Island Infernos: The US Army's Pacific War Odyssey, 1944

by John C. McManus

Emperor Hirohito issued a triumphant rescript to mark the supposed victory, prompting spontaneous waves of joyous festivities all over Japan from a worried population that had begun to sense the shadow of the American wolf approaching their door. “We celebrated the ‘Glorious Victory of Taiwan,’ ” one Japanese general recalled with chagrin after the war. Countering this narcotic-like self-delusion, Admiral Halsey, in tandem with Nimitz’s headquarters, released on October 17 a chortling statement: “Admiral Nimitz has received from Admiral Halsey the comforting assurance that he is now retiring toward the enemy following the salvage of all the Third Fleet ships recently reported sunk by Radio Tokyo.” Beyond the derisive humor, the statement made it clear that the Japanese had sunk none of Halsey’s ships, a true buzzkill for any Japanese observant enough to digest the message.2 The truth of the Japanese situation was, of course, considerably more unsettling than portrayed by Tokyo, though by no means hopeless. For the first two years of the war, the Philippines had served as little more than a backwater staging base, and a restive one due to growing guerrilla activity. The Japanese stuck mainly to their own bases and populated areas while they granted a meaningless proclamation of independence to a collaborationist regime under President José Laurel, a prominent politician who felt he could best protect his people by ingratiating himself with the occupiers.