Medieval Philosophy

by Peter S. Adamson

We are to imagine a poverty-stricken woman who takes her child into her bed to keep him warm, and tragically smothers him in her sleep. Here the desire and the intention to kill the baby are very much absent; yet she might be told by a priest to do penance for what has happened (§79). Why is this? For purely pragmatic reasons, says Abelard. We want to discourage other women from doing the same thing, so we make a lesson of the woman even though she is morally innocent. This is a good answer, I think, and it can be generalized. The reason we spend so much time evaluating, punishing, and praising actions is just that they are our only guides to finding out what intentions people had, even if they may be imperfect guides. Actions are public and observable, whereas intentions are not, so we must look to the things people do to find out what they chose to do. But strictly speaking, we judge them on their choices, not on their actions as such. It’s also worth emphasizing that, even if actions are in themselves morally neutral on Abelard’s theory, that doesn’t mean that they are morally neutral in every respect. Rather, they become good or bad precisely by stemming from good or bad intentions.