Stoicism: A Detailed Breakdown of Stoicism Philosophy and Wisdom from the Greats: A Complete Guide To Stoicism

by George Tanner

Introduction

So what is Stoicism? The answer to this question in many ways turns on another question: What is wisdom? Further, what part does wisdom play in our daily lives? For the Stoics, wisdom is the virtue that governs all others.

Both justice and prudence are cardinal virtues for the Stoics, and they appear together such that it is impossible to practice one while violating another.

Stoicism is that school of philosophy for which wisdom, being for them the state that obtains in a fully developed human nature, is the end of all ethical activity, is the goal of practicing the virtues in correct relationship with one another, and is thus the goal of an ethical life.

The end of love, the result of the lover’s union with their beloved, is reproduction. In the case of people, love’s aim is the creation of children. In the case of trades, love’s aim is the production of crafts. And in the case of wisdom, the lover seeks to produce and to spread concepts. In a sense, then, the philosopher’s goal is always pedagogical.

The Stoic idea of nature is different than the modern idea. Both instinct and inheritance play a role, like our modern concept, but they include the full development of a thing in their conversation.

If a seed that never becomes a tree can be said to have failed in its nature, so too can a person who never develops morally be said to have failed.

The cardinal Stoic virtues are courage, temperance, prudence, and justice.

History of Stoicism

All Stoics accept the three topoi, ethics, logic, and physics. Their all teach virtue with the aim of living in accordance with human nature. Their logical systems include both the modern, formal definition, the study of what consequences follow from what premises, and epistemic concerns, concerns about the nature of knowledge and what human beings can know. Stoic physics includes the modern sense of the word, encompassing a variety of natural sciences, and metaphysics and theology. For the Stoics, the gods and the soul were physical beings, and studying them revealed their governing principles.

The Good Life

“What is good?” This question is at the center of ethics. Before an ethical system can be constructed, criteria need to be established. For the ancients, and for many modern ethicists as well, the distinction between good and bad depend on life’s aim. Those choices which approach or are in accord with life’s aim are good. Those choices which frustrate or miss life’s aim are bad. I mentioned in the introduction that the aim of the Stoic life is agreement with nature. That lifestyle and those actions that agree with fully developed human nature are virtuous, and those that do not are vicious.

The Stoics think that, fundamentally, what is good exists in two places. First, a person may be good if they are well developed—if they are virtuous in character. Second, a person’s choices may be good if, by choosing, he or she is exercising virtue. In the case of inner virtue, a person must develop a stable or durable disposition, such that their character endures life’s tempests. In choice, a person must make a habit of virtuous activity, and this activity must be motivated by their virtuous character. If for example, one acts courageously because they do not know the danger of their situation, they are not for that reason good. If one is aware of the danger, that they may even be killed for pursuing a certain course but are directed by wisdom to uphold their duty, then their action is good.

For the Stoics, only choices can be good or evil.

Money, power, and pleasure outside the context of either concrete or abstract choices are externals. Externals can be positive, neutral, or negative. Positive externals are in some way fitting to our nature as human beings.

Negative externals are inconsistent with the nature of rational beings.

The Stoics think that correct judgments about choices and externals affect how we feel. A well-developed character and faculty of choice knows the difference between virtue and vice in choice and positive and negative in externals. Further, the development of one’s judgment is itself an object of morality. If I am not well developed, if I consistently choose externals over virtue, or choose externals that harm my character, I have bad judgment. Correct and incorrect judgments are products of my understanding of physics and logic. This is why the Stoics think physics and logic, the other two to poi, are necessary for a life in accordance with nature.

Desiring what is not in one’s power is not only contrary to nature, it is also a strain on human flourishing and an obstacle to a happy life.

On Control

In his Enchiridion, the Roman Stoic Epictetus compares life to a play. No matter the circumstances we find ourselves in, he says, we must give the best performance we can.

What is and is not in our power is a central Stoic theme and the heart of their ethics. To put it another way, the Stoics call us to recognize what we control and what we do not.

Why is this distinction important? Epictetus says that if we are invested in what we do not control, then we invite unhappiness. This, he thinks, is akin to slavery because our well being is at the mercy of either other people or fate. If we leave ourselves open to external influences, it is as though we are inviting strangers into our home and expecting them to care for it when we do not even care for it ourselves.

There are three classes of things which Epictetus thinks are in our control. Opinions and judgments are the first. We are capable of changing our opinions when they are ill-formed and reassessing our judgments when they are incorrect. Choices and actions are the second. Both the development of our faculty of choice, our prohairesis, and our concrete decisions are at the core of who we are as individuals. Desires and aversions are the third. What we do, what we choose, influences our desires, as do our experiences. But if a desire is harmful, we can choose to avoid it, to wean ourselves off it, or to seek help in doing so.

One pitfall Epictetus identifies lies in identifying oneself with one’s possessions.

Even the love of knowledge and books can leave us vulnerable.

By embracing those things that are in our control, we win the battle for happiness before it’s waged.

Progress toward tranquility is measured by the extent to which you’re withdrawn from externals. You turn to your own will, to your own faculties, to that part of you which is most you. And in doing so, you exercise this innermost part. By labor, you improve it so that it conforms to human nature. This is the path to freedom. With it comes faithfulness and modesty. Epictetus says that if someone gave you away as a slave, you would be rightfully angry. Giving yourself away is what you do with your mind when you tie your well being to external things.

There are situations whose outcomes are not in my control, but there is an extent to which I am responsible, to which I can act, such that abrogation of that responsibility is an injury to myself.

“Duties are universally measured by relations. Is anyone a father? If so, it is implied that the children should take care of him, submit to him in everything, patiently listen to his reproaches, his correction. But he is a bad father. Are you naturally entitled, then, to a good father? No, only to a father. Is a brother unjust? Well, keep your own situation towards him. Consider not what he does, but what you are to do to keep your own faculty of choice in a state conformable to nature.”

The innermost circle, consisting of our immediate family, is considered by the Stoics the most important. As the circle expands, to friends, to neighbors, to countrymen, and to the whole of humanity, our concern becomes more distant, our attachment more remote. Developing our concern to the limits of the circle is, for the Stoics, a kind of development of our sense of justice.

Virtue in Stoicism

The Stoics think that virtue, moral goodness, is not just sufficient for happiness, it’s necessary.

Understanding virtue is both a cognitive and a practical state of being. One must know the character of the virtues, their description, and the distinction between them in order to practice them. But likewise one must know them in practice, through habit and application, to fully grasp their meaning.

Zeno says that each virtue is a kind of wisdom.

Cleanthes thought that all the virtues were wisdom.

Chrysippus thought that each virtue was a type or branch of wisdom.

First Cleanthes. If all the virtues are one in the way he means, what is, for example, courage? Courage would be in part a kind of knowledge about what is and is not to be feared and how we should behave in the face of that which threatens us. The other half of courage would be knowledge about the exercise of this first knowledge; a kind of second-order knowledge. But what can we say about the difference between this knowledge and, say, prudence or practical wisdom? They would both be a kind of knowledge, and the object of both kinds, in the second-order version, is a correct exercise of that knowledge. But is everything which we call prudence also courage? What of returning to my friend something he has loaned? Should we say that there is no difference between the correct choice in circumstances like this and those in which my life or my well-being is in danger? I might need new friends if the prospect of returning what is owed to them is a source of disturbance!

What, then, if we do consider the virtues as separate as Chrysippus would, but as all branches or kinds of wisdom instead of all being the same wisdom but in different circumstances? This view seems to more accurately describe the relationship between the virtues as an interconnected we. Under this view, we can explain why, for example, prudence without justice is not a virtue: In the case, I might choose correctly how to carry out some or another aim, but that aim is something like murder or theft. I am therefore wise with respect to my execution, but unwise in what I desire to do.

The Stoics hold that human nature has certain propensities (oikeiôsis) for moral development. Beyond being fully developed human nature, virtue is a state toward which we unconsciously, maybe even by instinct, tend. When we learn to reason during and after childhood, we can then refine our instincts through habituation.

The Stoics identify three drives belonging to every human. First, we act to achieve our goals and interests. These include wealth, security, health, etc. Second, we identify with the interests of others. We start with our immediate family, then our friends, fellow citizens, and finally humanity as a whole. Third, we reason about and solve the problems facing us in life. These drives or propensities require the virtues if they’re to be successful. We need courage and temperance if we are to achieve our goals. To exercise our concern for the expanding circle of people, we require justice. And prudence or a well-developed faculty of choice empowers us to confront life’s problems.

Temperance divides into honor, self-control, and propriety. Prudence breaks into good judgment (as arises from knowledge of logic and physics), discretion, and resourcefulness. Justice is comprised of kindness, piety, and sociability. And courage can be divided into perseverance, magnanimity, and confidence.

Cicero says that justice consists in giving others what they deserve. The end of justice is, first, treating others in a way that benefits both parties involved. This is akin to honoring a contract, one whose first clause is not to do harm. Beyond the advantage of both parties, however, justice also serves and advances the ends of human society as a whole. By fulfilling our duties with regard to justice we bolster trust in cooperation between all parties involved in agreements.

Courage is also called greatness of strength or of the noble spirit. This is not what we typically consider courage to be, but it is, for the Stoics, its defining characteristic. Not only does it involve attaining those things that make our lives better, whether through hard work and discipline or through endurance, but also in rising above what we have acquired. Insofar as bettering ourselves in any way requires us to face difficulties and challenges and to rise above our present condition, it is an act of courage.

The latter aspect of rising above what we gain, orderly behavior and self-control, the Stoics call temperance. A certain amount of propriety in daily life conserves what is good tout court and what is befitting of any particular situation.

The virtues are also closely connected in structure with the three topoi, logic, ethics, and physics. The three topoi correspond to three Stoic disciplines—desire, action, and assent.

Desire derives from physics. One must train to want only what is possible and to ignore what the universe doesn’t allow. For the Stoics, this well-maintained desire is rooted in cause and effect. Through acquaintance with what the causes of circumstances and events are, one is steeled against outcomes inconsistent with what is in one’s own power. Of course, extreme examples involve the desire to live forever or to live a life without suffering. But also included are desires involving other people, for them to never disappoint you or to do what is contrary to their nature or moral development. Desire is therefore linked to courage and temperance. Courage, in this case, is endurance in the face of fortune, good and bad. Temperance, in this case, is well-regulated desire. The Stoics refer to desire as the doctrine of acceptance.

Action, also called Stoic philanthropy, is the idea that humans ought to develop concern for others that is in accord with the exercise of justice. This is the discipline closest ethics. The Stoics believe that we exist for other people, to teach them and to develop with them. If we can do neither, we should at least suffer their faults, aware that they are also reflections of our own follies.

Assent is also called Stoic mindfulness. We make choices about which experiences we accept and reject. Knowing what lessons are to be drawn is related to prudence. It is therefore dependent upon logic. Assent also governs opinion. If I believe something, I am giving assent to it. But if I believe things without sufficient evidence, I am imprudent with respect to my opinions. And perhaps the most important beliefs I have concern the nature of the cosmos as a whole and my place within it.

Stoic Logic and You

Prudence, practical wisdom about matters great and small in ethical life, owes its power to both logic and physics, where the former studies what consequences follow from what premises and the latter supplies the premises for sound arguments. If we are to make prudent decisions, to judge when and to what extent specific actions are to be taken, we must have firm support upon which to ground and to justify our choices.