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“evil is nothing, since He cannot do it who can do anything.”
the chiefest good which thou saidst was placed in God, and likewise thou provedst, that God Himself is the chiefest good and full happiness, out of which thou madest me a present of that inference, that no man shall be happy unless he be also a God.
the form of goodness is the substance of God and of blessedness, and that unity is the same with goodness, because it is desired by the nature of all things;
God governeth the whole world with the helm of goodness, and that all ...
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there is no nature...
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In body like a sphere well-rounded on all sides,{52} it doth roll about the moving orb of things, while it keepeth itself unmovable.
Happy is he that can behold The well-spring whence all good doth rise, Happy is he that can unfold The bands with which the earth him ties.
Love hath no law but her own will.
You lose while back to hell you look.”
wickedness bearing rule and sway, virtue is not only without reward, but lieth also trodden under the wicked’s feet, and is punished instead of vice.
That which things should be done in the kingdom of God, who knoweth all things, can do all things, but will do only that which is good, no man can sufficiently admire nor complain.”
For if those things which were a little before concluded be kept unviolated, thou shalt by His help, of whose kingdom we speak, know that the good are always powerful, and the evil always abject and weak, and that vices are never without punishment, nor virtue without reward, and that the good are always prosperous, and the evil unfortunate, and many things of that sort, which will take away all cause of complaint, and give thee firm and solid strength.
I have swift and nimble wings which will ascend the lofty skies, With which when thy quick mind is clad, it will the loathéd earth despise,
“First then,” quoth she, “that good men are always powerful, and evil men of no strength, thou mayest easily know, the one is proved by the other. For since that good and evil are contraries, if it be convinced that goodness is potent, the weakness of evil will be also manifest; and contrariwise if we discern the frailty of evil, we must needs acknowledge the firmness of goodness.
There be two things by which all human actions are effected, will and power, of which if either be wanting, there can nothing be performed.
For if there want will, no man taketh anything in hand against his will, and if there be not power, the will is in vain.
if thou seest any willing to obtain that which he doth not obtain, thou canst not doubt but that he wanted ...
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every man is mighty in that which he can do, and weak in that which he cannot do.”
all men both good and bad without difference of intentions endeavour to obtain goodness.”
men are made good by the obtaining of goodness.”
“And if evil men did obtain the goodness they desire, they could not be evil.” “It is true.” “Wherefore since they both desire goodness, but the one obtaineth it and the other not, there is no doubt but that good men are powerful, and the evil weak.”
that he which can use that natural function is stronger than he which cannot.”
“the good seek to obtain the chiefest good, which is equally proposed to bad and good, by the natural function of virtues, but the evil endeavour to obtain the same by divers concupiscences, which are not the natural function of obtaining goodness.
good men are powerful and evil men weak.”
must thou of force judge him most powerful who obtaineth the end of all that can be desired, beyond which there is nothing.
intemperance makes them frail, since they cannot strive against vice. Or do they wittingly and willingly forsake goodness, and decline to vices? But in this sort they leave not only to be powerful, but even to be at all. For they which leave the common end of all things which are, leave also being.
evil men are not at all, who are the greatest part of men: but yet it is so. For I deny not that evil men are evil, but withal I say that purely and simply they are not.
For as thou mayest call a carcase a dead man, but not simply a man, so I confess that the vicious are evil, but I cannot grant that they are absolutely. For that is which retaineth order, and keepeth nature, but that which faileth...
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their power proceedeth not from forces but from weakness. For they can do evil, which they could not do if they could have remained in the performance of that which is good. Which possibilit...
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For if, as we concluded a little before, evil is nothing, since they can only do evil, it is manifest th...
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“Since therefore he that can only do good, can do all things, and they who can do evil, cannot do all things, it is manifest that they which can do evil are less potent.
all power is to be accounted among those things which are to be wished for, and that all such things have reference to goodness, as to the very height of their nature. But the possibility of committing wickedness cannot have reference to goodness. Wherefore it is not to be wished for. Yet all power is to be wished for; and consequently it is manifest, possibility of evil is no power.
the sentence of Plato is true: that only wise men can do that which they desire, and that the wicked men practise indeed what they list, but cannot perform what they would. For they do what they list, thinking to obtain the good which they desire by those things which cause them delight; but they obtain it not, because shameful action cannot arrive to happiness.{56}
the good are never without rewards, nor the evil without punishments.
in all things that are done that for which anything is done may deservedly seem the reward of that action, as to him that runneth a race, the crown for which he runneth is proposed as a reward.

