Blackshirts and Reds: Rational Fascism and the Overthrow of Communism

by Michael Parenti

In March 1996, several months before the election, when polls showed him trailing the Communist candidate, Gennadi Zyuganov, Yeltsin ordered decrees drawn up “that would have canceled the election, closed down parliament and banned the Communist Party” (New York Times, 7/2/96). But he was disuaded by advisors who feared the measures might incite too much resistance. Though he decided not to call off the election, “Yeltsin was never committed to turning over the government to a Communist if he lost” (San Francisco Chronicle, 7/26/96). During the 1996 campaign, Yeltsin and his associates repeatedly announced that a communist victory would bring “civil war.” In effect, they were voicing their willingness to discard democracy and resort to force and violence if the election did not go their way. Nor was it taken as an idle threat. At one point surveys showed that “about half the population believed that civil war would result if the Communists won” (Sacramento Bee, 7/9/96). Through all of this Yeltsin received vigorous support from the White House and the U.S. media.