The Effective Executive

by Peter F. Drucker

Pick the future as against the past; Focus on opportunity rather than on problem; Choose your own direction—rather than climb on the bandwagon; and Aim high, aim for something that will make a difference, rather than for something that is “safe” and easy to do.

A good many studies of research scientists have shown that achievement (at least below the genius level of an Einstein, a Niels Bohr, or a Max Planck) depends less on ability in doing research than on the courage to go after opportunity.

Achievement goes to the people who pick their research priorities by the opportunity and who consider other criteria only as qualifiers rather than as determinants.

As a rule it is just as risky, just as arduous, and just as uncertain to do something small that is new as it is to do something big that is new.

It is more productive to convert an opportunity into results than to solve a problem—which only restores the equilibrium of yesterday.

The effective executive does not, in other words, truly commit himself beyond the one task he concentrates on right now. Then he reviews the situation and picks the next one task that now comes first.

Concentration—that is, the courage to impose on time and events his own decision as to what really matters and comes first—is the executive’s only hope of becoming the master of time and events instead of their whipping boy.

Effective executives do not make a great many decisions. They concentrate on the important ones.

Unless a decision has “degenerated into work” it is not a decision; it is at best a good intention.

the action to carry it out should be as close as possible to the working level and as simple as possible.

They all tackled a problem at the highest conceptual level of understanding. They tried to think through what the decision was all about, and then tried to develop a principle for dealing with it. Their decisions were, in other words, strategic, rather than adaptations to the apparent needs of the moment.

THE ELEMENTS OF THE DECISION PROCESS

The clear realization that the problem was generic and could only be solved through a decision which established a rule, a principle;

The most important thing distilled from the decision

The definition of the specifications

which the answer to the problem had to satisfy, that is, of the “boundary conditions”;

The thinking through what is “right,” that is, the solution which will fully satisfy the specifications before attention is given to the compromises, adaptations, and concessions needed to make the decision acceptable;

Equivalent to outlining objectives or the best desirable outcome of the decision, and only then proceeding to rank and quantify compromises

The building into the decision of the action to carry it out;

What you need to do (the what after the why and how)

The “feedback” which tests the validity and effectiveness of the decision against the actual course of events.

Metrics, kpis, Leading indicators that answer the question, how do we know this is effective?

“Is this something that underlies a great many occurrences? Or is the occurrence a unique event that needs to be dealt with as such?”

Like Ray dalios insights into pattern and principles

There is first the truly generic of which the individual occurrence is only a symptom.

Then there is the problem which, while a unique event for the individual institution, is actually generic.

it is, of course, a generic situation which occurs all the time. To think through whether to accept or to reject the offer requires some general rules. For these, however, one has to look to the experience of others.

Next there is the truly exceptional, the truly unique event.

And this, the early manifestation of a new generic problem, is the fourth and last category of events with which the decision process deals.

All events but the truly unique require a generic solution. They require a rule, a policy, a principle.

The effective decision-maker spends time to determine with which of these four situations he is dealing.

A second frame work. Consequential and irreversible + generic or unique. The first step is to know which type it is—and the hack is that most are reversible, inconsequential, and generic.

By far the most common mistake is to treat a generic situation as if it were a series of unique events; that is, to be pragmatic when one lacks the generic understanding and principle.

Equally common is the mistake of treating a new event as if it were just another example of the old problem to which, therefore, the old rules should be applied.

Can apply stop, FLoP, or know discern uniqueness of a new event?

Almost as common is the plausible but erroneous definition of the fundamental problem.

Or the definition of the problem may be incomplete.

The effective decision-maker, therefore, always assumes initially that the problem is generic. He always assumes that the event that clamors for his attention is in reality a symptom. He looks for the true problem.

And if the event is truly unique, the experienced decision-maker suspects that this heralds a new underlying problem and that what appears as unique will turn out to have been simply the first manifestation of a new generic situation.

the longevity of the temporary.

The risk that a quick fix becomes a permanent fixture that long outlives it’s utility and no longer solves any problem effectively

he asks himself every time, “If I had to live with this for a long time, would I be willing to?” And if the answer is “No,” he

keeps on working to find a more general, a more conceptual, a more comprehensive solution—one which establishes the right principle.

The decision-maker also always tests for signs that something atypical, something unusual, is happening;

“Does the explanation explain the observed events and does it explain all of them?; he always

writes out what the solution is expected ...

finally, he goes back and thinks the problem through again when he sees something atypical, when he finds phenomena his explanation does not really explain, or when the course of events deviates, even in details, from his expectations.

What are the objectives the decision has to reach? What are the minimum goals it has to attain? What are the conditions it has to satisfy?

any serious shortfall in defining these boundary conditions is almost certain to make a decision ineffectual, no matter how brilliant it may seem.

“What is the minimum needed to resolve this problem?” is the form in which the boundary conditions are usually probed.

The effective executive knows that a decision that does not satisfy the boundary conditions is ineffectual and inappropriate.

one can salvage the appropriate decision for the incorrect boundary conditions. It is still an effective decision.

It is still a better process than one without boundary conditions at all

clear thinking about the boundary conditions is needed so that one knows when a decision has to be abandoned.

clear thinking about the boundary conditions is needed also to identify the most dangerous of all possible decisions: the one that might—just might—work if nothing whatever goes wrong. These decisions always seem to make sense. But when one

thinks through the specifications they have to satisfy, one always finds that they are essentially incompatible with each other.

Highly improbable; no room for error; fooling yourself that you have the perfect plan, provided every thing goes right. Perhaps this is one reason why we underestimate timelines; we fail to recognize the boundary conditions, if we recognize them at all, and create an ideal scenario for our work. In reality, it was highly improbable it ever would have gotten done.

defining the specifications and setting the boundary conditions

always has to be done on interpretation. It is risk-taking judgment.

One has to start out with what is right rather than what is acceptable