Nehru and Bose: Parallel Lives

by Rudrangshu Mukherjee

He and Vithalbhai Patel, the elder brother of Vallabhbhai who was also in Vienna for treatment and had become a friend of Subhas’s, issued a joint statement. The Bose–Patel manifesto contained some clues about the new message that Subhas was seeking and intended to imbibe among Indians. The statement said, ‘We are clearly of [the] opinion that as a political leader Mahatma Gandhi has failed. The time has therefore come for a radical reorganization of the Congress on a new principle and with a new method.

bose and vitallbhai's joint issued statement

For bringing about this reorganization a change of leadership is necessary . . .

If the Congress as a whole can undergo this transformation, it would be the best course. Failing that a new party will have to be formed within the Congress, composed of all radical elements. Non-cooperation cannot be given up but the form of non-cooperation will have to be changed int...

In India, often within prison walls, Jawaharlal was also reviewing his political and ideological position in the context of Gandhi’s withdrawal of the Civil Disobedience Movement, his fasts and his focus on the removal of untouchability. He was seriously upset by Gandhi’s decision to halt the Civil Disobedience Movement. In his autobiography, he was to record the sense of loss and vacuum that overwhelmed him when he got the news of the withdrawal. He was frightened by Gandhi’s statement that Congressmen should turn to social work—to the spread of khadi, to hand-spinning and hand-weaving. He was appalled, and he wrote, ‘This was the political programme that we were to follow. A vast distance seemed to separate him [Gandhi] from me. With a stab of pain I felt that the chords of allegiance that had bound me to him for many years had snapped.’4

One reason for Jawaharlal’s growing ideological distance from Gandhi was his attraction to socialism and communism. His intellectual conversion to the Marxist way of looking at history and to socialism was articulated in the articles he wrote around this time and in the statements that he made; the most coherent evidence of this is available, however, in the letters that he wrote to his daughter Indira from prison. These letters were brought together in a book called Glimpses of World History. In two of these letters Jawaharlal explicated to his daughter the basic tenets of Marxism and communism and the materialist conception of history.14 He wrote to her admiringly about planning in the Soviet Union: ‘[T]he argument about the success or otherwise of the Five Year Plan is rather a pointless one. The answer to it is the present state of the Soviet Union. And a further answer is the fact that this Plan has

impressed itself on the imagination of the world. Everybody talks of planning now . . . The Soviets have put magic into the word.’ In Jawaharlal’s mind there were no doubts about the success of the Soviet economy based on socialist principles; and this success ‘is itself the most powerful argument in favour of socialism’.

nehru view rised for communism

written at great speed. Subhas began writing in earnest in June 1934 and the book was published in January the following year. Jawaharlal, too, began writing in June 1934 and finished

I have become a queer mixture of the East and West, out of place everywhere, at home nowhere. Perhaps my thoughts and approach to life are more akin to what is called Western rather than Eastern but India clings to me, as she does to all her children, in innumerable ways; . . . I cannot get rid of either that past inheritance or my recent acquisitions.

They are both part of me, and though they help me in both the East and the West, they also create in me a feeling of spiritual loneliness not in public activities but in life itself. I am a stranger and alien in the West. I cannot be of it. But in my own country also, sometimes, I have an exile’s feeling.’101

nehru's self analysis

The Working Committee rejected Jawaharlal’s proposal to allow the affiliation of trade unions and peasant leagues with the Congress, and also his efforts to link the Congress more directly with the movements for political reforms in the princely states. The 1935 Act was condemned but the Congress agreed to contest elections while deferring a decision on the question of office acceptance.

The relationship between Subhas and Patel had been somewhat fraught since the will left behind by the latter’s brother, Vithalbhai. Vithalbhai had died in Vienna in 1933 and had been devotedly nursed by Subhas during his illness. In his will Vithalbhai had endowed more than three-fourths of his estate to Subhas, to be spent by him ‘for the political uplift of India and preferably for publicity work on behalf of India’s cause in other countries’. Vallabhbhai refused to accept the will as genuine. In the spirit of bonhomie that prevailed at Haripura, Subhas agreed to Patel’s suggestion that the money should go to a special committee of the Congress. But they failed to agree on the composition of the committee. The matter was dragged to the law courts and Subhas lost the case in the Bombay High Court and subsequently on appeal as well. With the money, Vallabhbhai set up the Vithalbhai Memorial Trust having first obtained a commitment from all the legal heirs of his brother that none of them would accept or claim a penny from the estate.3

Subash and patel relation

Sarat Bose complained to Gandhi that Patel wanted that ‘not a word, not a comma should be changed’.34 Patel and his group obviously believed that there was only one solution to the impasse: Subhas had to abandon his new boat and come aboard on Gandhi’s as a part of the crew. But these signals of intransigence did not deter Subhas from trying to find some kind of middle ground with Gandhi. He embarked on this effort through letters while convalescing in a place near Dhanbad.

Subash was recovering in gomoh near dhanbad

Jawaharlal wrote, ‘[T]he association of vague Leftist slogans with no clear Leftist ideology or principles has in recent years been much in evidence in Europe. It has led to Fascist development . . . The possibility of such a thing happening in India possessed my mind and disturbed me. The fact that in international affairs you held different views from mine and did not wholly approve our condemnation of Nazi Germany or Fascist Italy added to my discomfort, and looking at the picture as a whole, I did not at all fancy the direction in which apparently you wanted us to go.’ In a more general context, Jawaharlal commented, ‘We are temperamentally different and our approach to life and its problems is not the same.’ And as if to elaborate his attitude to life, Jawaharlal, towards the end of his reply, mused thus with more than a hint of self-pity: ‘I am an unsatisfactory human being who is dissatisfied with himself and the world, and whom the petty world he lives in does not particularly like.’38 The two points are important as they throw some light on the two different paths the two men would take.

Nehru to subash

‘I would ask Panditji in the first place wherein he finds opportunism or fascism in the programme of the Forward Bloc. I would ask him in the second place to tell us who among the members of the Forward Bloc are either opportunists or fascists . . . I should rather label as opportunists those who would run with the hare and hunt with the hound—those who pose as leftists and act as rightists—those who talk in one way when they are inside a room and in quite a different way when they are outside . . . Are those people to be called fascists who are fighting against fascism within the Congress and without or should they be dubbed as fascists who support the present autocratic “high command” either by openly joining the present homogeneous Working Committee or by secretly joining in their deliberations and drafting their resolutions.’69

Subash harsh reply to nehru

there were aspects of Subhas’s attitude that were more akin to Gandhi’s than to Jawaharlal’s.75 With Gandhi he shared the sense of certainty about the path he had chosen. Neither of them had Jawaharlal’s persistent self-doubt and proneness to self-scrutiny. Possibly since the time he refused to join the ICS, Subhas had an idea of his own mission and destiny. This was imbricated with his own notions of sacrifice. Gandhi had his own commitment to the quest for truth from which he never separated his political activities. He was always sure of his inner voice.76 The temperaments of both Gandhi and Subhas were imbued with a sense of religiosity, not in any narrow and sectarian meaning of the term but in a more profound way that pertained to their understanding of what bestowed an inner significance to human lives and human history.

Jawaharlal’s intellectual trajectories had different orientations. He was not drawn easily, as he himself wrote in his autobiography, towards religion and spirituality. This was one factor in his intellectual distance from both Gandhi and, more agonizingly, from Kamala. He was less sure of his path, troubled as he always was by introspection. These features of his personality invariably made him appear torn and occasionally vacillating. Both Gandhi and Subhas believed that their politics derived a purpose from activism. As the latter reminded Jawaharlal in the harsh letter of 28 March 1939: ‘[T]he unity that we strive for or maintain must be the unity of action and not the unity of inaction.’77 Jawaharlal paused before he acted and this often irked those who, like Subhas, made a virtue of their own impatience.

Subhas’s campaign to get himself re-elected he could not accept from his heart. He informed Subhas of this in the most gracious of terms: ‘I felt all along that you were far too keen on re-election. Politically there was nothing wrong in it and you were perfectly entitled to desire re-election and to work for it. But it did distress me for I felt that you had a big enough position to be above this kind of thing.

‘I felt all along that you were far too keen on re-election. Politically there was nothing wrong in it and you were perfectly entitled to desire re-election and to work for it. But it did distress me for I felt that you had a big enough position to be above this kind of thing.’78 Jawaharlal perhaps felt that Subhas was spoiling for a fight and needlessly precipitating a confrontation with the established Congress leadership. With an international crisis looming because of an impending war in Europe, the Congress could ill afford to get bogged down in an internal feud. He believed that the party and the country needed at that juncture a credible and non-partisan leadership and only Gandhi could provide this. He felt helpless and feared that Subhas was falling prey to provincial forces and aspirations. To Krishna Menon he wrote in early April, ‘[F]or the moment Subhas has become a kind of symbol of Bengal and it is quite impossible to argue with or about symbols. I feel very helpless.’79

Nehru on subas attitude

Once it became obvious, after the Pant resolution was introduced, that what was emerging was a challenge to Gandhi, many of Subhas’s supporters, like the CSP, reviewed their own positions. Jayaprakash Narayan summed up the situation rather well: ‘The whole issue then stood thus—acceptance of Pant’s resolution would mean supporting Gandhian leadership and opposition to it would mean an advocacy of alternative leadership. The socialist line was opposed to both.’82 There was a growing realization within the left group that it was not strong enough to precipitate a clash with the Gandhian leadership. Rammanohar Lohia had written with some insight in March 1939 that the ‘Leftists in the Congress should not aspire to set up an alternative leadership to the present leadership of the “Right”. They have not the strength to control the destiny of the nation, nor can they hope to attain it in the future. A direct offensive against the Right Congress leaders would result in internal conflict.’ Jayaprakash Narayan also held a similar view.83 Subhas in his unbounded optimism had overestimated his support base. Or, to put it differently, he had failed to read the pulse of the Congress, even of those he saw as his own supporters. He had brought himself perilously close to becoming a hero without a chorus.

jp narayan and lohia views on the re-election and pant resolution

Apart from the differences in their temperament, Jawaharlal had also written to Subhas about their divergent understanding of the international situation, especially what was happening in Italy and Germany under fascism and Nazism respectively. Subhas’s views on these totalitarian regimes was obvious in his willingness to meet the Nazi official Dr O. Urchs in Bombay on 22 December 1938. He was also of the view that Germany was the only power with the strength to challenge Britain.85 When and if it did so, he thought, there would be a real opportunity for Indian nationalism to strike against British rule in India. Jawaharlal’s condemnation of fascism and Nazism was not tempered by any considerations of realpolitik. It was forthright and ideological. His views on India’s position in the event of a war between Germany and Britain was more considered, calibrated and different from Subhas’s. He wrote, ‘The fascist powers would very much like India to be a thorn in the side of England when war comes, so that they might profit by the situation we create. There is nothing that we would dislike so much as to play into the hands of the fascist powers, just as we dislike being exploited by imperialist Britain. Our anti-war policy must therefore be based on freedom and democracy and opposition to fascism and imperialism. And yet with a little twist it might well be turned into a pro-fascist policy.

nehru and subash views on germany and other facist powers

This letter, written on the train to Wardha, has grown long. But I want to add a few words to it and to tell you how much I desire that the long conflict of India and England should be ended and that they should cooperate together. I have felt that this war, with all its horrors, has brought this opportunity to our respective countries and it would be sad and tragic if we are unable to take advantage of it.’9

‘Subhas Bose is going to pieces and has definitely ranged himself

against the Congress. This is very unfortunate, but there it is . . . He now talks the most arrant nonsense about rival Congress and the like . . . Subhas Bose does not seem to have an idea in his head, and except for going on talking about leftists and rightists he says little that is intelligible.’11 Jawaharlal was not prone to using this kind of language about anybody. These words can only be taken as signs of his growing anger at, and his political and personal distance from Subhas.

Subhas suggested that a free Indian government be established in Berlin, and much to the surprise of Woermann spoke about sending 100,000 German troops to invade and free India.41 It became evident to Woermann that Subhas’s aims and Germany’s priorities were incompatible. Subhas believed that Germany wanted to destroy the British Empire. He was possibly unaware that Hitler’s priorities did not include the British Empire at this point of time. He was occupied full time with the planning of Operation Barbarossa—the invasion of the Soviet Union. A quick victory in Russia, Hitler believed, would force Britain out of the war. This was his limited aim in early 1941. A significant section of the Nazi leadership that may have even included Hitler, was not averse to a peace agreement with Britain around 1940–41. Witness, Rudolf Hess’s flight to Scotland with an offer of peace.

Germany had other priorities than india when asked for help for india

W]e have nothing in common with the Nazis, it is true. But why should that prevent us from taking some help from them, provided they did not try to interfere with our work or influence us ideologically . . . We won’t say anything either in favour of or against the Germans for what they do in Europe does not strictly concern us.’54

Lately subash views about germany

‘I do not . . . doubt the bona fides of Mr Bose. I think he has come to a certain conclusion which I think is wrong, but nevertheless a conclusion which he thinks is for the good of India. We parted company with him many years ago. Since then we have drifted further apart and today we are very far from each other. It is not good enough for me, because of my past friendship and because I do not challenge his motives, to say anything against him. But I do realize that the way he has chosen is utterly wrong, a way which I not only cannot accept but must oppose, if it takes shape. Because any force that may come from outside will really come as a dummy force under Japanese control. It is a bad thing psychologically for the Indian masses to think in terms of being liberated by an outside agency.’85

Nehru on subash ina freedom plan

Jawaharlal was opposed to fascism (and of course to its most virulent form, Nazism) since its inception in Europe. He read the fascist movement—it so happened, rightly—as the greatest threat to hard-won democratic liberties. He made no secret of this opposition—his writings of the 1930s are replete with his condemnation of fascism as are his letters on history that he wrote to his young daughter. Subhas did not share this antipathy. He saw Mussolini as a great man who represented the aspirations of the age. He met him a number of times and sought his advice. His admiration for Mussolini ran so high that he thought that the highest compliment he could pay to Gandhi’s Salt March was by comparing it to Mussolini’s march on Rome: a march in which Mussolini was not even present. Subhas saw fascism as a movement that represented discipline and efficiency; he argued that the future of India would have to be fashioned through a mixture of fascism and communism. Subhas had from his youth a fascination for things military, and this may have been one factor that attracted him to militaristic regimes. There is no record of Subhas ever criticizing the atrocities committed by the Black Shirts in Italy, the Nazi regime in Germany and other parts of Europe, and the Japanese army in Southeast Asia. He had studied philosophy and in his personal life was a deeply religious man, but he saw no ethical problems in trying to achieve his noble vision through an alliance with regimes that stood fo...

Nehru and bose core belief on facism