The Open Society and Its Enemies (Princeton Classics)

by Karl Popper

I believe, in common with a great number of thinkers, and especially with many social scientists, that the distinction between laws in sense (a), i.e. statements describing regularities of nature, and laws in sense (b), i.e. norms such as prohibitions or commandments, is a fundamental one, and that these two kinds of law have hardly more in common than a name. But this view is by no means generally accepted; on the contrary, many thinkers believe that there are norms—prohibitions or commandments—which are ‘natural’ in the sense that they are laid down in accordance with natural laws in sense (a).

The starting point which I have called ‘naïve monism’ is the stage at which the distinction between natural and normative laws is not yet made.

Within this stage, we may further distinguish between two possibilities. The one can be described as a naïve naturalism. At this stage regularities, whether natural or conventional, are felt to be beyond the possibility of any alteration whatever.

More important is a stage which we can describe as a naïve conventionalism—a stage at which both natural and normative regularities are experienced as expressions of, and as dependent upon, the decisions of man-like gods or demons.

It is understandable that those who think in this way may believe that even the natural laws are open to modifications, under certain exceptional circumstances; that with the help of magical practices man may sometimes influence them; and that natural regularities are upheld by sanctions, as if they were normative.

The breakdown of magic tribalism is closely connected with the realization that taboos are different in various tribes, that they are imposed and enforced by man, and that they may be broken without unpleasant repercussions if one can only escape the sanctions imposed by one’s fellow-men.

When this differentiation is clearly understood, then we can describe the position reached as a critical dualism, or critical conventionalism.

the opposition between nature and convention.

Critical dualism merely asserts that norms and normative laws can be made and changed by man, more especially by a decision or convention to observe them or to alter them, and that it is therefore man who is morally responsible for them;

certain decisions may be eliminated as incapable of being executed, because they contradict certain natural laws (or ‘unalterable facts’).

Critical dualism thus emphasizes the impossibility of reducing decisions or norms to facts; it can therefore be described as a dualism of facts and decisions.

The statement that norms are man-made (man-made not in the sense that they were consciously designed, but in the sense that men can judge and alter them—that is to say, in the sense that the responsibility for them is entirely ours) has often been misunderstood. Nearly all misunderstandings can be traced back to one fundamental misapprehension, namely, to the belief that ‘convention’ implies ‘arbitrariness’; that if we are free to choose any system of norms we like, then one system is just as good as any other.

artificiality by no means implies full arbitrariness.

The view that norms are man-made is also, strangely enough, contested by some who see in this attitude an attack on religion.

this view is an attack on certain forms of religion, namely, on the religion of blind authority, on magic and tabooism. But I do not think that it is in any way opposed to a religion built upon the idea of personal responsibility and freedom of conscience.

I only maintain that it is we, and we alone, who are responsible for adopting or rejecting some suggested moral laws; it is we who must distinguish between the true prophets and the false prophets.

If, however, you accept the Christian ethics not because you are commanded to do so but because of your conviction that it is the right decision to take, then it is you who have decided.

there are important natural laws of social life also. For these, the term sociological laws seems appropriate. It is just the fact that in social life we meet with both kinds of laws, natural and normative, which makes it so important to distinguish them clearly.

I have in mind, rather, such laws as are formulated by modern economic theories, for instance, the theory of international trade, or the theory of the trade cycle. These and other important sociological laws are connected with the functioning of social institutions.

institutions, like levers, are needed if we want to achieve anything which goes beyond the power of our muscles.

institutions are always made by establishing the observance of certain norms, designed with a certain aim in mind.

intermediate positions arise from the misapprehension that if a norm is conventional or artificial, it must be wholly arbitrary.

three most important of these intermediate positions. They are (1) biological naturalism, (2) ethical or juridical positivism, and (3) psychological or spiritual naturalism.

these positions has been used for defending ethical views which are radically opposed to each other; more especially, for defending the worship of power, and for defending the rights of the weak.

(1) Biological naturalism, or more precisely, the biological form of ethical naturalism, is the theory that in spite of the fact that moral laws and the laws of states are arbitrary, there are some eternal uncha...

Biological naturalism has been used not only to defend equalitarianism, but also to defend the anti-equalitarian doctrine of the rule of the strong.

The choice of conformity with ‘nature’ as a supreme standard leads ultimately to consequences which few will be prepared to face; it does not lead to a more natural form of civilization, but to beastliness14

He overlooks the fact that he makes a choice, a decision; that it is possible that some other people cherish certain things more than their health (for instance, the many who have consciously risked their lives for medical research). And he is therefore mistaken if he believes that he has not made a decision, or that he has derived his norms from biological laws.

(2) Ethical positivism shares with the biological form of ethical naturalism the belief that we must try to reduce norms to facts. But the facts are this time sociological facts, namely, the actual existing norms. Positivism maintains that there are no other norms but the laws which have actually been set up (or ‘posited’) and which have therefore a positive existence.

‘According to some forms of this theory, it is a gross misunderstanding to believe that the individual can judge the norms of society; rather, it is society which provides the code by which the individual must be judged.

As a matter of historical fact, ethical (or moral, or juridical) positivism has usually been conservative, or even authoritarian; and it has often invoked the authority of God.

(3) Psychological or spiritual naturalism is in a way a combination of the two previous views, and it can best be explained by means of an argument against the one-sidedness of these views. The ethical positivist is right, this argument runs, if he emphasizes that all norms are conventional, i.e. a product of man, and of human society; but he overlooks the fact that they are therefore an expression of the psychological or spiritual nature of man, and of the nature of human society. The biological naturalist is right in assuming that there are certain natural aims or ends, from which we can derive natural norms; but he overlooks the fact that our natural aims are not necessarily such aims as health, pleasure, or food, shelter or propagation.

This plausible position was, I believe, first formulated by Plato, who was here under the influence of the Socratic doctrine of the soul, i.e. of Socrates’ teaching that the spirit matters more than the flesh15.

spiritual naturalism has been much used, and especially by Plato, to justify the natural prerogatives of the ‘noble’ or ‘elect’ or ‘wise’ or of the ‘natural leader’.

On the other hand, it has been used by Christian and other16 humanitarian forms of ethics, for instance by Paine and by Kant, to demand the recognition of the ‘natural rights’ of every human individual.

Looking back at this brief survey, we may perhaps discern two main tendencies which stand in the way of adopting a critical dualism. The first is a general tendency towards monism17, that is to say, towards the reduction of norms to facts. The second lies deeper, and it possibly forms the background of the first. It is based upon our fear of admitting to ourselves that the responsibility for our ethical decisions is entirely ours and cannot be shifted to anybody else; neither to God, nor to nature, nor to society, nor to history. All these ethical theories attempt to find somebody, or perhaps some argument, to take the burden from us18. But we cannot shirk this responsibility. Whatever authority we may accept, it is we who accept it. We only deceive ourselves if we do not realize this simple point.

Plato, of course, does not always use the term ‘nature’ in the same sense. The most important meaning which he attaches to it is, I believe, practically identical with that which he attaches to the term ‘essence’. This way of using the term ‘nature’ still survives among essentialists even in our day; they still speak, for instance, of the nature of mathematics, or of the nature of inductive inference, or of the ‘nature of happiness and misery’19. When used by Plato in this way, ‘nature’ means nearly the same as ‘Form’ or ‘Idea’; for the Form or Idea of a thing, as shown above, is also its essence.

The Form or Idea of a sensible thing is, as we have seen, not in that thing, but separated from it; it is its forefather, its primogenitor; but this Form or father passes something on to the sensible things which are its offspring or race, namely, their nature.

Plato not only teaches that the soul is prior to other things and therefore exists ‘by nature’; he uses the term ‘nature’, if applied to man, frequently also as a name for spiritual powers or gifts or natural talents, so that we can say that a man’s ‘nature’ is much the same as his ‘soul’; it is the divine principle by which he participates in the Form or Idea,

the term ‘race’, again, is frequently used in a very similar sense. Since a ‘race’ is united by being the offspring of the same primogenitor, it must also be united by a common nature. Thus the terms ‘nature’ and ‘race’ are frequently used by Plato as synonyms, for instance, when he speaks of the ‘race of philosophers’ and of those who have ‘philosophic natures’; so that both these terms are closely akin to the terms ‘essence’ and ‘soul’.

This principle, when applied to the science of society and of politics, leads to the demand that the origin of society and of the state must be examined. History therefore is not studied for its own sake but serves as the method of the social sciences. This is the historicist methodology.

What is the nature of human society, of the state? According to historicist methods, this fundamental question of sociology must be reformulated in this way: what is the origin of society and of the state?

The origin of society is a convention, a social contract. But it is not only that; it is, rather, a natural convention, i.e. a convention which is based upon human nature, and more precisely, upon the social nature of man.

This social nature of man has its origin in the imperfection of the human individual.

Plato teaches that the human individual cannot be self-sufficient, owing to the limitations inherent in human nature.

They can reach perfection only through the state and in the state; the perfect state must offer them the proper ‘social habitat’, without which they must grow corrupt and degenerate. The state therefore must be placed higher than the individual since only the state can be self-sufficient (‘autark’), perfect, and able to make good the necessary imperfection of the individual.

Society and the individual are thus interdependent. The one owes its existence to the other. Society owes its existence to human nature, and especially to its lack of self-sufficiency; and the individual owes his existence to society, since he is not self-sufficient. But within this relationship of interdependence, the superiority of the state over the individual manifests itself in various ways;

the only really important division of labour turns out to be that between rulers and ruled, claimed to be based upon the natural inequality of masters and slaves, of wise and ignorant.

In practice, everything is left to the wisdom of the great lawgiver (a godlike philosopher, whose picture, especially in the Laws, is undoubtedly a self-portrait;

Such an emphasis upon oneness and wholeness—especially of the state; or perhaps of the world—may be described as ‘holism’. Plato’s holism, I believe, is closely related to the tribal collectivism mentioned in earlier chapters. Plato was longing for the lost unity of tribal life. A life of change, in the midst of a social revolution, appeared to him unreal. Only a stable whole, the permanent collective, has reality, not the passing individuals. It is ‘natural’ for the individual to subserve the whole, which is no mere assembly of individuals, but a ‘natural’ unit of a higher order.