The Bomb: Presidents, Generals, and the Secret History of Nuclear War

by Fred Kaplan

After indulging another round of objections from his advisers, Kennedy made his point more firmly. “Now let’s not kid ourselves,” he said. “Most people think that if you’re allowed an even trade, you ought to take advantage of it.” Bundy protested with unusual vigor. “I think we should tell you the universal assessment of everyone in the government who’s connected with alliance problems,” he said, his voice quivering. “If we appear to be trading the defense of Turkey for the threat in Cuba, we will face a radical decline.” Kennedy asked, “How much negotiation have we had with the Turks?” Rusk replied, “We haven’t talked with the Turks.” The president was floored. “I’ve talked about it now”—a possible Cuba-for-Turkey missile trade—“for about a week.” Yet no one had asked the Turks what they think? A few minutes later, Kennedy asked how many missiles we had in Turkey anyway. Nobody knew. An aide in the back of the room called out, “We have fifteen Jupiters.” “Fifteen Jupiters in Turkey?” Kennedy said, once again—judging from his tone—astonished, in this case by the willingness of his advisers to risk so much for the sake of so little.