Ages of Discord: A Structural-Demographic Analysis of American History

by Peter Turchin

In 1861, however, these institutions failed catastrophically. By this point, the American political elites had lost their ability to cooperate in finding a compromise that would preserve the commonwealth.

In the 1860s, Americans learned that large-scale complex societies are actually fragile, and that a descent into a civil war can be rapid.

Today, 150 years later, this lesson has been thoroughly forgotten. As I discuss in Chapter 11, the degree to which cooperation among the American political elites has unraveled during the past decade is eerily similar to what happened in the 1850s, the decade preceding the Civil War.

Just because we cannot imagine our actions leading to disaster, it doesn’t mean that such a disaster cannot happen.

A well-meaning intervention to fix one particular problem is likely to have unexpected and, often, undesirable consequences

There is a marked tendency among policy-makers to deal with economic or political crises of today as though they were completely new and unprecedented. Such blindness to history often leads us to repeat old mistakes.

This research program raises two fundamental questions. First, are there general principles of social dynamics? Second, even supposing we discover such principles by studying historical societies, will they still apply to the very different societies of today?

As all these trends intensify, the end result is state bankruptcy and consequent loss of military control; elite movements of regional and national rebellion; and a combination of elite-mobilized and popular uprisings that expose the breakdown of central authority.

Sociopolitical instability resulting from state collapse feeds back on population growth via depressed birth rates and elevated mortality and emigration. Additionally, increased migration and vagrancy spread the disease by connecting areas that would have stayed isolated during better times. As a result, epidemics and even pandemics strike disproportionately often during the disintegrative phases of secular cycles (Turchin 2008b).

The data also indicate that one of the most reliable predictors of state collapse and high political instability is elite overproduction (Turchin and Nefedov 2009:314).

when the supply of labor exceeds its demand, its price should decrease (depressing living standards for the majority of population).

The principle of elite overproduction is also a consequence of the law of supply and demand. The elites (in both agrarian and capitalist societies) are consumers of commoner labor. Low labor costs lead not only to declining living standards for a large segment of the population (employees, especially unskilled ones), but also to a favorable economic conjuncture for the elites (more specifically, for the economic segment of the elites—employers).

The third consequence is that the twin processes of declining living standards for the commoners and increasing consumption levels for the elites will drive up socioeconomic inequality.

elite overproduction increases the probability of violent intraelite conflict.

Elite overproduction leading to intraelite competition and conflict is, thus, one of the chief causes of political instability.

These three causes interact in producing conditions ripe for political violence. Thus, one common tactic employed by the counter-elites is to mobilize the masses against the established elites, something made possible by deep-running popular discontent.

Overpopulation, by contrast, results in popular immiseration and discontent, but as long as the elites remain unified, peasant insurrections, slave rebellions, or worker uprisings have little chance of success, and are speedily suppressed.

The overall purpose of this book is to test the predictions of the Structural-Demographic Theory against the empirical material of the United States from its formation (c.1780) to the present.

(the effect of labor oversupply on living standards, the elite overproduction principle, and the structural-demographic causes of sociopolitical instability,

Structural-demographic theory represents complex (state-level) human societies as systems with three main compartments (the general population, the elites, and the state) interacting with each other and with socio-political instability via a web of nonlinear feedbacks

Youth bulges tend to be politically highly destabilizing, because a sudden increase in new workers joining the labor force tends to depress their employment prospects and wages

Furthermore, young adults in the 20–29 age cohort are particularly susceptible to radicalization.

rapid population growth in excess of employment opportunities can lead to declining standards of living, a youth bulge, and rapid urbanization—all processes that increase the mobilization potential of the population and thus are inherently destabilizing.

Elite overproduction, the presence of more elites than the society can provide positions for, is inherently destabilizing.

the only feasible way to deal with such complex systems is to build a spectrum of models, each addressing a somewhat different aspect of the problem, and each simple enough to avoid the pitfalls of large, unwieldy models (large parameter numbers and structural instability). As Einstein famously said, a model should be as simple as possible, but no simpler than that.

Average Stature Average height is one of the most sensitive indicators of the biological wellbeing of a population (Komlos 1985, Fogel 1986, Steckel 1995). Physical stature is determined by the balance between nutritional intakes and demands made on the organism by the environment during the first 20 years of its life.

Life Expectancy The dynamics of life expectancy confirm the pattern revealed by the stature data

because at the individual level there is a strong positive correlation between life expectancy and stature, except at extreme heights

the history of the United States since 1780 can be divided into four phases; two during which popular wellbeing increased, and two during which it declined. The transitions between different phases were gradual (and, as noted above, there was substantial variation between the timing of some trend reversals for different variables),

The first phase (1780–c.1830) was characterized by low immigration. During this period real wages tripled and the relative wage more than doubled, while the American population enjoyed tall (and increasing) stature and long life expectancy. The optimistic social mood prevailed and young adults married early.

During the second phase (c.1830–c.1910), the United States experienced a massive immigration wave. Real wages stagnated (between 1840 and 1880), but more tellingly, the proportion of the GDP going to the wage labor declined from 1830 to 1910. During the second half of the nineteenth century average stature and life expectation declined, while the age at first marriage increased.

The third phase (c.1910–c.1960) was characterized by declining immigration (especially after 1920). Real wages increased dramatically (by a factor of 3.5). The average height and life expectancy also grew in a remarkable fashion, while the age at first marriage decreased (except during the 1930s).

The fourth phase (from c.1960 and continuing today) saw another wave of massive immigration. The GDP share to workers declined, and real wages stagnated (after the 1970s). The rate at which stature and life expectancy increased s...

while the age at first marriage grew to levels ne...