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February 10 - February 14, 2022
If we choose not to weaponize technologies such as artificial intelligence, that does not mean that our competitors will follow suit and be bound by the same choices. We do not have to be happy about this reality, but we cannot afford to deny it either.
If we choose not to weaponize technologies such as artificial intelligence, that does not mean that our competitors will follow suit and be bound by the same choices. We do not have to be happy about this reality, but we cannot afford to deny it either.
The reason to build weapons is not because we want to but because we believe we have to, because we do not want to live disarmed and defenseless in a world full of predators.
Limiting the development and use of autonomous weapons will likely only be possible once the United States and its competitors can negotiate from positions of strength—with weapons to trade away—and are motivated by the fear that the continued construction of these weapons will endanger their security.
XQ-58A would be low cost, at least in Pentagon terms—so low cost that it would be what the laboratory team called “attritable.” In other words, the Air Force could afford to buy a lot of them and lose a lot of them in combat. The XQ-58A is expected to cost several million dollars per aircraft once sensors and weapons are added, meaning that the Air Force could buy roughly a dozen or two XQ-58As for the price of one F-35A.
XLUUVs, which also got a new name shortly after I saw it: the Orca.
on September 14, 2019, when a rudimentary swarm of seventeen drones and eight cruise missiles of Iranian origin struck oil refineries in Saudi Arabia and knocked half of its production facilities offline.
success is always a function of three factors that do not change: the range of fire (how far militaries can shoot), the accuracy of fire (how well they can hit what they are shooting at), and the effect of fire (how much damage they can do).
on June 20, 2019, Iranian forces shot down a US RQ-4 Global Hawk, a nearly $220 million surveillance drone,6 with a precision surface-to-air missile.
In time, more of these systems will be armed with directed energy weapons that will enable them to shoot at the speed of light without the constraints of physical ammunition. The result will be an exponential increase in the number of available weapons such that when a future call for fires goes out, it will be far likelier that military systems are in the position to shoot in larger volumes and at greater velocities than ever.
The goal will be to build ever more resilient networks that can function securely, recover quickly, and reconstitute themselves even when under severe attack.
Strategy is perhaps the most abused word in Washington.
Government strategies are more often laundry lists of hopes and dreams that help leaders avoid making choices.
we need a strategy of defense without dominance.
for the US military to deny military dominance to China, as it must, it will have to do less everywhere else.
Trump’s decision to withdraw from the nuclear agreement with Iran was a mistake—not because the deal was “good,” but rather because it would have enabled America to spend less of its limited military power focused on what is ultimately a secondary priority.
future force should be built around larger numbers of smaller systems.
the future force should consist of smaller numbers of people operating much larger numbers of highly intelligent unmanned machines.
future force should also be built around highly decentralized networks that move limited amounts of data rather than the highly centralized networks of today that must move tons of data.
The United States needs capable allies and partners to succeed in the world, especially to balance Chinese power.
a defense acquisition system that has been optimized for risk aversion and cost accounting, not rapid technology development at scale; a defense industry that has become increasingly consolidated and closed to new entrants; a breakdown in the relationship between the national security and technology communities; and a broader failure of imagination about America’s rapidly diminishing military dominance.
The problem is that the process that validates requirements can drag on for months, even years, leaving troops in need without cutting-edge or even effective capabilities.
If senior leaders do not define their top problems more clearly, defense buzzwords actually become obstacles to real change because the bureaucracy simply rebrands everything it has long been doing using these new terms.
They should be framed around the kill chain—how to gain better understanding, make better decisions, and take better actions faster and more often than specific military competitors.
deny China’s means of projecting power and committing acts of aggression.
US and allied forces would have to close the kill chain against 350 Chinese ships during the first three days of a conflict.
