Medieval Philosophy

by Peter S. Adamson

With Albert, he holds that our ultimate happiness can lie in the beatific vision alone. No created thing can satisfy the human will, because no matter how good a created thing may be, it is good only by participating in God’s more perfect goodness (ST 1.2 Q2 a8 resp).7 On this point Albert and Aquinas agree with their fellow Dominican Robert Kilwardby. He too emphasizes the difference between the mere “felicity” in this life and the full happiness or “beatitude” available in the afterlife.8 But, as in other areas of his philosophy, Kilwardby leans more towards the traditional Augustinian teachings. For him all philosophical speculation is justified by its contribution to our moral development, whereas Albert, following Aristotle, made contemplation an end in itself, and one that surpasses the life of practical virtue. Characteristically, Aquinas splits the difference. He agrees with Albert that contemplative vision is our ultimate end, but adds the more Augustinian point that the vision of the divine essence involves not just knowledge of God, but also love, and the delight one has in beholding Him (ST 1.2 Q3 a4 resp).9 Yet Aquinas was keenly aware of the tensions between Aristotelian and Augustinian ethics, as is abundantly clear from a set of disputed questions that he devoted to the topic of the virtues.10 His attempt to resolve those tensions begins with the very definition of virtue. He asks