The Strategy of Denial: American Defense in an Age of Great Power Conflict

by Elbridge A. Colby

The key, then, is for the United States to include enough states in its defense perimeter such that together these alliances enable a coalition strong enough to deny China hegemony in Asia—particularly by being strong enough to prevail in a systemic regional war—but also be discriminating enough not to overextend itself. Crucially, the United States’ choice is essentially binary—states are either in or out of its perimeter. It is tempting to hedge by making partial or ambiguous commitments, but this is imprudent in the face of a very strong aspirant like China. Ambiguity is tenable when a potential attacker is weak. When such an opponent can be effectively resisted at relatively low cost, ambiguity about a defense perimeter is tolerable and even attractive, because the aspirant cannot do anything too consequential and the ambiguity preserves leverage over the vulnerable states’ behavior.