Theories of the Policy Process

by Christopher M. Weible

In contrast to a framework, a “theory consists of many variables and the relations among them that are used to explain and predict processes and outcomes” (Ostrom 2014, 269).

The original eight design principles focus on institutional arrangements, including: (1) well-defined boundaries of the resource and resource users; (2) congruence between appropriation and provision rules and local conditions; (3) most individuals affected by operational rules can participate in modifying the operational rules; (4) monitors who are accountable to the appropriators; (5) use of graduated sanctions; (6) low-cost conflict resolution mechanisms; (7) minimal recognition of rights to organize; and (8) nested enterprises (Ostrom 1990, 90).

Whereas framework and theory are distinct concepts, they closely interact. Frameworks provide structure for theories by identifying the key concepts and variables that scholars draw on.

“The Three Worlds of Action: A Metatheoretical Synthesis of Institutional Approaches” (Kiser and Ostrom 1982) represents the initial published attempt to identify the concepts and variables useful for scholars who are interested in how institutions affect the incentives confronting individuals and the individuals’ resultant behavior.

The IAD framework has a problem-solving orientation. The purpose of the IAD framework is to allow scholars to explore and explain how people use institutional arrangements to address shared problems and to understand the logic of institutional designs (Ostrom 1987).

In understanding the how and why of institutional design, it is then possible to develop informed proposals for improving institutional performance.

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“The theory of collective action is the central subject of political science.”

Cooperation and coordination, however, cannot be taken for granted. Rather, individual interests and collective interests often diverge. The tension between individual and group is the core of collective action problems, and institutional arrangements are one tool used to try to align the two.

The initial step in analyzing a collective action problem is to identify an action situation. An action situation bounds one or more collective action dilemmas.

questions that correspond to the parts of an action situation need to be addressed.

The left-hand column of Table 6.1, developed by Elinor Ostrom (2007b, 29–30), provides an illustrative set of questions oriented to studying common pool resources. For a fully developed set of coding forms and code books that guide analysts through the process of identifying action situations and operationalizing the components, see the SES Library (https://seslibrary.asu.edu/).

In addition to identifying action situations and their constituent components, an analyst using the framework must also make explicit assumptions about how actors make choices.

an analyst must make assumptions about (1) how and what participants value; (2) what their information- processing capabilities are; and (3) what internal mechanisms they use to decide upon strategies (Ostrom 2005).

Grounding a theory or model in explicit assumptions about human choice is not unique to the IAD framework. A number of the major theories of policy processes, such as the Advocacy Coalitions Framework (ACF) and Punctuated Equilibrium Theory (PET), are grounded in some form of bounded rationality.

Criteria used to evaluate the institutional arrangements, processes, and outcomes of action situations are similar to those used in many public policy analyses (Stone 2012; Weimer and Vining 2016). Effectiveness, efficiency, equity, and accountability are all commonly used evaluative criteria.

Effectiveness measures vary by context.

Evaluations of equity often take two forms. One is equity through fiscal equivalence, and one is redistributional equity.

The first addresses the relationship between who bears the costs of providing a shared benefit and who receives or enjoys the flow of benefits.

Fiscal equivalency also shapes individual behavior. Individuals may pursue strategies that minimize their contributions to a public good, even engaging in rule-breaking behavior, if they receive few benefits.

Redistributional equity entails distributing resources to disadvantaged or marginalized actors.

Accountability and responsiveness of governing officials to the actors subject to the rules and who make use of the public goods and common pool resources is another pair of evaluative criteria.

Accountability refers to whether decision making authority has been exercised appropriately (Schlager and Blomquist 2008, 68). Who determines appropriateness has important implications for behavior.

Accountability and responsiveness appear in local public economies as different mechanisms structuring relations among citizens and public officials, such as voting with one’s feet or attending public meetings (Oakerson and Parks 2011).

For scholars interested in learning more about how the criteria have been operationalized, particularly for common pool resource settings, the original common pool resource coding forms may be found in the SES Library (https://seslibrary.asu.edu/). The coding forms used in the International Forestry Resources and Institutions (IFRI) project may be found at http://www.ifriresearch.net/.

Action situations are structured by physical and material conditions, rules (in use), and community characteristics. These three categories form the context of the action situation.

In 1977, the Ostroms published a book chapter that remains foundational for describing physical and material conditions. The chapter, entitled “Public Goods and Public Choices,” presents a two-by-two typology of goods based on costliness of excluding actors from a good and the subtractability or rival-rousness in the use of the good.

IAD scholars have paid most attention to common pool resources and public goods, both of which are characterized by costly exclusion. What distinguishes them from one another is subtractability. CPRs are characterized by subtractability, that is, what one actor consumes is not available for other actors; whereas public goods are characterized by nonsubtractability.

Costliness of exclusion and subtractability lay the groundwork for collective action dilemmas, and consequently they have important policy implications.

Even if exclusion is adequately realized so that the group of users or beneficiaries of a CPR or public good is effectively restricted, another type of collective action dilemma may emerge in relation to use.

Thus, both access and use raise collective action dilemmas,

The IAD framework, at its core, is about institutions.

What are institutions? According to Crawford and Ostrom (1995, 582), institutional arrangements are “enduring regularities of human action in situations structured by rules, norms, and shared strategies, as well as by the physical world.” As prescriptions, institutional arrangements guide, constrain, and direct people’s choices and actions.

Rule typology. Kiser and Ostrom (1982) make sense of what appears to be an infinite variety of rules by classifying rules according to the components of the action situation that they directly affect (see Figure 6.2).

Entry and exit rules affect the number of participants, their attributes and resources, whether they can enter freely, and the conditions they face for leaving.

Position rules establish positions in the situation.

Authority rules assign sets of actions that participants in positions at particular nodes ...

Scope rules delimit the potential outcomes that can be affected and, working backward, the actions...

Aggregation rules affect the level of control that a participant in a position exercises in ...

Information rules affect the knowledge-contingent information s...

Payoff rules affect the benefits and costs that will be assigned to particular combinations of actions and outcomes, and they establish th...

As E. Ostrom (2005) explains, once she realized that she would not find a rule, or the rule, that accounted for positive outcomes of resource user– governed common pool resources she turned to identifying design principles.

Design principles are patterns, or configurations, of rules.

The rule typology helps to bring order to what would otherwise be a very disorderly and messy reality.

Rules-in-use and rules-in-form. Most applications of the IAD framework involve identifying rules-in-use.

Rules-in-use are the prescriptions that people follow in practice and they are often not written down. Rules-in-use may be distinct from rules-in-form, which are the rules adopted through collective choice venues and they are often written down.

Grammar of institutions.

The grammar provides a “theory that generates structural descriptions of institutional statements” (Crawford and Ostrom 1995, 583).

The attribute identifies the doer of the action, the actor to whom the institutional statement applies. The deontic identifies whether the action is required, permitted, or forbidden. The aim is the verb of an institutional statement. It identifies the action of the attribute. The condition defines the what, when, where, and how of the action or outcome. The or else identifies a sanction if the institutional statement is violated.

statements that contain all five of the original components are rules (Crawford and Ostrom 1995, 584).

E. Ostrom was always quick to point out that institutions can only be understood in context, in the context of other institutional statements, and in the context of physical and material conditions and attributes of the community.