Veerappan: Chasing the Brigand

by K. Vijay Kumar

Before I left Chennai to join the STF, I called on the CM. Despite all the media reports, she wished me luck and assured me of her full support. I knew she meant it. In my previous stint with the STF, I recall that all demands made by Walter Davaram, including satellite phones and Bolero jeeps, were approved immediately by the state administration. The CM ensured that red tape never hindered the STF. Just as it should be with any special force anywhere. Elite groups are typically created to handle crisis situations. They need mission-focused troops, rigorous training, inspiring leadership at all levels and the best possible gear. The last thing they need is to deal with bureaucratic queries about why special rations in place of standard rations, or ‘2,000 ammo 7.62 cal’ when ‘2,500 ammo 9 mm’ is in stock. It is for this reason that the ‘tail’ (quartermaster/storekeeper) must look at the ‘teeth’ (fighter in front).

How relevant this is for any manager. Need to have trust in one who has been given the responsibility and supporting him or her to the hilt is a must for any success.

Despite her generosity, the CM never put any pressure on us to deliver results. Only once during an election campaign in May 2004 near the STF headquarters in Sathy did she ask, ‘How is it going?’

Again a very good lesson for all the management to be learnt from a politician.

I also impressed upon all the men to try and win the hearts and minds of the local populace and build upon my predecessor Nataraj’s work. ‘If you can’t befriend them, at least don’t antagonize them,’ I would emphasize repeatedly.

This is the strategy to be used in situations like Kashmir. A K. P. S. Gill succeeding in Punjab is not a good example.

Veerappan could not survive without the people outside his gang who aided him either out of fear or greed. We needed to win these people over. To this end, we organized extensive programmes in villages, including medical camps. In many cases, it was the first time in years that the villagers were examined by a qualified doctor. Then, there were spiritual doctors like Inspector Dharmaraj, who wooed the villagers of Martelli—once the gang’s stronghold—with a Bible in hand instead of an AK.

Again proves there are situations where love wins and force and power will fail.

I knew Hussain was alluding to Operation Jungle Storm, a mammoth mobilization that the STF had carried out in June 2000. More than 1,000 men had churned the jungles for over two months under IG Balachandran, who had meticulously prepared the plan. But Jungle Storm did not yield the desired outcome. Instead of actually scouring the dense forest, the teams got bogged down by the attempts to achieve daily targets for kilometres covered, villages visited and sources met. They stuck to beaten paths. Food was delivered by jeeps and vans. To collect it in time, the teams loitered near the pickup points, instead of performing in-depth patrolling. Most aspects of the operation were micromanaged and the local commanders’ own tactics and initiative were mothballed.

Shows you get what you measure and not necessarily achieve what you want to achieve by that measurement.

There is an old adage that one should not confuse activity for progress.

Ha! one wishes the managers understand this. Late nights and weekend workers do not necessarily indicate better workmanship or dedication.