Return of the God Hypothesis: Breakthroughs in Physics, Cosmology, and Biology Seeking Evidence for the Existence of God

by Stephen C. Meyer

When I was PhD student at Cambridge, a supervisor once told me to “beware the sound of one hand clapping.” By that he meant that it is impossible to assess an argument without assessing the counterarguments. Later, as a college professor, I developed a corollary to this principle. I used to tell my own students that the best way to weigh an argument was to see how well it withstood critical scrutiny and how well its proponents could respond to the strongest objections to their case. Medieval philosophers presupposed this principle in their disputational method. They would first make an affirmative argument for a proposition and then respond one by one to possible objections to it.

in challenging the case for intelligent design, Stephen Fletcher appealed to the authority of Wikipedia, while Wikipedia appealed to the authority of Stephen Fletcher.

Richard Dawkins in defense of Krauss, claimed that my critique misrepresented the evolutionary mechanism as a purely random process. Instead, both Krauss and Dawkins insisted, in Dawkins’s words, that “natural selection is a nonrandom process,” implying that it presumably could succeed in finding the extremely rare functional arrangements of nucleotide bases and amino acids within the space of possible arrangements in available evolutionary time. After the debate, Dawkins defended Krauss on the blog site Why Evolution Is True, operated by University of Chicago biologist Jerry Coyne, another New Atheist. “Meyer was terrible,” Dawkins wrote. “When will these people understand that calculating how many gazillions of ways you can permute things at random is irrelevant. It’s irrelevant, as Lawrence said, because natural selection is a nonrandom process.”51

As conceived from Darwin to the present, natural selection “selects,” or acts to preserve, those random variations that confer a fitness or functional advantage upon the organisms that possess them. But it “selects” only after such advantageous variations or mutations have arisen. Thus, selection does not cause novel variations; rather, it sifts what is delivered to it by the random changes (i.e., mutations) that do cause variations. This has been neo-Darwinian orthodoxy for many decades. All this means that natural selection does nothing to help generate functional DNA base (or amino-acid) sequences, that is, new genetic information. It can only preserve such sequences (if they confer a functional advantage) once they have originated. Adaptive advantage accrues only after the generation of new functional genes and proteins—after the fact, that is, of some presumably successful random mutational search. Thus, the evolutionary mechanism as a whole depends upon an ineliminable element of randomness—a point that even other evolutionary biologists acknowledged after the debate in Toronto. Laurence Moran and P. Z. Myers, both outspoken atheists, criticized Krauss and Dawkins for mischaracterizing the neo-Darwinian mechanism as wholly nonrandom, and Moran specifically blamed Krauss’s uncritical reliance upon Dawkins as the source of his misinformation.52

proponents of the inflationary multiverse argue that, since the inflaton field can produce an infinite number of other universes, every event that has occurred in our universe is bound to occur somewhere endlessly many times. It follows that events or conditions that appear extremely improbable, considering only our universe, are actually highly probable—or even inevitable. Sooner or later some universe had to acquire the finely tuned conditions necessary to sustain life. Our universe just happened to be the lucky one. According to this theory, since we only observe the bubble universe in which we live, we falsely think the conditions necessary for life are extremely improbable, when in fact, given the action of the inflaton field as a universe-generating mechanism, a life-friendly universe must inevitably arise in some universe somewhere—we just happen to be living in that lucky universe.10

Many physicists today regard the argument over fine tuning as “a wash.” Some leading physicists have told me—in all candor—that they regard the multiverse hypothesis as a speculative metaphysical hypothesis, not a scientific one.19 For them, since neither other universes nor God can be observed or measured, the choice between the two theories comes down to subjective preference.20 They would deny any evidential or theoretical reasons for preferring one hypothesis over the other. I’ve come to a different conclusion. Because both scientific and metaphysical hypotheses can be evaluated by comparing their explanatory power to that of their competitors (see Chapter 11), we can assess the relative merits of the theistic design and multiverse hypotheses. And there are many reasons for preferring theistic design over the multiverse.

as the Oxford philosopher Richard Swinburne has argued, the theistic design hypothesis constitutes a simpler and less ad hoc explanation for cosmic fine tuning.21 Swinburne affirms here the principle of Ockham’s razor, which states that when attempting to explain phenomena we should, as much as possible, avoid “multiplying (theoretical) entities.” In other words, when evaluating competing hypotheses, we should prefer, all other things being equal, the simpler hypothesis with fewer such theoretical entities. Swinburne notes that the God hypothesis requires the postulation of only one explanatory entity, an intelligent and powerful transcendent agent, rather than multiple entities, including an infinite number of causally separate universes and the various universe-generating mechanisms posited by multiverse advocates. As he argues, “It is the height of irrationality to postulate an infinite number of universes never causally connected with each other, merely to avoid the hypothesis of theism. Given that . . . a theory is simpler the fewer entities it postulates, it is far simpler to postulate one God than an infinite number of universes, each differing from each other.”22

another reason to prefer theistic design as an explanation of fine tuning over exotic versions of naturalism that postulate a multiverse. In order to explain the origin of the fine tuning in our universe, both inflationary cosmology and string theory (and versions of the multiverse that combine them) posit universe-generating mechanisms that themselves require prior unexplained fine tuning.

depending on the inflationary model, to produce a life-compatible universe the shutoff energy of the inflaton field requires fine tuning of between 1 part in 1053 and 1 in 10123. In addition, the shutoff interval of the inflaton field must also be precisely finely tuned. In current models, inflation begins at around 10−37 seconds after the big bang and ends about 10−35 seconds after the big bang, during which the radius of space itself expands by a factor of at least 1026.29

Carroll and Tam have shown that the fraction of realistic cosmologies—cosmologies generating life-friendly universes—resulting from inflation is exceedingly small, approximately 1 in 1066,000,000, an unimaginably small fraction. This vanishingly small ratio, and corresponding degree of improbability, implies the need for another source of extreme fine tuning.

initial-entropy fine tuning—estimated by Roger Penrose at 1 part in 1010123—it

Bruce Gordon quips that the use of inflationary cosmology to solve the fine-tuning problem associated with the standard big bang model is like “digging the Grand Canyon to fill a pothole.”33

in string theory just the solutions that produce universes with a positive cosmological constant represent 10500 (or possibly 101,000) possible solutions.35 Many more such solutions exist that do not meet this criterion.

Robin Collins has a clever way of characterizing this whole situation. He likens physicists who attempt to explain fine tuning solely by reference to universe-creating mechanisms, without intelligent design, to a hapless soul who denies any human ingenuity in the making of a freshly baked loaf of bread simply because the baker used a breadmaking machine. Clearly, argues Collins, such a benighted fellow has overlooked an obvious fact: the breadmaking machine itself required prior ingenuity and design, as did the recipe for and the preparation of the dough that went into it. Similarly, even if a multiverse hypothesis is true, it would support, rather than undermine, the intelligent design hypothesis, since the multiverse hypothesis depends upon the specific features of universe-generating mechanisms that invariably require prior and otherwise unexplained fine tuning.39

why. When Hawking substituted iτ (imaginary time) for the variable t (real time) in Einstein’s mathematical expression, the resulting depiction of the geometry of spacetime did not correspond to anything in the real universe.

exhibit this same dual nature.33 The Formation of Quantum Mechanics

In quantum cosmology: (1) the origin of the universe is the explanandum; (2) a specific universal wave function provides the explanans; and (3) the mathematical procedure by which physicists solve the Wheeler-DeWitt equation provides the “warrant” for presenting any specific universal wave function as the explanation for the origin of the universe.

two basic options, neither of which supports Krauss’s atheistic or materialistic viewpoint. Either the laws that he and Vilenkin invoke to explain the origin of space (and energy) are mathematical descriptions that exist only in the minds of physicists—in which case they have no power to generate anything in the natural world external to our minds, let alone the whole universe. Or the mathematical ideas and expressions, including those describing possible universes, exist independently of the human mind. In other words, quantum cosmology suggests either a kind of magic where human math creates a universe (clearly, not a satisfactory explanation) (Fig. 18.1) or mathematical Platonism.18 FIGURE 18.1 Matter out of math? Mathematical concepts, expressions, and equations exist in minds. That raises a profound question for quantum cosmologists. How do the mathematical expressions that they use to describe possible universes (or the early universe) cause an actual material universe to come into existence?

universe with certain possible properties logically precedes the mathematical procedures that produce a solution to the Wheeler-DeWitt equation—a universal wave function that allows assigning definite probabilities to the different possible properties or attributes that the universe could possess. Thus, the mathematical procedures that quantum cosmologists use to produce a wave function to explain the origin of the universe tacitly presuppose the existence of a universe.24 The quantum cosmologists are thus like bakers who allege they have baked a cake before they had the ingredients to do so, but in describing the amazing trick discuss how they used those very ingredients to bake the cake.25

Indeed, even if Professor Krauss could explain the origin of matter, energy, space, and time from nothing, or from nothing but the mathematically expressed laws of physics, he still could not explain the origin of the information necessary to express and solve the equations that supposedly explain the origin of the universe. Instead, as we have seen, the quantum cosmological theories subtly depend upon the activity of a mind to model the origin of the universe. It follows that if some version of quantum cosmology provides the correct model for the origin of the universe, then mind, not just matter and energy (or even math), played a causal role in that ultimate origin event. Insofar as quantum cosmology models the origin of the universe, it implies the need for prior intelligent design.

quantum cosmology does not explain the origin of the universe in purely materialistic terms. Instead, to the limited extent it succeeds, it attributes causal powers to abstract mathematics and depends upon intelligent inputs of information from theoretical physicists as they model the origin of the universe. Thus, it does not dispense at all with intelligent design or with theism as an explanation for the origin of the universe. Instead, quantum cosmology implies the need for an intelligent agent to breathe, if not “fire into the equations,” then certainly specificity and information. Thus, it implies something akin to the biblical idea that “in the beginning was the Word.” And that’s not nothing—by anyone’s definition.

every possible universe described by the universal wave function also exists as its own separate reality. Thus, this interpretation circumvents the need to explain what causes the collapse of the universal wave function to bring a specific universe or, indeed, our universe into existence. That’s because, again, the wave function never collapses. All possible universes described by the universal wave function exist, because the universal wave function represents the most fundamental description of reality that we have and every possibility that it describes must exist in some universe.

treating the universal wave function ψ as the ultimate explanatory principle or as the ground of all being fails to account for the dependence of ψ and its specific mathematical features on prior infusions of information into the mathematical operations that generate ψ. Recall that to generate a universal wave function of any kind, quantum cosmologists modeling the origin of the universe first have to solve the Wheeler-DeWitt equation.11

even if the many-worlds interpretation does in some weak sense “explain” the origin of our and other universes, the universal wave function that putatively does that explaining itself reflects prior intelligent design. Physicists don’t even get a universal wave function “to reify” until they first solve the Wheeler-DeWitt equation.

infinite-universe cosmologies, physicists could attribute any event to chance—to a statistically improbable quantum fluctuation that nevertheless had to occur eventually (and an infinite number of times) in any one of an infinite number of possible universes. This means, assuming such a cosmology, that an exquisitely designed machine or an intricately crafted piece of poetry is just as likely to have been produced by random fluctuations in the quantum vacuum as by an intelligent human being. It also means that natural phenomena such as earthquakes are just as likely to have resulted from a series of improbable random fluctuations in a quantum vacuum as they are from a discernible progression of material causes.

Cf Brian Greene in To the End of Time reducing all to random fluctuations from quantum foam origins

Thus, infinite-universe cosmologies, including Tegmark’s, have an unexpected liability: once they are permitted as a possible explanation for anything, they undermine confidence in practical and scientific reasoning about everything.

many physicists now worry that positing an infinite number of universes, either to solve the fine-tuning problem or (to the extent that any might be aware of it) the problem of the informational inputs necessary to render quantum cosmology plausible, should lead us to doubt the reliability of our own minds.18 In other words, positing infinite-universe cosmologies leads inevitably to radical epistemological skepticism.

The many-worlds interpretation and the mathematical universe hypothesis flagrantly violate the Ockham’s razor principle. Indeed, both interpretations multiply theoretical entities infinitely. Consequently, an unadorned God hypothesis clearly qualifies as a theoretically simpler, less convoluted explanation for the origin of the universe and its specific (life-permitting) attributes than either of these interpretations of quantum cosmology. Moreover,

attempt to refute the case for God based upon the science of cosmology has ultimately resulted in absurd cosmologies that undermine belief in the reliability of science. Unlike the founders of modern science, who understood that their belief in God gave them a reason to trust in the uniformity and intelligibility of the universe and the reliability of the human mind, contemporary physicists averse to theistic belief have proffered ideas that deny, by implication, precisely such uniformity, intelligibility, and reliability.

the “specified complexity” or “specified information” of DNA implicates a prior intelligent cause not only because materialistic origin-of-life scenarios fail to explain it, but also because we know that intelligent agents can and do produce information of that kind. We have positive experience-based knowledge of an alternate cause sufficient to produce this effect. To depict proponents of the theory of intelligent design as committing the GOTG fallacy, critics must misrepresent the case for it. For example, as Michael Shermer claims, “Intelligent design . . . argues that life is too specifically complex (complex structures like DNA) . . . to have evolved by natural forces. Therefore, life must have been created by . . . an intelligent designer.”13 In short, he claims that proponents of intelligent design argue as follows: Premise: Material causes cannot produce or explain specified information. Conclusion: Therefore, an intelligent cause produced the specified information in life. In fact, the case for the intelligent design of life, presented in Chapters 9 and 10 and in my previous books, doesn’t rely on such logic. Instead, the argument takes the following significantly different form: Premise One: Despite a thorough search, no materialistic causes have been discovered with the power to produce large amounts of specified information necessary to produce the first cell. Premise Two: Intelligent causes have demonstrated the power to produce large amounts of specified info...

what about the argument that this book presents not just for an intelligent designer of unspecified identity, but specifically for a theistic designer and creator—a God hypothesis—as the best explanation for biological and cosmological origins? Is it a GOTG argument? Again, it is not. Though the argument presented here does concern events that confront materialistic accounts of the origin of the universe and life with causal discontinuities or explanatory gaps, it does not affirm the existence or activity of God solely on the basis of those gaps. Instead, it uses straightforward considerations of causal adequacy along with parsimony and other theoretical virtues14 to assess the explanatory power of competing metaphysical hypotheses and to present theism as an inference to the best explanation, not an argument from ignorance.

all materialistic theories of the origin of the material universe face a fundamental problem given the evidence we have of a cosmic beginning. Before matter and energy exist, they cannot cause, or be invoked to explain, the origin of the material universe. Instead, positing a materialistic process to explain the origin of matter and energy assumes the existence of the very entities—matter and energy—the origin of which materialists need to explain. No truly materialistic explanation can close this particular causal discontinuity or gap—the gap between either nothing or a preexisting immaterial or mathematical reality, on the one hand, and a material universe, on the other. Nor do appeals to the laws of nature solve this problem. Stephen Hawking’s claim that the “laws of science” or “the law of gravity” can explain “why there is something rather than nothing” betrayed a deep philosophical confusion about what the laws of physics can do. Laws of nature describe how nature operates and how different parts of nature interact with one another; they don’t cause the natural world to come into existence in the first place. This suggests the futility of waiting for the discovery of some new law of nature or a “theory of everything.” No law of nature can close the causal discontinuity between nothing and the origin of nature itself.

the laws of physics cannot explain their own fine tuning or the fine tuning of the initial configurations of mass-energy at the beginning of the universe. We saw that, in order to describe the behavior of a physical system, all known laws of physics require extrinsic inputs of information about the initial and boundary conditions of the system in question and about the values of their own constants of proportionality. By “extrinsic,” I mean the information about such conditions that comes from beyond the laws of physics themselves.

the concept of God has inherent in it precisely those attributes—transcendence, omnipotence, creative power, free will, and intelligence—that confirm its adequacy as a cause of the origin of the universe, its fine tuning, and the information necessary for life. Thus, a theistic God would, if existent, provide a more causally adequate explanation for the origin of life and the universe than any entity affirmed in competing worldviews (such as materialism or pantheism) that deny a transcendent reality and intelligent agent separate from the material universe. By contrast, arguments that commit the GOTG fallacy exemplify a specific type of argument from ignorance—one in which the evidence against a proposed material cause leads immediately to the affirmation of a God hypothesis without any presentation of positive reasons for affirming the causal adequacy of that hypothesis.

more intellectually rigorous approach to the challenge of explaining crucial events in the history of life and the universe would permit scientists and philosophers to consider competing possible explanations even if they posit the activity of a creative intelligence. The critical question is not “Which materialistic or naturalistic hypothesis best explains the origin of life and the universe?” but rather, “What actually caused life, the universe, and its fine tuning to arise?”

As Berkeley psychology professor Alison Gopnik observes, “By elementary-school age, children start to invoke an ultimate God-like designer to explain the complexity of the world around them—even children brought up as atheists.”30

As Lawrence Krauss has correctly pointed out, “The universe is the way it is, whether we like it or not. The existence or nonexistence of a creator is independent of our desires. A world without God or purpose may seem harsh or pointless, but that alone doesn’t require God to actually exist.”41 Or, as he put it in another context with characteristic pith, “The universe doesn’t exist to make you happy.”42

We are not alone in a vast impersonal and meaningless universe—the product of “blind, pitiless indifference.” Instead, the evidence points to a personal intelligence behind the physical world that we observe.