Neo-Aristotelian Perspectives on Contemporary Science (Routledge Studies in the Philosophy of Science Book 17)

by William M.R. Simpson

Jaworski (2011: 269). Roughly, staunch hylomorphists can be divided up into minimalists and substantivists about the way formal organization transforms the ontological identity of material components. Minimalists, like Jaworski (and perhaps pluriformists like Avicenna and Duns Scotus), hold that the formal identity of the materials remain fundamentally the same whether they exist in the wild or as integrated material parts that depend upon the organization of the whole. Radical minimalists about formal transformation of materials go so far as to say that sometimes these material parts, say fundamental physical particles, are individual substances integrated within more complex substances. Minimal-ists argue substantivists cannot account for the continuity of the substrate that is required for change. Substantivists deny that material components—even the ground-floor physical stuff—can actually remain what they are when they are incorporated into the organization of an inclusive whole: electrons are transformed into animated material components when integrated into the life of an animal. Substantivists contend the minimalist view undermines the integrity, unity, and identity of the organized whole, since parts of a whole cannot possess their own central or substantial formal identity. Radical Substantivists about the formal transformation of materials hold that there cannot be any actual parts in hylomorphic individuals, only potential parts. I leave the debate here.