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July 13 - July 20, 2022
But Machiavelli was the Michelangelo of politics. Like his contemporaries in the arts, Machiavelli ushered his field out of the dark ages and into the modern world. He is often considered the first modern political scientist and among the first “Realist” international relations scholars.
Machiavelli is best known for his short work of advice to the new Medici ruler, The Prince.
The book advised the new prince on how to consolidate power and recommends the use of any means necessary, no matter how diabolical, to protect the city-state in a turbulent and violent era.
Indeed, due to the widespread fame (or infamy) of The Prince, the adjective “Machiavellian” has become synonymous with cunning, double-dealing, and immorality.
In actuality, however, Machiavelli was a republican with a small “r.” (Ancient political theorists drew a distinction between democratic and republican forms of government, with “democracy” meaning direct majority rule of the people and “republicanism” connoting a system with a division of power among various branches of government, rule by elected representatives, and strong protections for minority rights.)
He makes this case for the democratic advantage most clearly in what many consider to be his greatest masterpiece, The Discourses on Livy.3 While less well-known than The Prince, The Discourses is nothing short of a full-throated defense of republican government. In fact, in this work, Machiavelli goes so far as to advise a wise prince to use his fleeting time in office not to rule with an iron fist, but, rather, to establish a republic. This he argues, is what will do most to contribute to the well-being of his people and to the prince’s own legacy.
Machiavelli’s conclusion is straightforward: Rome’s republican institutions were the secret to its success. As he writes, “For it is seen through experience that cities have never expanded either in dominion or in riches if they have not been in freedom.”5
Note that Machiavelli was somewhat “Machiavellian” in his defense of democracy. He does not extol republican systems of government because they protect the freedoms and human rights of their citizens, but rather for a more instrumental reason: they help the state to become more powerful.
“If one thinks the finer and nobler thing is to be a world-class leader, with an extensive dominion and empire, the center and focal point of everyone’s world—then one must admit that the Spartan constitution is deficient, and that the Roman constitution is superior and more dynamic. The facts themselves demonstrate the truth of this.”10
Before Rome, Athens was a leading state in the ancient world. Like the commentators on Rome mentioned earlier, ancient Greeks also attributed Athens’s success in international affairs to its open political institutions at home.
Hippocrates maintained that freedom domestically contributes to expansion internationally. He writes: where there are kings, there must be the greatest cowards. For men’s souls are enslaved, and refuse to run risks readily and recklessly to increase the power of somebody else. But independent people, taking risks on their own behalf and not on behalf of others, are willing and eager to go into danger, for they themselves enjoy the prize of victory.13
For the past several decades, social scientists have been obsessed with the question of whether democracies are different. And the answer they have found, in a wide range of discrete issue areas, from economic growth to military effectiveness, is that democracies do better.
First, to become a great power, a state must have a strong economy.
Perhaps most importantly, a state can translate economic weight into military power.
Granting or denying access to capital to other nations is also an important tool of diplomatic statecraft. Perhaps most importantly, however, the ability to borrow allows states to finance arms buildups and large wars in excess of normal revenue.
Second, to become an enduring global leader, a state must also be effective diplomatically.
Allies can also contribute resources and manpower to share in the burdens of diplomatic efforts, defense buildups, and combat. They
Enduring global leaders must also be effective not only at building their own alliances, but at preventing rivals from forming counterbalancing coalitions.
The final ingredient for global mastery is military power. Military power may be the most important resource in an anarchic international system. There is no world government and so there is no international 911 a state can call if it gets into trouble.18 This makes international politics a “self-help” system.
In sum, to achieve global mastery, a state must have a strong economy, strong diplomacy, and a strong military.
but denigrated direct democracy for its tendency to devolve into mob rule and tyranny of the majority.
But this distinction has become less important over time. It is simply not practical to have every citizen debate and vote on every issue in the modern world. In practice, what we today call democracy is what the ancients would have called a “republican” form of government. This book is really about the advantages of “republican” forms of government, and it concurs with past philosophers who saw downsides to direct democracy.
Contemporary political scientists define democracies as political systems in which political officeholders are selected through competitive, popular elections.21 Thicker definitions add a broad set of political and civil liberties, such as freedom of speech and assembly, that are necessary to make an electoral political system work.
What unites autocratic forms of government, however, is that their leaders are either unelected or have been selected through sham elections in which the outcome was rigged by authorities. Their citizens also lack the broad sets of political and civil freedoms enjoyed in more open societies.
The widely used Polity scores measure the level of democracy of every country in the world from 1800 to the present on a twenty-point scale, ranging from −10 (most autocratic) to +10 (most democratic).22 According to these rankings, Mexico, for example, is considered more democratic than North Korea, but less so than the United States.
The democratic advantage in international diplomacy goes beyond formal commitments, however. Democracies also enjoy more “soft power.”47 Political scientist Joseph Nye defines hard power as the ability to influence others through economic or military threats or promises. He contrasts that with soft power—a term he coined—to mean achieving one’s goals by getting others to want what you want.
Nye argued that the United States, due to its attractive political system, culture, and foreign policies, built up large reservoirs of soft power during the Cold War.
according to a recent ranking of soft power, the top twenty nations with the most soft power around the world are all democracies.48
Finally, democracies may also be better at foreign policy decision-making in general. As we will see later, scholars have argued that democracies may enjoy a wartime advantage due to two factors.50 First, democratic leaders may make better decisions about war and peace due to the free flow of information and open debate in their societies. And second, democracies may produce more capable military officers who are empowered to take initiative on the battlefield.
If democratic warriors are better able to take initiative on the battlefield, then democratic diplomats may also be more effective at the negotiating table.
On December 7, 1941, Japan attacked the U.S. naval base at Pearl Harbor. Tokyo intentionally picked a fight with the world’s largest economic power on the assumption that the United States did not have the stomach for a major war in the Pacific. A few years later, on September 2, 1945, Japan formally surrendered on the decks of the USS Missouri in Tokyo Bay.
The democratic peace theory—the idea that democracies do not fight other democracies—is well known. What is less well known is that democracies win the wars they fight.52 Indeed, since 1815, democracies have won over 76 percent of their wars.
First, as the examples above indicate, democracies are more likely to choose wars they can win, or at least ones in which losses will not be devastating.
Democratic leaders may be pickier about the wars they fight because they conduct foreign policy with an eye to the ballot box.
In addition, democratic states facilitate free flows of information, which allow leaders to make more accurate assessments about their prospects for victory.
In addition, democratic states produce better soldiers. To fight effectively, officers must be prepared to take initiative on the battlefield.
Moreover, autocrats do not tend to empower lower-level officers because they like to maintain strict control from the top. Additionally, democratic soldiers are often more motivated because they believe they are fighting for their own nation’s freedom, not because they are forced into battle.
Furthermore, democracies are known to comply with the laws of war and treat prisoners humanely. This makes surrender an easier proposition for enemy soldiers. Just think of Saddam Hussein’s army surrendering in droves without much of a fight in the 1991 and 2003 Gulf Wars.
Democracies also enjoy a military advantage due to their innovation edge.
Perhaps democracy’s greatest advantage over autocracy in international warfare, however, is that democrats have the luxury of focusing their militaries on international warfare. Autocratic leaders, on the other hand, fear their own people more than foreign powers.
In sum, democracies enjoy a military advantage because they make better decisions on matters of war and peace, their soldiers take initiative on the battlefield, they are more innovative in military-technological competitions, and they have the luxury of focusing on external enemies.
Of course, social science is not physics. The strongest relationships we have are general tendencies, not hard and fast rules.
We can, therefore, aggregate these mid-level findings about a democratic advantage in discrete areas into a bigger theory about domestic political institutions and international power and influence. Democracies should enjoy a systematic advantage in international geopolitics.
Some see the constraints on government power in democracies as a weakness, but, in fact, they are democracy’s greatest strength. These constraints facilitate economic growth by giving individuals and businesses confidence that they will be able to reap the rewards of their labors, investments, and innovations.
The further one goes back in time, the fewer states that meet contemporary standards of democracy, but some states were more open than others even in the ancient world, and this book contends that those differences matter.
state possesses diplomatic strength when it has a large network of effective and reliable allies and partners and when it does not face a formidable counterbalancing coalition. Military strength exists when a state possesses a quantitative and/or qualitative military advantage over its rivals.
The dependent variable is international power and influence.
If this argument is correct, then we should expect that democracies tend to possess more hard and soft power resources than do autocracies. In a sense, therefore, these are both intervening and dependent variables according to this theoretical framework.
We might also expect that, while autocracies may launch serious challenges for world domination, they will tend to fail in their bids. Finally, we should expect that power transitions, situations in which a rising challenger overtakes a declining hegemon, will be less likely when there is a reigning democratic hegemon and a rising autocratic challenger.
But some of the benefits, especially those that rely on checks and balances within the system, do not apply to direct democracies in which simple majority opinion can result in decision making that is every bit as rash as in autocracies. Direct democracies should tend to do better than autocracies, therefore, but not as well as republics. It is republics, or what we today call democracies, that should benefit from the full range of democratic advantages.
