European Strategy in the 21st Century: New Future for Old Power (Routledge Studies in European Security and Strategy)

by Sven Biscop

The EU is the only actor that does not impose limitations on foreign ownership of...

Only in the course of 2016 did some Member States, Germany in particular, begin to show concern about this, mostly for economic reasons: the loss of valuable technologies and intellectual property. No EU Member State can introduce any limitation on its own, however – Chinese and other investors would just shift their attention to its neighbours.

The result would be that the entire South China Sea could only be sailed through with Chinese permission, contrary to international law, which clearly states that artificial islands do not generate such rights. The international community therefore does not accept China’s claims, and the American, but also the British and French navy and air force regularly traverse the area in order to underline this. Yet China’s neighbours, most of which are heavily economically dependent on China, are under severe pressure.

In a way, how exactly the claims of the various countries concerned are settled does not really make a difference to the EU. Who owns which rock or islet does not really concern us in Brussels – as long as all disputes are settled peacefully and in a way that does not hinder the freedom of navigation.

The alternative, so China should understand, is that the US will continue to increase military pressure and the region will see an acceleration of the arms race that is already gripping it, as military expenditure in most countries of the region is on the rise. But to get that message across, the EU will have to take a much more resolute and united stance than has been the case hitherto.

principle, because whenever possible we prefer to pursue our interests by cooperating with others through a series of bilateral, regional, and global frameworks, rather than by trying to impose our ideas. At the same time such cooperation is a way of reducing tensions between the powers. That is why the Global Strategy refers to effective multilateralism as a vital EU interest.

other powers that multilateralism à la carte cannot work. China needs the multilateral economic system, which enables global free trade. The point to be made is that international maritime law (UNCLOS) and the peaceful settlement of disputes are as much a part of the multilateral order as the free trade regime or a bilateral investment treaty.

ours. Yet as long as China does not abandon its assertive stance, the risk of incidents cannot be fully excluded.

But even if China’s economic growth continues to slacken, it will likely remain higher than growth in Europe for some time to come. And given the size of the country, that growth will remain of crucial importance for the global economy (Shambaugh, 2016).

For those Asian countries that try to maintain an equidistant position between China and the US, the economic anchorage that TPP would have offered is very important.

With the economic foundation of the pivot gone, it will be even more difficult for these

countries to avoid being sucked completely into the Chinese maelstrom. And China indeed did not waste any time stepping into...

At a stroke, the FTAs that the EU has concluded or is envisaging (with South Korea, Japan, Singapore, Australia, and others) have become much more important. Not just economically, but in strategic terms, for these will be t...