Embers of War: The Fall of an Empire and the Making of America's Vietnam

by Fredrik Logevall

And on this point, available DRV internal sources are clear: At the start of 1954, it was American policy more than French policy that was of chief concern to Ho Chi Minh and the Politburo. The United States was now the principal enemy, not France.2 Should President Dwight Eisenhower choose to further increase his involvement in the French cause, perhaps by sending ground troops to the war theater, or by ordering air strikes on Viet Minh positions, it would have enormous implications for the balance of military forces. Conversely, should the American president alter his hostile attitude toward diplomacy and come out in favor of a negotiated settlement, that too would change the dynamics in a fundamental way. Yet again the question loomed, for Viet Minh leaders and for their counterparts in Paris, Beijing, Moscow, and London: What will the Americans do?