The Gatekeepers: How the White House Chiefs of Staff Define Every Presidency

by Chris Whipple

‘No, you’ll be that person. They don’t know me. And I don’t know them. And you do know me. You know my approach. You know my mind. You have a sense for my goals. And I trust you implicitly to do this in the right spirit and in the right way.” Watson knew when Carter’s mind was made up: “This was an order; it was not, ‘Let’s talk about this.’

“I was very pleased and overwhelmed with pleasure—politically speaking and personally—to have Jack as a new friend and a supporter.”

Watson was fascinated by Carter’s steely determination and eclectic intellect: trained in the navy on nuclear submarines, he could talk knowledgeably about the throw weights of intercontinental missiles and the political theories of Reinhold Niebuhr: “He was the most supremely self-confident person I had ever encountered,” Watson says. “He had an amazing capacity to absorb and assimilate information on a wide range of subjects and to pull the information out in an organized way, and apply it.”

“The thing about Jack, more than his intellect, was his discipline,” he says. “We used to joke about his desk. He would polish it. The desk was always shiny and there was nothing on it.” Watson, who had been part of an elite U.S. Marines special operations unit, made it all look effortless.

As Peter Bourne, Carter’s biographer, puts it: “He not only lacked the polish that Carter had acquired but pointedly eschewed any inclinations in that direction.”

Jordan was a precociously brilliant political strategist, and a perfect complement to the pious, high-minded candidate. “Carter, who wanted to be simultaneously above and a part of politics, saw it only as a means to an end,” writes Bourne. “Jordan…enjoyed politics and had little compunction about doing what was necessary to win.”

Watson’s transition effort would become a model for future administrations. “No president-elect before or since had ever been prepared so comprehensively in preparation for taking over the office,”

“Unbenownst to us, Carter had set up—and you could say wisely perhaps—a transition-in-waiting operation that included some very good people. And then Jack was named the transition head. The problem was not Jack’s doing—but it looked, from the campaign staff side, like he was aggrandizing power and becoming the chief of staff and bringing his own people over.”

“Some Thoughts on Organizing the Executive Office of the President.” At the beginning at least, I think your five to eight top aides should be equal in their status, salaries and access to you. In effect, you should act as your own chief of staff. There is no way for you to predict how your choices for the top jobs will cope with the unique challenges of the White House. If a “first among equals” naturally emerges later, and you decide that designation of a chief of staff would help you, you can name him then.

“Ham’s thing was, ‘Let me think of a great idea, and I’ll give a memo to Carter,’ ” says Rubenstein. “That’s what he was good at. He wasn’t good at managing people; he had no skill set in that.”

“He had this chief of staff office, but he was hardly ever there because he didn’t want people calling him to make decisions,” says Rubenstein. “So he would go hide out in other offices in the EOB [Executive Office Building] or elsewhere so people couldn’t get access to him.” Jordan continued doing what he did best: writing memos to the president. Jordan’s deputy, Landon Butler, recalls Cheney’s advice to his boss: “ ‘Ham, the chief of staff cannot write in this office. You can’t sit down for three days and work on a memo. Because everything backs up if you do that.’ And that struck me as being damn good advice. Ham never took it.”

Everything in Washington is connected. Everything. You step on their toes on one thing, they’re going to remember on the next thing.”

“We probably had two hundred people and all of them horses, all of ’em passionate, all of ’em hardworking,” says Butler. “So somebody had to set an agenda. Somebody had to set the tone and say, this is important, and this isn’t. And that wasn’t easy to do.” At the urging of Eizenstat, Vice President Walter Mondale was drafted to prioritize issues according to the level of attention required: presidential, vice presidential, cabinet. But even this did not solve the problem. As Eizenstat points out, “You needed to have someone to execute them. And that couldn’t be the vice president.”

I want to talk to you about a fundamental threat to American democracy….It is a crisis of confidence. It is a crisis that strikes at the very heart and soul and spirit of our national will. We can see this crisis in the growing doubt about the meaning of our own lives and in the loss of a unity of purpose for our nation…. Carter went on to describe the symptoms of America’s ills: What you see too often in Washington and elsewhere around the country is a system of government that seems incapable of action. You see a Congress twisted and pulled in every direction by hundreds of well-financed and powerful special interests. You see every extreme position defended to the last vote, almost to the last breath, by one unyielding group or another…you see paralysis and stagnation and drift. You don’t like it, and neither do I. What can we do?

“On the battlefield of energy we can win for our nation a new confidence, and we can seize control again of our common destiny….We simply must have faith in each other, faith in our ability to govern ourselves, and faith in the future of this nation.”

His positions are correct, his values sound….This is not an inconsiderable gift; his performance in office shows us why it’s not enough.” The problem, Fallows argued, was fundamental: Carter and those closest to him to him took office in profound ignorance of their jobs. They were ignorant of the possibilities and the most likely pitfalls. They fell prey to predictable dangers and squandered precious time…. Carter often seemed more concerned with taking the correct position than with learning how to turn that position into results. He seethed with frustration when plans were rejected, but felt no compulsion to do better next time. He did not devour history for its lessons, surround himself with people who could do what he could not, or learn from others that fire was painful before he plunged his hand into the flame.

Watson brought order and efficiency to the West Wing and mended relationships with the powers that be on Capitol Hill, who were astonished to suddenly have their phone calls returned. “Jack knew what to do, knew how to get it done,” says Jay Beck, Jordan’s deputy and close friend. “I think throughout that last year, when Carter was so focused on the hostages, Kennedy, and all, Jack was there to make the trains run.”

it would have created an initial impression of more organization, of a clearer sense of priorities, of a more professional operation. So, yes, I think it would have made a difference.”

They need someone to organize issues for them, to organize decisions, to bring the politics and the policy together, to have outreach to interest groups, to make sure that relations with Congress are going as smoothly as possible, to make sure the scheduling is done in the most logical way, to set priorities. That can’t be done by the president himself—however smart or wise he is.”

Hill: ‘We’re not going to do that—and here’s why.’ And sometimes you’re being as gentle as a butterfly. You have to be tough and you have to be gentle and you have to be sensitive—a lot of the qualities of a good Marine officer.”

“In retrospect,” says Fallows of Carter’s White House, “there should have been some way to empower Ham as the confidant, as the trusted truth teller. And somebody else would be the one asking, ‘Okay, where should we be six months from now? Where should we be two years from now?’ Every president is destined to fail in some way, because the job involves a wider range of talents than any person has. And so, yes, every president should have a chief of staff who makes a complete whole. And few of them do.”

“And maybe that’s the strength of presidents like Reagan—who don’t think they’re the smartest person around.”

Spencer had been watching Baker since he’d been Ford’s delegate hunter in 1976: “I thought, number one, he’s organized. Number two, he’s upwardly mobile—he didn’t want to look bad.”

Baker’s next move would speak volumes about his mastery of White House governance, and his ability to outsmart his rivals. The next morning, he invited Meese to breakfast. It was a shame about all this fuss, Baker told him, pulling out a yellow legal pad. Why don’t you and I just divide up our duties, lawyer to lawyer?

Baker proposed that Meese should be “counselor to the president”; he would be in charge of policy, supervise the domestic and national security councils, preside over cabinet meetings, and have cabinet rank. Baker, as chief of staff, would control access to the president, paperwork, speechwriting, and the White House staff. Meese readily agreed, and Baker had a memo typed up for their signatures. “The way I made it right with Ed worked,” says Baker. “It worked for the Gipper, it worked for the country, it worked for me.”

The truth was, Baker had cleverly seized the levers of power. While Meese was technically in charge of “policy,” Baker was in charge of executing it; the chief also controlled information to and from the president, and the daily message. Meese was left, as one observer put it, “with a nice title and a fancy office and little else.” Baker states it more diplomatically....

“About to inherit worst economic mess of any Pres. in 50 years. So first order of business—get a handle on the economy! Second: Our international position has deteriorated badly. (1) defenses weak (2) Our word is no longer trusted—because our diplomacy has been uncertain. RR [Ronald Reagan] wants to see flag of liberty flying once again around the world. Thinks U.S. has a special mission in lifting that banner.”

Roles of C of S (acc to Jack Watson) 1) Resolve disputes that don’t need to go to the Pres. 2) Be an HONEST BROKER. Make sure everything completely staffed out. 3) C of S is place where policy and politics come together. (make sure the political aspect—the p.r. aspect—is looked at.) 4) Administer the place. Run it.

****** Central Theme we ought to push Pres. seriously weakened in recent years Restore power & auth to Exec Branch—Need strong leadership Get rid of War Powers Act—restore impoundment rights 2) Strong Cabinet & strong staff in WH Not “either or” proposition. Have to have both. 3) Orderly schedule & orderly paper flow is way you protect the Pres. Well designed system. Got to be brutal in scheduling decisions. Most valuable asset in D.C. is time of RR Need to have discipline & order & be discriminating *DON’T USE THE POLICY PROCESS TO IMPOSE YOUR POLICY VIEWS ON PRES.

The most successful managers are those that are secure enough to surround themselves with extremely strong-willed, talented people.”

A reporter who covered the Reagan White House recalls, “There were times when the president would arrive in the morning and say, ‘Well, boys, what do you have for me?’ And Baker would organize an agenda and an objective for the president….They initiated programs that they knew he would like—and Reagan was grateful for that.”

“You do not serve your president well if you are just a yes man,” explains Baker. “That’s not what presidents need; that’s not what presidents want. One of the things I am most proud of is that all of the presidents I have worked for have said, ‘Jim Baker was able to tell me what he really thought, whether I wanted to hear it or not.’ You have to be willing to do that. You have to be willing to speak truth to power.”

Baker pleaded guilty to spinning, not leaking. “There’s a difference,” he says. “Leaking is when you put something out to drive policy in one way or another, or to scratch your own back or promote yourself at the expense of somebody else. But it’s your job as the chief of staff to spin the president’s position.”

“He understood that the press corps was part and parcel of governing,” says Tutwiler. “He always treated them with respect—even if he couldn’t stand the individual he was dealing with.”

“He had this zen quality,” she says. “He was put together and he just exuded this air of calm and cool and above it all. He was the one with the secret sauce. He was the one who you thought knew everything; he was giving context and perspective—without spin; whether you agree or disagree, you know he was a straight shooter. That’s what everybody felt. He was a straight shooter. And extremely bright.”

“Day in and day out, he’s focused. He does not wing it. He thinks before he speaks,”

“Baker is not perfect,” says Tutwiler. “But he can handle pressure. He’s a Steady Eddie. And he’s a realist. It’s almost clinical. He doesn’t lead with emotion. He can handle a whole lot of incoming and just not get rattled.” Baker’s version is that he simply delivered a dose of reality. “My message when I got back to the Situation Room was calming, because I relayed the doctors’ message. And the doctors’ message was that the surgery had been successful. They expected the president to gain a full recovery.”

“The people want us to act, and not in half measures,”

“He knew when to hold ’em; he knew when to fold ’em,” says Baker. “He was a great negotiator. Reagan always said, ‘I’ll take eighty percent of what I want, and come back later for more.’ He never understood the diehards who would go off the cliff with their flags flying.”

they both understood that your political adversary didn’t have to be your political enemy. And that’s why they were able to achieve a heck of a lot of good for this country.”

“They would fight all day long over policy and after five o’clock they’d get together, drink whiskey, and tell Irish stories,”

“Baker delivers bad news in a most respectful way,” says Tutwiler. “It’s not that he’s sycophantic; he’s not at all—but he has a lot of patience. He has an enormous amount of personal security because he was somebody before he came here.” Spencer adds, “Jimmy was good at sayin’, ‘Hey, boss, you’re wrong.’

He and Darman got out their yellow pads and made a list of pluses and minuses—starting with the downside of staying as chief of staff: Stay Downside 1. totally exposed/accountable for any and all “failures.” 2. defense??? soc. sec. reversal perhaps 3. have to re-staff with people won’t really favor 4. everything a repeat, somewhat boring 5. Senate losses in ’86 6. possibility of counter-coup or unfavorable terms if things go sour

Upside 1. poss. longest c.o.s. in modern period. 2. poss. Sec State (query this??) 3. “responsible” thing to do Darman summarized the downside and upside of going to Treasury: Treas Downside 1. will be in middle of revenue fight (true also if stay [as COS]) 2. “leaving a sinking ship” stories (mitigated somewhat by DTR apt.) 3. not as good as State (but: bird in hand vs. bush) Upside 1. helps RR bld momentum (while JAB still centrally involved as chief ec. spokesman) 2. serious, substantive job • back to professional image (not just pol.) • better positioning for later: a) public life b) private life 3. can make own agenda—and stay a “winner”

“You gotta have nerves of steel, you have to have endless energy, you gotta know how to pace yourself—because it is not just the most important job, it’s the hardest job: You have to be like three people. But none of that would matter if your skill set doesn’t complement the president’s. James Baker complemented, he augmented, he meshed—he was a leader.”

Presidents sometimes make the mistake of hiring for the White House chief of staff somebody who brought them to the dance, rather than the person who needs to be the dance partner once you’re governing,” he says. “In campaigning, you try to demonize your opponent. In governing, you make love to your opponent. That’s how you put coalitions together. Jim Baker understood campaigning, but he was a real pro at governing.”

“You may be the second-most-powerful person in Washington. But the minute you forget that your power is all vicarious from the president—then you’re in trouble. Your job is to make sure the president gets to hear all sides of every issue. But that doesn’t mean that you don’t make your case.”

Dear Mr. President, I respectfully submit this letter of resignation as Chief of Staff and Assistant to the President…. You have accorded me the greatest privilege of my life: the honor of serving as your Chief of Staff over the past four years—years which historians will undoubtedly view as a period of much-needed and striking accomplishment. I know that you are fond of saying that such achievements are a team effort, but if that is so, it is also true that rarely in our nation’s history has a team been so ably led and inspired…by your success and personal example you have restored the potency, purpose and effectiveness of the Presidency.

“This seemed odd under the circumstances….In the president’s place, I would have put many questions to the applicant. How will you be different from Jim Baker? How will you handle Congress? What do you know about defense and foreign affairs? Who will you bring with you and who will you get rid of? What practices will you want to change? How will you handle the press? Why do you want this job?”

“You remember that expression: ‘trust but verify’? Well, he was trust. She was verify.”