Barbarians at the Gate: The Fall of RJR Nabisco
Rate it:
Open Preview
Kindle Notes & Highlights
Read between July 24 - September 3, 2019
0%
Flag icon
But if it’s an LBO, not only do you not have to bring it, you don’t have to see it, you don’t know where you’re going to get
0%
Flag icon
This is a business for people who don’t have money, but who know somebody who has money, but who doesn’t put it up either…
2%
Flag icon
“The only way to recognize these values, I believe, is through a leveraged buyout.”
3%
Flag icon
The man who would come to represent the new age of business was born in 1931
4%
Flag icon
“He was convinced that all of the decisions got made by the senior people in the accounts. He thought he could leverage that money pretty well.”
6%
Flag icon
arrived twenty minutes late, punctually, to everything. “If you’re on time, no one notices you,” he would say.
8%
Flag icon
“you always tell people how badly you’ve been running the goddamned company, so they’ve got some upside.”
8%
Flag icon
“Recognize that ultimate success comes from opportunistic, bold moves which, by definition, cannot be planned.”
13%
Flag icon
Reynolds’s ideal marriage partner was Nabisco Brands, headed by a
13%
Flag icon
breezy, likable Canadian named Ross Johnson.
13%
Flag icon
$4.9 billion, at the time the largest merger ever to take place outside the oil industry.
14%
Flag icon
deep differences in the two organizations were soon apparent.
17%
Flag icon
Michael Milken,
17%
Flag icon
Johnson remained a prude about corporate debt, the core of any LBO.
20%
Flag icon
The basics of an LBO were relatively simple and familiar to all three men. A firm such as Kohlberg Kravis, working with a company’s management, buys the company using money raised from banks and the public
20%
Flag icon
sale of securities; the debt is paid down with cash from the company’s operations and, often, by selling pieces of the business.
20%
Flag icon
Good, bad, or indifferent, you’re always thinking, you’re doing, you’re extending yourself. If you don’t do that, the place becomes a bore. You’ve got to create some excitement.
21%
Flag icon
Wall Street turned to its one guaranteed source of income: takeovers.
22%
Flag icon
“The problem with the company going private,” he said to himself, “is that nobody would pay any attention to him.”
22%
Flag icon
charts Martin didn’t appear to wield much power, but he had Johnson’s ear, and he began acting as his gatekeeper. Nobody was more jealous of Martin’s rise than Horrigan,
22%
Flag icon
“golden parachutes”
22%
Flag icon
Johnson suggested a joint venture instead.
23%
Flag icon
Morris and RJR Nabisco combine their respective food businesses—Nabisco and General Foods
23%
Flag icon
“What are the practical realities of operating under an LBO structure?” Johnson asked.
23%
Flag icon
First, could you raise the kind of money it would take to buy
23%
Flag icon
capital base.
25%
Flag icon
Practically unknown just five years before,
25%
Flag icon
never, forgot that lesson about the importance of being your own boss.
26%
Flag icon
The two estimated how much money they could make at Bear Stearns over the next decade, compared to going their own way. Bear won. Kravis left anyway.
26%
Flag icon
Kohlberg Kravis was able to use a company’s own strengths to acquire
26%
Flag icon
When Simon took Gibson public eighteen months later, it sold for $290 million. Simon’s $330,000 investment
26%
Flag icon
was suddenly worth $66 million in cash and securities.
26%
Flag icon
in effect subsidized the trend.
26%
Flag icon
What made them soar was junk bonds.
27%
Flag icon
Michael Milken,
29%
Flag icon
by his targets, competitors nipping at his heels, Kravis
29%
Flag icon
By the mid-1980s competitors such as Morgan Stanley and Merrill Lynch were thrusting into LBOs and, in efforts to compete with Drexel’s junk-bond capabilities, had begun lending their own money in interim takeover financings known as “bridge loans.” These loans were typically refinanced, or bridged, by the later sale of junk
29%
Flag icon
bonds. The trend was collectively known as merchant banking, a highfalutin term that basically meant investment banks were putting their money where their mouths had been for years.
30%
Flag icon
“gun-to-the-head” strategy.
31%
Flag icon
although not by much. The $75 a share worked out to $17.6 billion, nearly three times the size of the Beatrice deal.
31%
Flag icon
LBOs are not democracies: each executive in a Kohlberg Kravis-owned company answers to Kravis and Roberts.
32%
Flag icon
Was there, as Jim Stern had already wondered, enough takeover money in the world to do it?
32%
Flag icon
Shearson, which would invest hundreds of millions of dollars in an RJR Nabisco buyout, wasn’t hired help; it was a full partner.
35%
Flag icon
merchant-banking game:
35%
Flag icon
shifting allegiances is a misstatement. They have no allegiances,
35%
Flag icon
And believe me, you don’t want to be the new man at a poker game that’s been running for years.”
37%
Flag icon
LBOs, defensive recapitalizations, poison pills, spin-offs, everything.
39%
Flag icon
bear hug letter to the board.
39%
Flag icon
discuss a joint bid.
39%
Flag icon
tender offer,
« Prev 1 3