distinction is the shape of the tongue. Most sibilants have a groove running down the centerline of the tongue that helps focus the airstream, but it is not known how widespread this is. In addition, the following tongue shapes are described, from sharpest and highest-pitched to dullest and lowest-pitched:
Hollow (e.g. [s]): This hollow accepts a large volume of air that is forced through a typically narrow aperture that directs a high-velocity jet of air against the teeth, which results in a high-pitched, piercing "hissing" sound. Because of the prominence of these sounds, they are the most common and most stable of sibilants cross-linguistically. They occur in English, where they are denoted with a letter s or z, as in soon or zone.[dubious – discuss]
Alveolo-palatal (e.g. [ɕ]): with a convex, V-shaped tongue, and highly palatalized (middle of the tongue strongly raised or bowed).
Palato-alveolar (e.g. [ʃ]): with a "domed" tongue (convex and moderately palatalized). These sounds occur in English, where they are denoted with letter combinations such as sh, ch, g, j or si, as in shin, chin, gin and vision.
Retroflex (e.g. [ʂ]): with a flat or concave tongue, and no palatalization. There is a variety of these sounds, some of which also go by other names (e.g. "flat postalveolar" or "apico-alveolar"). The subapical palatal or "true" retroflex sounds are the very dullest and lowest-pitched of all the sibilants.
The latter three post-alveolar types of sounds are often known as "hushing" sounds because of their quality, as opposed to the "hissing" alveolar sounds. The alveolar sounds in fact occur in several varieties, in addition to the normal sound of English s:
Palatalized: Sibilants can occur with or without raising the tongue body to the palate (palatalization). Palatalized alveolars are transcribed e.g. [sʲ] and occur in Russian; they sound similar to the cluster [sj] occurring in the middle of the English phrase miss you.
Lisping: Alveolar sibilants made with the tip of the tongue (apical) near the upper teeth have a softer sound reminiscent of (but still sharper-sounding than) the "lisping" [θ] sound of English think. These sounds are relatively uncommon, but occur in some of the indigenous languages of California[9] as well as in the Spanish dialects of western and southern Andalucía (southwest Spain), mostly in the provinces of Cádiz, Málaga, Sevilla and Huelva. In these dialects, the lisping sibilant [s̟] (sometimes indicated in Spanish dialectology as ⟨s̄⟩) is the most common pronunciation of the letters s and z, as well as c before i or e, replacing the [s] or [θ] that occur elsewhere in the country.[10]
Speaking non-technically, the retroflex consonant [ʂ] sounds somewhat like a mixture between the regular English [ʃ] of "ship" and a strong American "r"; while the alveolo-palatal consonant [ɕ] sounds somewhat like a mixture of English [ʃ] of "ship" and the [sj] in the middle of "miss you".
Place of articulation
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Sibilants can be made at any coronal articulation[citation needed], i.e. the tongue can contact the upper side of the mouth anywhere from the upper teeth (dental) to the hard palate (palatal), with the in-between articulations being denti-alveolar, alveolar and postalveolar.
Point of contact on the tongue
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Further information on these variants and their relation to sibilants: Postalveolar consonant
The tongue can contact the upper side of the mouth with the very tip of the tongue (an apical articulation, e.g. [ʃ̺]); with the surface just behind the tip, called the blade of the tongue (a laminal articulation, e.g. [ʃ̻]); or with the underside of the tip (a subapical articulation). Apical and subapical articulations are always tongue-up, with the tip of the tongue above the teeth, while laminal articulations can be either tongue-up or tongue-down, with the tip of the tongue behind the lower teeth. This distinction is particularly important for retroflex sibilants, because all three varieties can occur, with noticeably different sound qualities.
For tongue-down laminal articulations, an additional distinction can be made depending on where exactly behind the lower teeth the tongue tip is placed. A little ways back from the lower teeth is a hollow area (or pit) in the lower surface of the mouth. When the tongue tip rests in this hollow area, there is an empty space below the tongue (a sublingual cavity), which results in a relatively duller sound. When the tip of the tongue rests against the lower teeth, there is no sublingual cavity, resulting in a sharper sound. Usually, the position of the tip of the tongue correlates with the grooved vs. hushing tongue shape so as to maximize the differences. However, the palato-alveolar sibilants in the Northwest Caucasian languages such as Ubykh are an exception. These sounds have the tongue tip resting directly against the lower teeth, which gives the sounds a quality that Catford describes as "hissing-hushing". Ladefoged and Maddieson[1] term this a "closed laminal postalveolar" articulation, and transcribe them (following Catford) as [ŝ, ẑ], although this is not an IPA notation.
Symbols in the IPA
Possible combinations
Linguistic contrasts among sibilants
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Not including differences in manner of articulation or secondary articulation, some languages have as many as four different types of sibilants. For example, Northern Qiang and Southern Qiang have a four-way distinction among sibilant affricates /ts/ /tʂ/ /tʃ/ /tɕ/, with one for each of the four tongue shapes. [citation needed] Toda also has a four-way sibilant distinction, with one alveolar, one palato-alveolar, and two retroflex (apical postalveolar and subapical palatal). [citation needed]
The now-extinct Ubykh language was particularly complex, with a total of 27 sibilant consonants. Not only all four tongue shapes were represented (with the palato-alveolar appearing in the laminal "closed" variation) but also both the palato-alveolars and alveolo-palatals could additionally appear labialized. Besides, there was a five-way manner distinction among voiceless and voiced fricatives, voiceless and voiced affricates, and ejective affricates. (The three labialized palato-alveolar affricates were missing, which is why the total was 27, not 30.) [citation needed] The Bzyp dialect of the related Abkhaz language also has a similar inventory. [citation needed]
Some languages have four types when palatalization is considered. Polish is one example, with both palatalized and non-palatalized laminal denti-alveolars, laminal postalveolar (or "flat retroflex"), and alveolo-palatal ([s̪ z̪] [s̪ʲ z̪ʲ] [s̠ z̠] [ɕ ʑ]). [citation needed] Russian has the same surface contrasts, but the alveolo-palatals are arguably not phonemic. They occur only geminate, and the retroflex consonants never occur geminate, which suggests that both are allophones of the same phoneme. [citation needed]
Somewhat more common are languages with three sibilant types, including one hissing and two hushing. As with Polish and Russian, the two hushing types are usually postalveolar and alveolo-palatal since these are the two most distinct from each other. Mandarin Chinese is an example of such a language. [citation needed] However, other possibilities exist. Serbo-Croatian has alveolar, flat postalveolar and alveolo-palatal affricates whereas Basque has palato-alveolar and laminal and apical alveolar (apico-alveolar) fricatives and affricates (late Medieval peninsular Spanish and Portuguese had the same distinctions among fricatives).
Many languages, such as English or Arabic, have two sibilant types, one hissing and one hushing. A wide variety of languages across the world have this pattern. Perhaps most common is the pattern, as in English and Arabic, with alveolar and palato-alveolar sibilants. Modern northern peninsular Spanish has a single apico-alveolar sibilant fricative [s̠], as well as a single palato-alveolar sibilant affricate [tʃ]. However, there are also languages with alveolar and apical retroflex sibilants (such as Standard Vietnamese) and with alveolar and alveolo-palatal postalveolars (e.g. alveolar and laminal palatalized [ʃ ʒ tʃ dʒ] i.e. [ʃʲ ʒʲ tʃʲ dʒʲ] in Catalan and Brazilian Portuguese, the latter probably through Amerindian influence,[13] and alveolar and dorsal i.e. [ɕ ʑ tɕ dʑ] proper in Japanese).[14]
Only a few languages with sibilants lack the hissing type. Middle Vietnamese is normally reconstructed with two sibilant fricatives, both hushing (one retroflex, one alveolo-palatal). Some languages have only a single hushing sibilant and no hissing sibilant. That occurs in southern Peninsular Spanish dialects of the "ceceo" type, which have replaced the former hissing fricative with [θ], leaving only [tʃ].
Languages with no sibilants are fairly rare. Most have no fricatives at all or only the fricative /h/. Examples include most Australian languages, and Rotokas, and what is generally reconstructed for Proto-Bantu. Languages with fricatives but no sibilants, however, do occur, such as Ukue in Nigeria, which has only the fricatives /f, v, h/. Also, almost all Eastern Polynesian languages have no sibilants but do have the fricatives /v/ and/or /f/: Māori, Hawaiian, Tahitian, Rapa Nui, most Cook Islands Māori dialects, Marquesan, and Tuamotuan.
Tamil only has the sibilant /ʂ/ and fricative /f/ in loanwords, and they are frequently replaced by native sounds. The sibilants [s, ɕ] exist as allophones of /t͡ɕ/ and the fricative [h] as an allophone of /k/…
Peter Judd. PJ to his friends, and everyone else. Fluffy-haired and youthful at forty-eight, and with a vocabulary peppered with archaic expostulations—Balderdash! Tommy-rot!! Oh my giddy aunt!!!—Peter Judd had long established himself as the unthreatening face of the old-school right, popular enough with the GBP, which thought him an amiable idiot, to make a second living outside Parliament as a rent-a-quote-media-whore-cum-quiz-show-panel-favourite, and to get away with minor peccadilloes like dicking his kids’ nanny, robbing the tax-man blind, and giving his party leader conniptions with
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a vocabulary peppered with archaic expostulations—Balderdash! Tommy-rot!! Oh my giddy aunt!!!—
Peter Judd. PJ to his friends, and everyone else. Fluffy-haired and youthful at forty-eight, and with a vocabulary peppered with archaic expostulations—Balderdash! Tommy-rot!! Oh my giddy aunt!!!—Peter Judd had long established himself as the unthreatening face of the old-school right, popular enough with the GBP, which thought him an amiable idiot, to make a second living outside Parliament as a rent-a-quote-media-whore-cum-quiz-show-panel-favourite, and to get away with minor peccadilloes like dicking his kids’ nanny, robbing the tax-man blind, and giving his party leader conniptions with
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This highlight has been truncated due to consecutive passage length restrictions.
alacrity /əˈlakrədē/ I. noun brisk and cheerful readiness • she accepted the invitation with alacrity. – origin late Middle English: from Latin alacritas, from alacer ‘brisk.’
Grand Guignol,
The Théâtre du Grand-Guignol (French pronunciation: [lə teɑtʁ dy ɡʁɑ̃ ɡiɲɔl]) was a theater in the Pigalle district of Paris (7, cité Chaptal). From its opening in 1897 until its closing in 1962, it specialized in horror shows. Its name is often used as a general term for graphic, amoral horror entertainment, a genre popular from Elizabethan and Jacobean theater (for instance Shakespeare's Titus Andronicus, and Webster's The Duchess of Malfi and The White Devil), to today's splatter films.
Promotional poster for a Grand Guignol performance
Theater
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The former location of the Grand Guignol, now home to the International Visual Theatre [fr]
The Théâtre du Grand-Guignol was founded in 1897 by Oscar Méténier, who planned it as a space for naturalist performance.[1] With 293 seats, the venue was the smallest in Paris.[2]
A former chapel, the theatre's previous life was evident in the boxes — which looked like confessionals — and in the angels over the orchestra. Although the architecture created frustrating obstacles, the design that was initially a predicament ultimately became beneficial to the marketing of the theatre. The opaque furniture and gothic structures placed sporadically on the walls of the building exude a feeling of eeriness from the moment of entrance. People came to this theatre for an experience, not only to see a show. The audience at Grand Guignol endured the terror of the shows because they wanted to be filled with strong "feelings" of something. Many attended the shows to get a feeling of sexual arousal.[3]
Underneath the balcony were boxes (originally built for nuns to watch church services) that were available for theatre-goers to rent during performances because they would get so aroused by the action happening on stage. It has been said that audience members would get so boisterous in the boxes, that actors would sometimes break character and yell something such as "Keep it down in there!" Conversely, there were audience members who could not physically handle the brutality of the actions taking place on stage. Frequently, the "special effects" would be too realistic and often an audience member would faint or vomit during performances. Theater director Max Maurey used the goriness to his advantage by hiring doctors to be at performances as a marketing ploy.[4]
The theatre owed its name to Guignol, a traditional Lyonnaise puppet character, joining political commentary with the style of Punch and Judy.[3]
The theatre's peak was between World War I and World War II, when it was frequented by royalty and celebrities in evening dress.[5]
Nicholas
narrator said “Robert” for the poet instead of Nicholas Frost the right-winger previously referred to. Since Robert Holden is repeatedly named , my guess is that’s where the error was made. I’m just surprised that the audiobook editor and/or crew didn’t catch it…
major-domo
A majordomo (US: /ˌmeɪdʒərˈdoʊmoʊ/) is a person who speaks, makes arrangements, or takes charge for another. Typically, this is the highest (major) person of a household (domūs or domicile) staff, a head servant who acts on behalf of the owner of a large or significant residence.
A majordomo at hotel des Deux Magots, Paris in 25 November 2009
A majordomo may also, more informally, be someone who oversees the day-to-day responsibilities of a business enterprise.[1] Historically, many institutions and governments—monasteries, cathedrals, and cities—as well as noble and royal houses, also had the post of majordomo, who usually was in charge of finances.
Additionally, the Hispanos of New Mexico use the related term mayordomo to refer to the manager of an acequia system for a town or valley. Also, when translated into English, "mayordomo" means butler.
batman.
batman /ˈbatmən/ I. noun ‹dated› (in the British armed forces) an officer's personal servant. – origin mid 18th cent. (originally denoting an orderly in charge of the bat horse ‘packhorse’ that carried the officer's baggage): from Old French bat (from medieval Latin bastum ‘packsaddle’) + man.
batman
batman /ˈbatmən/ I. noun ‹dated› (in the British armed forces) an officer's personal servant. – origin mid 18th cent. (originally denoting an orderly in charge of the bat horse ‘packhorse’ that carried the officer's baggage): from Old French bat (from medieval Latin bastum ‘packsaddle’) + man.
Heckler & Koch.
Heckler & Koch GmbH (HK or H&K; German pronunciation: [ˌhɛklɐ ʔʊnt ˈkɔx]) is a German firearms manufacturer that produces handguns, rifles, submachine guns, and grenade launchers. The company is located in Oberndorf am Neckar, Baden-Württemberg and also has subsidiaries in the United Kingdom, France, and the United States.
Heckler & Koch GmbH
Company type
Private (GmbH)
Industry
Defense
Founded
28 December 1949; 75 years ago
Founders
Edmund Heckler
Theodor Koch
Alex Seidel
Headquarters
Oberndorf am Neckar, Germany
Area served
Worldwide
Key people
Jens Bodo Koch (CEO)
Products
Firearms, weapons
Revenue
Increase €305.1 million (2022)[1]
Operating income
Increase €46.23 million (2022)[1]
Net income
Increase €50.639 million (2022)[1]
Total assets
Increase €328.194 million (2022)[1]
Total equity
Decrease €70.313 million (2022)[1]
Number of employees
1,156 (2023)[2]
Website
heckler-koch.com
Heckler & Koch was founded in 1949 by former Mauser engineers Edmund Heckler, Theodor Koch, and Alex Seidel, who founded the company out of the shuttered Mauser factory in Oberndorf.[3] The company initially produced machine tool and metal parts until 1956 when, in response to a Bundeswehr contract for a new service rifle, HK developed the Heckler & Koch G3. The success of the G3 rifle prompted HK to transition to the defense industry. HK was owned by Royal Ordnance from 1991 to 2002, and is currently part of the Heckler & Koch Group, comprising Heckler & Koch GmbH, Heckler & Koch Defense, NSAF Ltd., and Heckler & Koch France SAS. The company's motto is "Keine Kompromisse!" (No Compromises!).[4]
Nicolas Walewski's financial holding company CDE has held a majority stake in Heckler & Koch since July 2020.[5]
History
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An early-production G3 rifle, Heckler & Koch's first firearm, photographed by the United States Army's Ordnance Corps in January 1961
With the fall of Nazi Germany and the following Allied occupation of Germany, Oberndorf came under French control, and the entire Waffenfabrik Mauser AG factory was dismantled by French occupying forces. All factory records were destroyed on orders of the local French Army commander. In 1948, three former Mauser engineers, Edmund Heckler, Theodor Koch, and Alex Seidel, saved what they could from the factory and used what they had salvaged to start a machine tool plant in the vacant factory that became known as the Engineering Office Heckler & Co.[6][7]
On 28 December 1949, the Engineering Office Heckler & Co. changed its name and was registered officially as Heckler & Koch GmbH. Initially the new company manufactured machine tools, bicycle and sewing machine parts, gauges, and other precision parts.[8] In 1956, Heckler & Koch responded to the West German government's tender for a new infantry rifle for the Bundeswehr with the proposal of the G3 battle rifle, based on the Spanish CETME Model 58 rifle and developed in cooperation with CETME.[6][7] The German government awarded Heckler & Koch the tender and in 1959 declared the G3 the standard rifle of the Bundeswehr.[9][10] Later in 1961, Heckler & Koch developed the 7.62×51mm HK21 general-purpose machine gun, based on the G3.[11]
In 1966, Heckler & Koch introduced the HK54 machine pistol, which eventually launched in 1969 as the MP5 submachine gun.[12] Two years later, the company introduced the HK33 assault rifle, a smaller version of the G3 chambered in 5.56×45mm NATO.[13][14]
Diversification
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In 1974, Heckler & Koch diversified into two more areas, HK Defense and Law Enforcement Technology and HK Hunting and Sports Firearms. Since then, HK has designed and manufactured more than 100 different types of firearms and devices for the world's military and law enforcement organizations as well as sports shooters and hunters.[15] In 1990, Heckler & Koch completed two decades of development of their caseless weapon system and produced prototypes of the G11 rifle. The company also produced prototypes of the G41 assault rifle intended for the Bundeswehr. Due to the international political climate at the time (East and West Germany uniting and defense budget cuts) the company was unable to secure funded contracts from the German government to support production of either weapon system and became financially vulnerable. The following year, Heckler & Koch was sold to British Aerospace's Royal Ordnance division.[4]
During 1994 and 1995, the German government awarded Heckler & Koch contracts for producing an updated standard assault rifle and updated standard sidearm for the Bundeswehr. Heckler & Koch developed and produced the Project HK50, a lightweight carbon fiber assault rifle, which became the G36 assault rifle. In addition, Heckler & Koch produced the P8 pistol, derived from its USP handguns produced since 1989. The USP was adopted as the standard sidearm of the Bundeswehr in 1994, and the G36 was adopted as their standard-issue rifle in 1995.[16]
As the result of a 1999 merger between British Aerospace and Marconi Electronic Systems, Heckler & Koch was owned by the resulting BAE Systems; it was contracted to refurbish the British Army's SA80 rifles (which had been manufactured by Royal Ordnance)[17] This contract entailed a modification program to the SA80 series of rifles to address a number of reliability issues with the design. In 2002, BAE Systems restructured and sold Heckler & Koch to a group of private investors, who created the German group holding company HK Beteiligungs GmbH.
In 2003, HK Beteiligungs GmbH's business organization restructured as Heckler & Koch Jagd und Sportwaffen GmbH (HKJS), and its business was separated into the two business areas similar to the 1974 business mission areas: Defense, and Law Enforcement and Sporting Firearms. In 2004, Heckler & Koch was awarded a major handgun contract for the United States Department of Homeland Security, worth a potential $26.2 million for up to 65,000 handguns.[18] This contract ranks as the single largest handgun procurement contract in U.S. law enforcement history.[19]
Heckler & Koch facility in Oberndorf am Neckar, 2008
HK was contracted by the United States Army to produce the kinetic energy subsystem[20] (see: kinetic projectiles or kinetic energy penetrator) of the Objective Individual Combat Weapon, a planned replacement for the M16 rifle/M203 grenade launcher combination. The OICW was designed to fire 5.56 mm rounds and 25 mm grenades. The kinetic energy component was also developed separately as the XM8, though both the OICW and XM8 are now indefinitely suspended.
Heckler & Koch developed an AR-15/M4 carbine variant, marketed as the HK416.[21] HK replaced the direct impingement system used by the Stoner design on the original M16 with a short-stroke piston operating system. The civilian models are named the MR223 and, in the U.S., the MR556A1.[22]
In 2007, United States Secretary of the Army Pete Geren agreed to hold a "dust chamber" test pitting the M4 against the Heckler & Koch HK416 and XM8, as well as the rival FN SCAR design. The Heckler & Koch XM8 and FN SCAR had the fewest failures in the test, closely followed by the HK416, while the M4 had by far the most.[23] In 2007, the Norwegian Army became the first to field the HK416 as a standard-issue rifle.[24]
HK sells its pistols in the United States to both law enforcement and civilian markets, through its HK USA subsidiary. The company has locations in Virginia, New Hampshire, and Georgia.
After his encounter with Jackson Lamb at the hospital, he’d come to on the floor; no obvious bruising, but he felt like he’d been trampled underfoot. The storeroom door hung open. River Cartwright was gone. Hobbs had got to his feet and made his way upstairs, where the first person he’d encountered was the newly arrived Nick Duffy. And Hobbs learned the hard way that shit travels downwards. “He was just this fat guy. How was I to know—” “Remember Sam Chapman? Bad Sam?” Hobbs did. “Bad Sam once said he wasn’t frightened of anyone except overweight guys with bad breath and ill-fitting shirts.
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