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March 26 - April 9, 2022
democracies enjoy a built-in advantage in long-run geopolitical competitions.
Herodotus, Machiavelli, and Montesquieu are among the classical political thinkers who argued that republican forms of government are best able to harness available domestic resources toward national greatness.
For the past two decades, cutting-edge research in economics and political science has been obsessed with the issue of whether democracies are different, and the consistent finding is that they perform a number of key functions better than their autocratic counterparts. They have higher long-run rates of economic growth.13 They are better able to raise money in international capital markets and become international financial centers.14 They build stronger and more reliable alliances.15 They are more likely to make and keep international agreements.16 They are less likely to fight wars (at
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Democracy is a force multiplier that helps states punch above their weight in international geopolitics.
America’s greatest strength in its coming competition with Russia and China, therefore, is not its military might or economic heft, but its institutions. For all of its faults, America’s fundamentals are still better than Russia’s and China’s. There is good reason to believe, therefore, that the American era will endure and the autocratic challenges posed by China and Russia will run out of steam. The
Discourses on Livy in the 16th century: “Fewer errors will be seen in the people than in the prince—and those lesser and having greater remedies.”22 “Hence it arises that a republic has greater life and has good fortune longer than a principality.”23
Machiavelli’s conclusion is straightforward: Rome’s republican institutions were the secret to its success. As he writes, “For it is seen through experience that cities have never expanded either in dominion or in riches if they have not been in freedom.”
“The chief cause of either success or the opposite is, I would claim, the nature of a state’s system of government.”
where there are kings, there must be the greatest cowards. For men’s souls are enslaved, and refuse to run risks readily and recklessly to increase the power of somebody else. But independent people, taking risks on their own behalf and not on behalf of others, are willing and eager to go into danger, for they themselves enjoy the prize of victory.
In sum, to achieve global mastery, a state must have a strong economy, strong diplomacy, and a strong military.
Good economic institutions are those that incentivize people to work hard, engage in productive economic activity, and make themselves and their nations richer. They include protections for private property rights, allowing individuals and firms to develop businesses, properties, and products without fear that their assets will be seized by other individuals or the state itself. They contain courts that reliably enforce contracts, so economic actors can transact with confidence that business agreements will be upheld. The rules need to be nondiscriminatory so as to encourage wide swathes of
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And radical innovation does not tend to happen in societies that enforce conformity and discourage new ways of thinking or doing things. A
constraints on executive power allow rulers to credibly commit to protecting individual property rights, encouraging citizens to engage in long-term planning, investment, and economic activity.
The democratic peace theory—the idea that democracies do not fight other democracies—is well known. What is less well known is that democracies win the wars they fight.52 Indeed, since 1815, democracies have won over 76 percent of their wars. Compare this to the much lower success rate of autocracies, which have been victorious in only 47 percent of cases. Statistical tests reveal that regime type is an important determinant of victory in war even after controlling for other factors that might matter, such as military power, terrain, strategy, allies, and distance.
In addition, democratic states facilitate free flows of information, which allow leaders to make more accurate assessments about their prospects for victory. Before a democratic leader makes a decision to go to war, he or she has been informed by vigorous debates within his or her own government and in the broader public. These debates weigh the available options and the associated costs and benefits. Autocratic leaders, on the other hand, do not benefit from hearing all sides of an argument. They tend to be surrounded by “yes men” who tell the dictator what he wants to hear.
Foreign policy wonks in the United States can burnish their credentials and advance their career prospects by consistently pointing out the flaws in U.S. foreign policy in op-eds, journal articles, and books. The same behavior in China would land one in jail. Leaders in autocratic states, therefore, may make less sound judgments on issues of war and peace because they need not worry about losing power at the ballot box and because they are less likely to have access to the best information about their chances of prevailing in armed conflict.
Perhaps democracy’s greatest advantage over autocracy in international warfare, however, is that democrats have the luxury of focusing their militaries on international warfare. Autocratic leaders, on the other hand, fear their own people more than foreign powers. They must devote considerable attention to domestic threats to their rule. Autocratic systems often lack legitimacy and
Indeed, Washington has arguably followed the same basic grand strategy since 1945: building, expanding, and maintaining a rules-based, liberal international order. It is a simple three-step strategy. First, set up an open system with international institutions, free trade, and support for democracy and human rights. Second, invite other countries to join the order. Third, defend the order against challengers.
The “China for a day” thesis assumes that it is big, government actions that really get things done. But the most important decisions for the future wealth and power of nations often do not come from the top down, but from the bottom up. The best ideas do not reside in the politburo but in talented individuals in the boardroom, or the battlefield, closest to the action. A government that gets out of the way and lets societal actors fill the void have often proven more successful. Indeed, too much government control can stifle creativity and crowd out the energies of society where the real
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Machiavelli argued: I, therefore, disagree with the common opinion that a populace in power is unstable [and] changeable. . . . The prince . . . unchecked by laws, will be more . . . unstable, and imprudent than a populace.
So, yes, democratic governments are slow and plodding in normal political times, but this also means that they get out of the way and let the blooming, buzzing confusion within their societies advance a multitude of options with a greater chance that at least one of them leads to major breakthroughs. It also means that they are more cautious and, therefore, less likely to make major blunders. As Machiavelli claimed, “one will see fewer mistakes in the populace than in the prince, and these will be less serious and easier to resolve.”15 Let
“those who censure the discord between the nobles and the plebians . . . consider only the tumult and shouts generated by such disorder, rather than the good results they generate.”
According to Thompson, the leading states in the international system for the past four hundred years (the timeframe of his study) have been: the Dutch Republic (1609–1713), Great Britain (1714–1945), and the United States (1945–present). These states were also among the most democratic of their time. According to this reckoning, therefore, liberal leviathans have led the world for the past four centuries and counting.
cannot force people to think and have good ideas by threatening to shoot them.”10
Acemoglu and Robinson have argued that autocracies can generate high rates of growth over the short term by directing unproductive resources toward more efficient uses. The CCP’s early growth model relied on moving unproductive rural labor in agriculture to urban manufacturing jobs to support export-led growth. It also relied on catching up with the advanced world by importing foreign technology. And it was boosted by government infrastructure spending. They argue that the easy gains from this model have been fully exploited, however, and absent the adoption of more inclusive economic
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Democracies have not made better decisions historically because they possess and process more data. They excelled because they used the data they had to consider multiple points of view, weigh pros and cons, and make sound decisions. Dictators make poor decisions because they dismiss, or are not even exposed to, contrary arguments. Even if China and other autocracies could control all the data in the world, it will not help them fix their poor, politically-driven decision making process. In sum, China’s autocratic system will continue to hold back China’s economic power.
In short, China’s efforts to win friends and influence people suffers from Beijing’s autocratic politics. The National Bureau of Asian Research reports that “it will be increasingly difficult for the [Chinese] government to prevent its domestic record on political and civil freedoms from affecting China’s international credibility.” The free nations of the world will be unlikely to trust an autocratic country to lead on the global stage.
the PLA demands strict obedience to orders, and it is unlikely that lower-level PLA officers will be willing or able to improvise on the battlefield. It is much safer to wait for orders from above than risk being charged with insubordination. No plan survives contact with the enemy, and PLA soldiers will be paralyzed without a plan. The PLA may be fine in the early stages of a tightly controlled military engagement, but it is hard to imagine it doing well once the chaos of war descends.
Indeed, contrary to the prevailing narrative, intense domestic political fights and polarization are not evidence that American democracy has failed; rather, they are proof that the system is working. Yes, democracy can be messy, but that is what makes the system great. These disagreements are not even permitted in autocratic states. Serious political conflicts of interest in autocracies often result in dead bodies. Our democratic political system gives us the ability to work out our differences through a mutually accepted and peaceful, institutionalized process. Legislative gridlock is not
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As we saw in the last chapter, China’s economy is dominated by large, state-owned enterprises. These companies are so important politically that China will not allow them to go out of business. They cannot fail. In the United States, we succeed because we fail. Many different ideas and products are brought to market. Almost all fail. The ones that do not can change the world.
Some, including in China, have called for a new reserve currency to replace the dollar, but there is no alternative in sight. Capital controls in China guarantee that the Renminbi (RMB) will not become a widely held reserve currency absent fundamental reforms. Russia is an economic basket case. And the political divisions within Europe make it less than ideal as a global financial center, as the European debt crisis demonstrated. Indeed, in recent years, as great power competition has grown more intense, the U.S. dollar has continued to grow stronger relative to other major currencies,
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Until Russia and China have the ability to fight a full-scale war in North America, talk of genuine multipolarity is premature.
China is certainly expanding its military capabilities, but it takes time (often a decade or more) to build major military platforms. Even if Xi Jinping makes the decision to do so today, it would take China until 2050 at the earliest to become a global military superpower.
Washington also has trust in its officer corps and strong civil-military relations. The United States is comfortable delegating tactical decisions to commanders on the ground. This provides a significant advantage over more sclerotic autocratic competitors, especially in a messy, high-intensity fight.
In sum, America’s vibrant economy, its strong alliance relationships, and its unmatched military, all reflections of the U.S. domestic political system, will continue to provide a significant source of strategic advantage for the United States over its autocratic competitors in the years to come. The international security environment is becoming more competitive, and the United States does not enjoy the unchallenged primacy it enjoyed in the 1990s. We have returned to an era of great power rivalry. But, there is no doubt that among these great powers, the United States remains far and away
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This book, therefore, made the “hard-power” case for democracy. Generally, democracy is admired because it is the best political system for advancing freedom, human rights, the rule of law, and human dignity. Those are important attributes, and democracy is rightly celebrated for these normative reasons. But by focusing too much on these softer assets, we overlook other important and practical benefits of democracy: Democracy is the best machine ever invented for generating enormous state wealth, influence, power, and prestige on the international stage. Indeed, it is difficult if not
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politics is the result of both virtu and fortuna. The literal translations of these words are virtue and fortune, but his intended meaning was somewhat closer to what we would today call skill and circumstances. Machiavelli argued that even the most skilled leaders sometimes fail due to other overriding forces and that when circumstances are propitious, skilled leaders must still be prepared to seize the moment.
We have seen in this book that democratic great powers have done quite well historically, but they have fallen for three reasons. Athens was defeated primarily due to a rash decision permitted by its system of direct democracy. Rome and Venice lost their vitality when they closed the open political systems that had sustained their rise. Finally, the Dutch Republic and Great Britain were surpassed by other, even more competitive, democratic rivals; England overtook the Dutch Republic and Great Britain passed the baton of democratic global leadership to the United States.
Domestically, therefore, Washington must continue to nurture its greatest source of strength: its institutions. Some argue that America’s greatest advantage is its innovative economy, its global network of alliances, or its military dominance, but this book explained how all of these positive attributes are, in fact, byproducts of America’s underlying domestic political system. Democracy is the master variable that explains U.S. success.
Contrary to the myth that democracies cannot pursue long-term grand strategies, the United States has been following the same basic grand strategy for three-quarters of a century. In fact, it is a variant of the same grand strategy that liberal leviathans have been pursuing for over two thousand years from Athens to Rome, from Venice to Amsterdam, and from London to Washington, DC. Step one, build a liberal international system. Step two, invite other nations to join. Step three, defend the system from challengers.
The democracy versus autocracy framework adopted in this book reveals autocracies’ greatest vulnerabilities. They cannot sustain high, long-run rates of economic growth and their financial markets are fragile. They are poor alliance builders and their aggressive actions often provoke counterbalancing coalitions. They struggle to develop high-end strategic military technologies. They make big blunders in foreign and defense policy. And their biggest security threat comes from their own people, making their regimes unstable.
