How to Be Perfect: The Correct Answer to Every Moral Question

by Michael Schur

This shouldn’t be that hard, right? You just need to make some small changes in the way you live.

Does Schur think it's easy to be good?

That plastic cup you tossed?

On some standards for grading our efforts, we're woefully under-good.

being good is impossible,

So... does this imply nihilism (here the denial that effort is worth it, or that it matters)? Is hopelessness the rational conclusion?

to boil down the whole confusing morass into four simple questions

Schur's key questions -- which Philosophers have made headway on answering (hence our efforts are not hopeless)

fell in love with ethics for a simple reason: Nearly every single thing we do has some ethical component to it, whether we realize it or not. That means we owe it to ourselves to learn what the hell ethics is and how it works, so we don’t screw everything up all the time. We share this planet with other people. Our actions affect those people. If we care at all about those people, we ought to figure out how to make the best decisions we can.

What are Schur's first TWO arguments motivating the study of ethics? Do these provide good reasons for you?

there’s just gonna be more confusing stuff in the next room, so we might as well get some help making sense of whatever we’re looking at now.

What is Schur's THIRD argument motivating the study of ethics? Is it a good reason? (Cf. Socrates' appeal to the Apollonian dictim, "Know Thyself")

a ton of people who have clearly decided they don’t care about being ethical,

If Schur is right, is being ethical optional? (On the next page, he seems to imply there is something wrong with these people: "If we care about anything in this life, we ought to care about whether what we’re doing is good or bad.")

Later I found out that Heidegger was basically a fascist, so I feel like I made the right call.

It's maybe worth comparing this dismissal with Schur's resistance to totally canceling Woody Allen.

virtue ethics, deontology, and utilitarianism—which are currently thought of as the “Big Three” in Western moral philosophy. That focus marginalizes some of the most famous thinkers in history, like Lao-tzu, David Hume, and John Locke, all of whose writings overlap with one of these Big Three theories but maybe aren’t integral to them. Also, because I wanted The Good Place to be secular, I shied away from religious thinkers

Limits of the book's scope: Contemporary mainstream Western ethics; not Eastern, not religious, not even specifically feminist ethics. We'll compensate for some of this using supplemental readings available via the course site.

Understanding an actual ethical theory that explains why it’s bad can then help us make decisions about what to do in a situation that’s less morally obvious than “Should I punch my friend in the face for no reason?”

Compare the point Schur is developing here to what Augustine says about explaining "time": What is time? Who can explain this easily and briefly? Who can comprehend this even in thought so as to articulate the answer in words? Yet what do we speak of, in our familiar everyday conversation, more than of time? We surely know what we mean when we speak of it. We also know what is meant when we hear someone else talking about it. What then is time? Provided that no one asks me, I know. If I want to explain it to an inquirer, I do not know. (Confessions, XI, xiv, 17; Chadwick translation)

I could describe actions as “good” or “bad”— sharing good murder bad helping friends good punching friends in the face for no reason bad —but what was underlying those behaviors? What’s an all-encompassing, unifying theory that explains “good” or “bad” people?

Here's the drumroll to what ethical theories do...

“virtue ethics”—tries

“virtues,”

they not only have these qualities but have them in the exact right amount.

This is a bit confused. See the Notes below about Schur's Error About Virtue.

We also might wonder if there’s a single way to define a “good” person;

Virtue theory, challenge 1

happiness. That’s the telos,4 or goal, of being human.

Virtue ethics, Aristotle's starting place is the end

“eudaimonia,”

different from pleasure

capital-H Happiness he’s talking about has to involve rational thought and virtues of character,

Aristotle’s flourishing, to me, is a sort of “runner’s high” for the totality of our existence—it’s

* Links virtue to happiness

perform their functions well.”

THE THING ITS VIRTUES ITS PURPOSE Knife Sharpness, blade strength, balance, etc. Cutting things well Tennis player Agility, reflexes, court vision, etc. Playing great all-around tennis Human Generosity, honesty, courage, etc. Flourishing/happiness

born with the potential

“virtue starter kits”—basic

extreme rule follower—or

natural aptitude

he took his aptitude and developed it, with many years of practice, into a skill.

*** (Where WE come in and become responsible)

habituation.…

“practice makes perfect”

can work for any virtue—even ones we seemingly weren’t born with aptitudes for,

good teacher

We have to be generous but not too generous, courageous but not too courageous, and so on.

This manifests Schur's Error About Virtue, which confuses virtue with the continuum on which it is represented. (He instructively slips this way several times, but I hasten to add also gets it right later -- for instance, in writing "“anger” is the quality [that defines the continuum], and “mildness” is the dead-solid-middle-point virtue we’re seeking".) According to Aristotle, virtue IS the mean between extremes. Virtue terms do not correctly describe the extremes or the midpoints between the mean and either extreme! Aristotle says "too much" is no longer courage but instead rashness (as in too much fear-eclipsing confidence), and the "too little" is not too little courage, it's cowardice (maybe too little confidence to overcome fear). As part of the antidote to Schur's Error About Virtue, take a look at Aristotle's discussion and further discussion of anger in reference to the mean: https://thereitis.org/aristotle_nicomachean-ethics/#anger1 and meditate on the quotation just above, where Schur himself nails the distinction.

“the mean.”

the golden mean of this quality: that perfect middle spot, representing the exact amount of the quality in question

The phrasing here again manifests Schur's Error About Virtue: A virtue is a character trait which Aristotle suggests we can usefully represent as "located" at the midpoint on a continuum of ANOTHER quality or qualities. The quality that defines the continuum isn't, say, generosity (running from a little to a lot); it's something else, like tendency-to-give (running from too little to too much). "Generosity" and other virtue terms are reserved to identify the traits that allow us to choose the mean between extremes well. So in Aristotle's sense, one can't technically be "too generous." If one tends-to-give beyond what is wise, that is not generosity, but overshooting virtue; it might be called extravagance. Still, setting aside the more rigorous language of virtue theory, when we're not doing ethics, we might describe an act that misses but aims at generosity as "too generous." I'd argue that it makes sense as a matter of courtesy to call someone like this "too generous" rather than just "wrong."

“anger” is the quality, and “mildness” is the dead-solid-middle-point virtue we’re seeking.

Schur here gets the distinction missed in Schur's Error About Virtue.

the most common criticism of virtue ethics: So, we just need to work and study and strive and practice, and somehow magically obtain this theoretical “perfect” amount of every quality, which is impossible to define or measure? Cool plan. Even Aristotle has a hard time precisely describing a mean sometimes.

Virtue theory, challenge 2, expands on challenge 1

“It is hard to define how, against whom, about what, and how long we should be angry, and up to what point someone is acting correctly or in error.”

Note well: Aristotle thinks the "intellectual virtue" known as practical wisdom (phronêsis) is what allows one to judge in specific cases what is not definable in the abstract. Phronêsis is roughly what allows adults to make better decisions than youths in possession of the same data.

it’s bad to punch our friend in the face for no reason, but now we understand why it’s bad: instead of exhibiting the mean of a virtue (mildness), it demonstrates a wildly excessive amount of anger.

Is THAT part of why it's bad? Is it all there is to why it's bad?

“flexibility” of response is actually a bit like comedic acting.

Approaching the mean for kindness helps us get closer to the mean for generosity, which helps us get closer to the mean for loyalty, which helps us approach the mean for temperance, and so on. Eventually we’ll truly flourish, achieving a mastery over the exact balances

If we elevate cruelty—transgressions against other humans—to the top of the “worst crimes we can commit” list, we can no longer find and exploit any such loopholes.

putting cruelty first in our list of things to avoid seems like a really good idea. Unfortunately, there’s a hefty price to pay: because there is so much cruelty all around us, thinking of it as humanity’s worst vice takes a heavy toll on our psyches. “If cruelty horrifies us,” Shklar writes, “we must, given the facts of daily life, always be in a state of outrage.”

How might Aristotle's practical wisdom guide us here? (About how to moderate our own responses to cruelty…)

You’re driving a trolley,

Version 0

we should pull the lever.

what if we’re not the driver,

Version 1

we’re standing on a bridge

Version 2

feels different,

Bentham’s initial phrasing of utilitarianism was that the best action is whatever makes the most people happy.

As utilitarianism has been developed, it has come to be understood not as promoting however much happiness is possible for as many people as possible, but as promoting however much overall happiness is possible (which allows cases in which more happiness is created for fewer people).

stress test

since people generally try to avoid pain whenever possible, our judgment may be skewed here.

Bad faith? (Yes, Sartre!)