The Story of Technology: How We Got Here and What the Future Holds

by Daniel M. Gerstein

In fact, most professional fields whose work impacts the public have an ethical code of conduct. Plumbers, construction workers, and law enforcement all have ethical standards to which a professional in the field must adhere. The IEEE code of ethics has a provision in its code specifically for dealing with the use of related technology: “to hold paramount the safety, health, and welfare of the public, to strive to comply with ethical design and sustainable development practices, and to disclose promptly factors that might endanger the public or the environment.”7 In the future, it seems almost no area of R&D will be impervious to the call for a code of ethics. Many are asking whether software developers should also be governed by such a code.

Intellectual property (IP) rights provide a mechanism for protecting R&D and guarding trade secrets. IP provides for the “assignment of property rights through patents, copyrights and trademarks.”9 Assuming the R&D has been appropriately documented and a patent has been submitted—either a provisional or full patent—a monopoly is established, and the IP is protected.

While the World Trade Organization (WTO) recognizes IP, and most nations have agreed to and ratified the WTO-crafted agreements in their parliaments, national laws have nuances, meaning that the application of IP across the world is not uniform.10 Even between trading partners with significant dealings, IP issues can be contentious.

While hacking and spying can be thought of as part of the normal—even if distasteful—competition between the nations, the use of joint ventures to create an institutionalized loss of IP is problematic.

The IP issue is made more complex by differences in culture between the United States and China, as China places greater emphasis on common good in the settlement of IP issues and is therefore more interested in the community-wide good that comes from dissemination and less interested in the individual benefit that is a higher priority for the United States.

The United States has several other initiatives designed to protect US R&D. Four that will be discussed include export controls, focused non-proliferation efforts, border security and customs, and the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS).

Under the Obama administration, an Export Control Reform Initiative was undertaken. Many in industry had complained that export control regulations placed an undue burden on them and resulted in a loss of revenue in some cases. The goal of the reform initiative was to restructure export control categories and build “higher walls around fewer items.”

INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS AND COALITIONS OF THE WILLING This category of international collaboration involves multilateral efforts to control proliferation. Forums such as the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), Nuclear Suppliers Group, Australia Group, and Wassenaar Arrangement are composed of like-minded nations that seek to cooperate to control dual-use technologies. The MTCR limits the proliferation of missiles with a payload of five hundred kilograms or more and a range in excess of three hundred kilometers.25 The Nuclear Suppliers Group seeks to reduce proliferation of dual-use nuclear technologies through the development and use of guidelines.26 The Australia Group looks to harmonize export control for technologies that could

contribute to the development of chemical or biological weapons.27 Finally, the Wassenaar Arrangement seeks to gain greater transparency and responsibility “in transfers of conventional arms and dual-use goods and technologies.”28 Other international efforts provide mechanisms for countering proliferation of WMD capabilities. Examples include the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI)29 and Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT). PSI provides increased international cooperation in interdicting shipments of WMD, their delivery systems, and related materials. Specifically, PSI assists partner nations in training for interdiction of transfers of suspected WMD capabilities, supports in strengthening national laws and promoting information exchange, and seeks to reduce proliferation by providing training support for combating illicit networks. GICNT is designed to “prevent, detect, and respond to nuclear terrorism.”30 Organizations such as the World Health Organization (WHO), Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), and World Organization for Animal Health (OIE) are helping to protect populations from emerging infectious disease, feed them, and improve their quality of life. The exchange of scientific and technical capacity underpins the efforts of all of these organizations.31 INTERNATIONAL TREATIES AND LAWS International treaties and laws seek to limit certain behaviors, activities, and weapons types through the development of legally bin...

Going back to the nineteenth century and the first age of globalization may seem irrelevant when considering today’s rapidly expanding democratization and proliferation of technology, but they are assuredly inextricably linked. Before the nineteenth century, trade was, as characterized by one account, “persistently low.”38 Beginning in the nineteenth century, with advances in technology for shipbuilding, navigation, and even agriculture and manufacturing (which generated goods in excess of what people required for subsistence), trade increased 3 percent annually until about 1913. World Wars I and II resulted in a significant reduction in global trade and a reversal of the earlier trends. With the end of the wars, trade began to increase until it reached a plateau in the 1950s coinciding with the beginning of the Cold War.

Trends in trade have also been fueled by lowering of supply chain costs and an increase in preferential trade agreements. Since the 1930s, these trends have also been fueled by a lowering of costs for sea freight and passenger air transport.40 Looking at trade agreements shows a slow increase from 1950–1977 to fifty agreements, holding steady with only modest increases from 1977–1990, an exponential rise to more than 280 agreements by 2000, and then a leveling off until 2010 at the end of the data set.

Since the end of World War II, the United States (at times even without our allies’ support) has sought to limit sales of technology.

the Soviet bloc lacked the supplies of components, trained computer specialists, and factories to manufacture these systems. One assessment indicated they were four years behind the West in the development of computer capabilities. The United States was able to retain this “strategic advantage” through an embargo on the shipping of computers to the East.

Global supply chains crisscross the world, and few countries remain isolated. Even the DPRK, which has been subjected to significant United Nations sanctions, has found ways to circumvent them, thus limiting their overall effectiveness. For example, the DPRK relied heavily on reverse engineering for its rocket designs; support from Egypt in the 1970s; likely, additional support from the Soviet Union and then Russia in the 1980s and 1990s;46 and other external sources of technology over more than forty-five years.

Despite export controls to limit the proliferation of military equipment and dual-use technology, knowledge products, and training for personnel, the record of nonproliferation activities has been mixed.

evidence suggests that nonproliferation and counterproliferation can slow but do not stop the flow of critical military and dual-use technologies.

The French secretly agreed to assist Israel by helping them build a nuclear reactor and underground reprocessing plant to produce plutonium.

The Israelis turned to Norway, which agreed to sell the “heavy water,” completing Israel’s nuclear pathway.

India pursued a peaceful nuclear program throughout the 1950s and early 1960s. By 1965, India began to reconsider its stance given the rivals in the region, Pakistan and China. India had also developed the complete nuclear fuel cycle and later conducted its first nuclear test in May 1974. Along the way, India was aided by the United States, which supplied a small amount of plutonium for research in 1966.49

India also used plutonium from a Canadian-supplied research reactor that contained US heavy water for conducting its first nuclear explosive test, and received indirect aid through information from Western scientific journals.

Khan earned a doctorate in engineering and took a position at a uranium-processing plant in the Netherlands. During his time in the Netherlands, he was “copying designs for centrifuges and compiling a list of potential companies that could provide Pakistan with the technology to produce highly enriched uranium for nuclear weapons.”51 Despite his activities having attracted the attention of Dutch law enforcement, he was not arrested and continued his efforts. Upon returning to Pakistan, Khan became essential to the development of an indigenous uranium enrichment process using the stolen centrifuge designs.

With the Soviets in Afghanistan and the United States needing a base of operations in close proximity, the United States placed support to Afghanistan ahead of nonproliferation policy. By then, Pakistan was well on its way to developing nuclear weapons, but Carter’s lifting of sanctions and $400 million in economic and military aid likely shortened the timelines for developing a nuclear capability.52 North Korea was aided in the development of a nuclear capability by A. Q. Khan. Based on this assistance, North Korea developed nuclear production facilities in the 1990s. Through the 1994 Agreed Framework, North Korea agreed to provide a complete history of its nuclear activities, mothball the nuclear production facilities, and refrain from reprocessing its spent nuclear fuel rods. However, simultaneously, North Korea began a covert reprocessing effort. Despite repeated overtures and direct pressure to cause North Korea to halt its nuclear weapons program, continued testing occurred in 2006, 2013, 2016, and 2017. North Korea’s last test was thought to be a hydrogen weapon, estimated by some to have a yield of up to 250 kilotons.

The North Korea example highlights that despite international efforts, a strong sanctions regime, and direct engagement at high levels bilaterally and as part of the six-party talks, the DPRK was able to develop WMD capabilities. Chinese theft of intellectual property demonstrates another dangerous technology proliferation window. The theft of IP—not just in military technology—has been sanctioned and, in some cases, undertaken through active participation by government organizations and employees. The IP loss has been in a wide range of technology sectors such as automobiles, aviation, chemicals, consumer electronics, electronic trading, industrial software, biotech, and pharmaceuticals.

Consider the case of a seventeen-year-old who received top honors in an US Air Force–sponsored hacking competition for finding 30 valid vulnerabilities. The field included 272 security researchers who discovered a total of 207 vulnerabilities.59 While the individual was obviously quite skilled and the label “untrained” does not exactly pertain, his skills did not require state capabilities to develop. Fields with the highest cost of or barriers to entry have the greatest potential for being monitored and controlled. Nuclear technologies, which require specialized processed materials, fall into this category.

Global corporations, supply chains, and knowledge proliferation will continue to make protecting key technologies more challenging. In looking to the future, the United States should look for other opportunities to more effectively “manage” technologies while protecting competitive advantages and US economic and security interests.

highly structured thinking and analysis can be quite constraining and limit considerations of other possibilities or potential outcomes.

The term orthogonal means “at a right angle to” or “very different or unrelated; sharply divergent.” Thus, an orthogonal thinker is one who approaches problems in different or nontraditional ways.

First, having people with a diversity of talents, experiences, and worldviews allows for more robust thinking.

Second, different groupings of personalities can introduce nonlinear or orthogonally oriented thinking into the solution of a problem.

Third, finding people with different risk tolerances can be very important to finding orthogonal solutions for addressing difficult problems.

Fourth, structured approaches that cause people to engage to address a common problem can expose orthogonal thinking.

in this chapter, we will look at the future of technology, in particular considering technology’s effect on future society.

Carlson’s curve.14 Dr. Rob Carlson demonstrated that increases in productivity for DNA sequencing and synthesis, combined with cost decreases, have made this biotechnology more widely available; and in fact, the changes in biotechnology that Carlson cataloged were even more significant than those in the IT sector.

rates were increasing exponentially and doubling in capacity every six months, or 400 percent per year.

To dehumanize warfare has the potential to make wars between nations more imaginable and therefore more likely. In addition, the use of autonomous systems against human formations presents ethical and moral dilemmas that will need to be contemplated.