Myanmar's Enemy Within: Buddhist Violence and the Making of a Muslim 'Other' (Asian Arguments)

by Francis Wade

But there evidently had been an organised effort to block information about the violence from reaching the UN, and the nearby policeman who did nothing to intervene was culpable in that. Why exactly it wasn’t clear, but theories began to circulate that perhaps civilian-on-civilian violence could prove beneficial for the military, which controls the police via the Home Affairs Ministry. One supposition that gained traction among those watching the events of 2012 and 2013 went that factions of the regime that were nervous about the potential for the transition to eat away at their influence might either manufacture, or allow to take hold, violence that appeared communal in nature. Greater political bargaining rights could be dangerous in a society with such deep fissures, so it went, for the populace was apparently already prone to conflict and this would only drive violent competition for the spoils of a democratic state. The scenes that emerged from Meikhtila and elsewhere would show that Myanmar was not ready for the military to step back. As a result, it could remain in a position that allowed it to protect its substantial political and economic interests.