Embers of War: The Fall of an Empire and the Making of America's Vietnam

by Fredrik Logevall

On June 24, Dulles told congressional leaders that any Geneva agreement would be “something we would have to gag about,” but he expressed optimism that the United States could “salvage something” in Indochina “free of the taint of French colonialism.” Specifically, Washington would assume responsibility for the defense of Cambodia, Laos, and southern Vietnam, with the first task the drawing of a line the Communists would not cross. Then, the secretary continued, the United States would “hold this area and fight subversion within with all the strength we have,” using economic and military assistance to the non-Communist governments as well as an American-led regional defense grouping modeled in part on NATO.34 It was a monumental decision, as important as any made by an American administration on Indochina, from Franklin Roosevelt’s to Gerald Ford’s. Its true import would become clear only with time, but even on that day the weight of the secretary of state’s words were hard to miss. The United States would thenceforth take responsibility for defending most of Indochina, he told the lawmakers, and without “the taint of French colonialism.”