The Strategy of Denial: American Defense in an Age of Great Power Conflict

by Elbridge A. Colby

Thus if the United States, under the shadow of China’s focused and sequential strategy, were to balk at defending a state in Asia to which it had provided a security commitment against Beijing, this decision would have profound implications not only for other allies in the region but for the anti-hegemonic coalition as a whole. It would provide direct evidence of America’s unwillingness to defend a confederate in the Western Pacific under the darkening shadow of Chinese military power—evidence that could not but be pointedly relevant to governments in Seoul, Manila, Hanoi, Jakarta, Kuala Lumpur, Bangkok, and even Canberra, Tokyo, and New Delhi. This action would speak far louder about the United States’ cost-benefit calculus regarding China and Asia than its behavior in a clearly distinguishable situation such as the conflicts in Afghanistan or Syria. Differentiated credibility is therefore of enormous importance in the context of the anti-hegemonic coalition.