Why Worry About Future Generations? (Uehiro Series in Practical Ethics)

by Samuel Scheffler

as Samuel Freeman implicitly does in the passage I quoted, that in a relationship of reciprocity, the reciprocal contribution of each party to the other must be understood in terms of the causal effects that each has on the life of the other. Clearly, generations who exist at some future time cannot make causal contributions to our well-being now. At most it is the prospect of their existence, which is to say our belief that they will exist, that can make such contributions. However, the idea of evaluative reciprocity, as applied to the case of future generations, asserts something different. It asserts that, on the one hand, we can causally enhance the ability of future generations to lead good and worthwhile lives. But, on the other hand, their survival enhances in a different way our ability to lead lives of purpose and value. Their most important contribution to us is not causal but rational, because their survival provides us with reasons for confidence in the value of many of our activities. As I have argued, this is what we ourselves believe, since if we thought they would not survive, we would see less reason to engage in many of the activities that we now value deeply.