Bringing Columbia Home: The Untold Story of a Lost Space Shuttle and Her Crew

by Michael D. Leinbach

Wetherbee located Dave King, and the two discussed their roles. King would be the “up and out” person, interfacing with the senior leaders of the many agencies involved, the White House, and NASA headquarters. King assigned Wetherbee as the crew recovery’s “down and in” leader, with operational decision authority for anything related to searching for and recovering Columbia’s astronauts.

Multiple leaders simply could not all have the final decision-making authority.

The mother then said something that stuck with Mango for the rest of his NASA career. It was a statement, not a question: “We are going to fly again, right?”

Wetherbee instructed the astronauts to be guided by an “Eight, Eight, Eight Rule” in recoveries: “Eight days from now, eight months from now, and eight years from now, we must be able to live with the consequences of the decisions that we will make in the field. Every decision must be based on our highest judgment using our greatest professionalism and human values.”10 He was determined that things be handled with appropriate dignity and respect for Columbia’s crew. He knew the astronauts would do this without fail.

Love the 8 rule

In the weeks between February 1 and May 10, 2003, nearly twenty-five thousand men and women searched 680,750 acres of land—in essence, walking every square foot of an area roughly the size of the state of Rhode Island. The US Forest Service, Bureau of Indian Affairs, Bureau

“NASA approach to things is to put 50,000 people in a line and move forward an inch at a time.”

avoid speculating about the cause of an accident for as long as possible.

someone whose mind is latched onto a given theory will pursue that line of investigation and disregard evidence that points to other possibilities.

CAIB’s report on the accident noted that NASA’s culture made it extremely difficult to raise concerns that would have been listened to.

“As a shuttle pilot, I knew exactly what those switches meant,” Melroy said, “and I was absolutely electrified!” The crew—“demonstrating excellent systems knowledge by taking actions not simulated in training”—had attempted to get the hydraulic systems working again after the ship lost control. Melroy said, “They were our heroes. Somehow, it made it easier to bear, knowing they were not helpless, but instead were fighting to save the vehicle in their last moments—right up to the end.”13

Here is a warning of the dangers of complacency and suppressed debate.

Clearly, changing organizational culture—and making those changes stick—is much harder than improving technology.

Senior NASA officials expressed surprise throughout the investigation as they learned about the concerns people said they had tried to raise while Columbia was in orbit. Leaders said they had no idea serious issues were not being elevated to their attention, when policies were clearly in place to encourage open and honest discussion.

agency’s culture eroded over time into one of “prove to me why it’s not safe to fly.”

Mission Management Teams would be required to meet every day the shuttle was in orbit, no matter how well things seemed to be going.

I can recall post-Columbia program-level meetings where we could not adjourn until at least one dissenting opinion was presented. It was a little awkward, but it was the right thing to do—to really show the team we meant what we said about open discussions.