Tools and Weapons: The Promise and the Peril of the Digital Age

by Brad Smith

In Washington, DC, those most bothered by the idea of a Digital Geneva Convention were often officials who had played a leading role in developing the nation’s offensive cyber capabilities. They argued that rules restricting the use of cyber capabilities would hold back governments like the United States. We pointed out that the US government already stood against the use of cyberattacks against civilians in times of peace, which was the area we were trying to restrict. And more broadly, the history of weapons technology showed that even if the United States was in a leadership position today, other nations would catch up soon. They pointed out that if we created stronger rules and the United States followed them, the country’s adversaries would not. But we believed international rules could nonetheless help put greater pressure on all countries, including by creating the moral and intellectual foundation needed for more coordinated international responses to cyberattacks. After all, it was even harder to restrain conduct if it violated no rules in the first place.