The Age of Eisenhower: America and the World in the 1950s

by William I. Hitchcock

It was a gamble, and it worked. On October 6, after six weeks of intensive shelling, Mao announced a one-week moratorium on the artillery attacks, a pause that stretched on for a few more weeks, until the crisis had passed. Quemoy remained under Taiwan’s control (as it does today). No “small” atomic bombs were dropped. America did not lose face in Asia. Chiang did not attack the mainland, though he continued to fume about insufficiently firm American support. Eisenhower’s strategy of patience paid off. He restrained his generals and his secretary of state, calmed his allies, and showed that the United States would not be bullied. It was a quiet and terribly important victory for the president. But of course it was not the kind of victory that played well on the home stage. The press attacked Eisenhower and Dulles mercilessly, first for allowing the United States to be manipulated by Chiang into such a dangerous predicament, and then for being insufficiently bold in standing by the Nationalist leader in his hour of need.