Medieval Philosophy

by Peter S. Adamson

whether virtue is correctly defined as “a good quality of mind by which we live rightly, which no one misuses, and which God works in us without our help” (DQV 1 a2). This definition was offered by Peter Lombard as a summary of Augustine’s teaching on virtue, and in the face of such authority Aquinas can hardly deny that it hits the mark. So he goes on to agree with the definition, adding just one apparently innocuous remark: the definition would still be accurate without the last phrase about God working virtue in us without our help. That part of the definition applies only to infused virtue, not to the kind of virtue we acquire by developing our natural capacity for goodness. Aquinas is not sliding into Pelagianism here. He would stoutly deny that natural virtue is enough to merit salvation and hence ultimate happiness. But the fact remains that virtuous acts can be performed, and virtuous character cultivated, with no special help from God. When we speak of such “natural” virtue, we do not mean that a virtuous character is born in us by nature, as if babies came into the world already honest, courageous, and generous. Babies do, however, come into the world with a natural ability to acquire these traits (DQV 1 a8 resp). Acquiring them takes training and practice, which is why parents coach children to perform the right kind of action repeatedly until it becomes, as we might aptly put it, “second nature.” Aquinas’ explanation of this point is a wonderful example of his ...