The Bomb: Presidents, Generals, and the Secret History of Nuclear War

by Fred Kaplan

General Lemnitzer replied with a brief memo, speaking on behalf of all the Chiefs, dismissing the whole notion of “controlled responses” and “negotiating pauses” in a nuclear war. First, he argued, it was impractical. U.S. nuclear forces were too vulnerable to risk holding back a large number of them once a war had begun; a Soviet strike would disable this so-called reserve force, so, as a practical matter, we had to use it or lose it. Second, there was a conceptual problem. The alleged advantages of “limiting” our attack were plausible only if the Soviets cooperated—that is, if they limited their attack too—and that premise, he wrote, “does not now appear realistic.”I Finally, Lemnitzer argued, the act of even advocating this “controlled response” doctrine “could gravely weaken the current deterrent posture.” Though he didn’t bother to elaborate, his point was clear: to the Chiefs, and to SAC, the appeal of nuclear weapons—the crux of their power to keep the enemy at bay—was precisely their massive destructiveness. Talking about restraining this power, much less touting restraint as a new “doctrine,” might tempt our enemies to flex their muscles without fear of a devastating counterpunch.