Critique of Pure Reason

by Immanuel Kant

From Wikipedia article on Critique of Pure Reason: 1. Synthetic judgments add something to a concept, (e.g. an observation, like all objects are heavy) whereas analytic judgments only explain what is already contained in the concept (e.g. all objects are experienced by a subject.) 2. For Kant, mathematics is a priori synthetic judgment. For example, Kant uses the classical example of 7 + 5 = 12.

The science of all the principles of sensibility a priori, I call transcendental aesthetic.* There must, then, be such a science forming the first part of the transcendental doctrine of elements, in contradistinction to that part which contains the principles of pure thought, and which is called transcendental logic.

From the Wikipedia article on Critique of Pure Reason: Transcendental Aesthetic and the Transcendental Logic, (reflect) his basic distinction between sensibility and the understanding.

that is, regards the object as a mere phenomenon. In reference to this subject, see the remark in Section I (SS 4)

At page 53 of "Basic Writings of Kant" in F. Max Muller translation in "Basic Writings of Kant" edited by Allen Wood. The upcoming text was skipped in the Muller translation through the highlighting on page 50 in this translation.

Against this theory, which grants empirical reality to time, but denies to it absolute and transcendental reality, I have heard from intelligent men an objection so unanimously urged that I conclude that it must naturally present itself to every reader to whom these considerations are novel. It runs thus: "Changes are real" (this the continual change in our own representations demonstrates, even though the existence of all external phenomena, together with their changes, is denied). Now, changes are only possible in time, and therefore time must be something real. But there is no difficulty in answering this. I grant the whole argument. Time, no doubt, is something real, that is, it is the real form of our internal intuition. It therefore has subjective reality, in reference to our internal experience, that is, I have really the representation of time and of my determinations therein. Time, therefore, is not to be regarded as an object, but as the mode of representation of myself as an object. But if I could intuite myself, or be intuited by another being, without this condition of sensibility, then

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BOOK I. SS 2. Analytic of Conceptions. By the term Analytic of Conceptions, I do not understand the analysis of these, or the usual process in philosophical investigations of dissecting the conceptions which present themselves, according to their content, and so making them clear; but I mean the hitherto little attempted dissection of the faculty of understanding itself, in order to investigate the possibility of conceptions a priori, by looking for them in the understanding alone, as their birthplace, and analysing the pure use of this faculty. For this is the proper duty of a transcendental philosophy; what remains is the logical treatment of the conceptions in philosophy in general. We shall therefore follow up the pure conceptions even to their germs and beginnings in the human understanding, in which they lie, until they are developed on occasions presented by experience, and, freed by the same understanding from the empirical conditions attaching to them, are set forth in their unalloyed purity.

How is singular different from particular?

stating a fact rather than an evaluative judgment

apodeictiical ( same as apodictic): expressing or of the nature of necessary truth or absolute certainty

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A remark which will be explained in the sequel.]

SS 6.

pg. 57 in Wood.

This book seems to see conceptions as opposed to intuition, as on pg. 51, "intuition. But besides intuition there is no other mode of cognition, except through conceptions;"

Inherence and Subsistence

something necessarily existing regardless of whether anything else exists

modality means the classification of logical propositions according to their asserting one of the following.

relates to

objects of intuition—

I presume quantity would relate to objects of intuition because intuition allows us to know numbers. Experience can show us that we have five fingers on our hand, but intuition is that that number is equal to 5 dots and not equal to 4.

For a while, the book has seemed repetitive. Words that have a vague meaning here: intuition, cognition, manifold, sense, sensibility, object, perception, synthesis

This sentence doesn't seem meaningful. If I am conscious that I am, why wouldn't I be conscious of myself as I am in myself?

apprehension: the gaining of understanding

BOOK II.

tuition: instruction

schema definition: (in Kantian philosophy) a conception of what is common to all members of a class; a general or essential type or form.

The three modi of time are permanence, succession, and coexistence.

stop 4/27/23

Stop here 4/28/23. Having read 100 pages, I intend to stop for a long time. I didn't like this very much. It was very hard to understand. But I did write some notes,