The God Who Failed: An Assessment of Jawaharlal Nehru's Leadership

by Madhav Godbole

But, public opinion, and particularly the intelligentsia, has now turned into Nehru-baiters. Nehru is blamed for all the ills afflicting the country. In retrospect, it is often easy to blame the persons who were at the helm of affairs. But, rather than being judgemental, wherever possible, I have tried to understand the compulsions under which certain decisions were taken.

According to the rules, IFS officers are not permitted to marry foreigners. Our batch mate, M.K. Khisha, who came from the Northeast, was posted in Spain on the completion of his training. There he fell in love with a charming young beauty, Gloria. They decided to get married but IFS rules came in the way and permission was denied. Khisha was heart-broken but Gloria did not lose hope. She wrote a letter in her own handwriting to Nehru, beseeching him to grant their request. As luck would have it, her letter was picked from the heap of incoming letters and placed before Nehru who magnanimously agreed to their request and thus Khisha and Gloria were united for life.

This trait of worshipping heroes is long embedded in the Indian psyche. In his closing speech in the Constituent Assembly, B.R. Ambedkar, Chairman of the Drafting Committee had, inter alia, emphasized: We must observe the caution which John Stuart Mill has given to all who are interested in the maintenance of democracy, namely, not to lay their liberties at the feet of even a great man, or to trust him with powers which enable him to subvert their institutions. There is nothing wrong in being grateful to great men who have rendered life-long services to the country. But there are limits to greatness. As has been well said by the Irish patriot Daniel O’Connell, ‘no man can be grateful at the cost of his honour, no woman can be grateful at the cost of her chastity and no nation can be grateful at the cost of its liberty’. This caution is more necessary in the case of India than in the case of any other country, for in India, Bhakti, or what may be called the path of devotion or hero-worship, plays a part in its politics unequalled in magnitude by the part it plays in the politics of any other country in the world. Bhakti in religion may be a road to the salvation of the soul. But in politics, Bhakti or hero-worship is a sure road to degradation and to eventual dictatorship. (Mukherjee 2007; pp. 217–18)

Patel commanded more support in the Congress Party as compared to Nehru. In his book, D.V. Tahmankar has stated that in 1929, the provincial Congress committees had voted Gandhi, Patel and Nehru, in that order, for the presidency of the Lahore Congress. Gandhi declined the honour, and according to the rule, the next choice, Patel, became the successful candidate. But Jawaharlal’s father, Motilal Nehru, wanted to see his son attain that national honour before his death—he died in 1931—and pleaded with Gandhi to persuade Patel to withdraw. The Mahatma intervened. Patel agreed and Nehru became president.

According to H.V. Hodson, when Nehru had submitted the list of independent India’s first cabinet to the Viceroy Lord Mountbatten in August 1947, Patel’s name was missing from it. It was Mountbatten who, on V.P. Menon’s prompting, made Nehru include Patel in the cabinet. V.P. Menon argued that an open clash in the Congress Party Working Committee between the two could result in Nehru’s defeat. Nehru’s main misgiving about Patel was that he would oppose a socialistic economic policy. Moreover, Nehru wanted to be all in all. S. Gopal calls this ‘an absurd story’.

‘I had a long talk with Patel yesterday,’ wrote Mountbatten to Lord Hastings Ismay on 4 October 1947. (The topic was Pakistan.) Mountbatten added: ‘He [Patel] had also attacked Nehru for the first time saying, “I regret our leader has followed his lofty ideas into the skies and has no contact left with earth or reality.’’’

Nehru and Patel differed from each other on several matters. In the conventional sense of the term, Patel was a conservative while Nehru was a progressive. Patel had his feet firmly on the ground while Nehru was a dreamer and idealist.

V.P. Menon has quoted Vallabhbhai Patel to say, ‘It will be folly to ignore realities; facts take their revenge if they are not faced squarely and well.’ (Menon 1956; p.494)

Nehru and Patel complemented each other. Nehru’s weaknesses were made up by Patel’s strong points and Patel’s weaknesses were made up by Nehru’s strong points. Patel had a strong hold over the Congress Party organization, while Nehru’s strength was in the fact that he was designated as the successor by Gandhi.

He was as much concerned about the future of the jagirdars as about the future of the tenants. There was certainly no sadistic socialism in his make-up. He felt that if the jagirdars were dispossessed without equitable compensation, their basis of livelihood would be gone and they would be ready recruits to the ranks of anti-social elements in the country. That is why he insisted that their lands should be taken only on payment of reasonable compensation for a limited period so that they might be able to adjust themselves. He was firmly of the opinion that the smaller jagirdars, who had nothing except their lands to live on, should not be dispossessed. (Menon 1956; p.489)

Patel had no quarrel with the theory of socialism, but he could not tolerate Congress socialists whose talk, he thought, had little relation to realities of life in India. Each group had its own pet theory: some wanted wholesale nationalization of industries; others advocated a cooperative system and a third coterie preferred confiscation of all property. Patel once said: ‘We are told there are eighty-four castes among Brahmans, but judging by their disputes and difference, I think there must be eighty-five varieties of socialists!’… His advice to young socialists was: ‘Before you talk of socialism you must ask yourself how much wealth you have created by your own labour. It is necessary to learn how to produce wealth before thinking what to do with it.’ (Tahmankar 1970; p.278)

In his note dated 12 January 1948, Patel questioned Nehru’s interpretation of the prime minister’s role as inconsistent with a democratic system of government, for it would raise him ‘to the position of a virtual dictator’. Patel said the prime minister was no doubt ‘first among equals’, but he had no overriding powers over his colleagues ‘as responsibility for implementing policy decisions rested with the ministry concerned and on the minister in charge’.

In one of his more important speeches, made on 6 January 1948 at Lucknow, Patel said: I am a true friend of the Muslims although I have been described as their greatest enemy. I believe in plain speaking. I do not know how to mince words. I want to tell them frankly that mere declarations of loyalty to the Indian Union will not help them at this crucial juncture. They must give practical proof of their declarations. (Akbar 1988; p.454)

His views on the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS) were so unlike the position of the Congress Party that he was considered a communalist. Patel had said: I invite the R.S.S. to join the Congress and not to weaken the administration by creating unrest in the country. I realize that they [the R.S.S.] are not actuated by selfish motives but the situation warrants that they should strengthen the hands of the government and assist in maintaining peace… In the Congress those who are in power feel that by virtue of authority they will be able to crush the R.S.S. By danda (the stick) you cannot suppress an organization. Moreover, danda is meant for thieves and dakus (dacoits). Using danda will not help much. After all, the R.S.S. men are not thieves and dacoits. They are patriots. They love their country. Only their trend of thought is diverted (sic). They are to be won over by Congressmen with love. (Akbar 1988; p.454)

Rajendra Prasad wanted the the date of the Republic Day to be changed on the ground that his astrologers considered it to be inauspicious! Nehru opposed it saying that India would not be run by astrologers, at least so long as he was around. Rajendra Prasad seemed to have overlooked the significance of 26 January in India’s freedom struggle.

Nehru considered Tandon to be Hindu- reactionary. Tandon’s image was synonymous with the pro-Hindu lobby within the Congress and he had become a symbol of Hindu revivalism. He was the man who could not become chairman of the Allahabad municipality in 1923 because the Muslims would not support him; Nehru had to be drafted into the job at the last minute. As chief of the Congress Party in Uttar Pradesh (UP) at that sensitive time, Tandon kept making speech after speech demanding that Muslims had to adopt a ‘Hindu culture’, if they wanted to live in India.

It is counter-productive to create an impression that secularism implies negation of religion. In fact, this was the reason why the inclusion of the word ‘secular’ in the Constitution was objected to in the Constituent Assembly.

In September 1947, Patel’s home ministry, with the help of the army, had removed more than ten thousand Muslim men, women and children to safety in the Red Fort and opened free kitchens for them. Both Lord and Lady Mountbatten visited the refugees and expressed great satisfaction with the work of Patel’s volunteers. But Patel’s detractors did not give him credit for it.

Sardar Patel was a much misunderstood man. His passion for order and discipline was often considered to be due to a desire for exercise of authority. He believed in protecting the rights of Muslims as much as those of the Hindus but he could not appreciate the hesitation of Pandit Jawaharlal and others to oppose Muslim fanaticism. The Sardar had no more sympathy with the Hindu Mahasabha and Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh than others, but he wanted them to be dealt with in the same manner as the Muslim League and the communist parties and similar anti-national organizations…

Madhu Limaye has stated: ‘He [Patel] was a counterpoise as well as a good comrade to Jawaharlal. After his death, Jawaharlal’s impatience and authoritarian tendencies had full and unbridled sway.’ (Limaye 1985; p.150)

Nehru’s writ ran unquestioned all over the country. For all practical purposes, he was the uncrowned, elected ‘King’. But Nehru was too much of a democrat. He wanted to take people with him even on contentious issues. As a result, he was often blamed for indecisiveness.

It must also be remembered that there was overwhelming support for the adoption of the socialistic pattern of society. Some may say this was brain-washing of people but there it was. To be a progressive, one had to be a leftist, at least a socialist. In making an assessment of Nehru’s term in office, this factor must be borne in mind.

The innate wisdom of this large, far-flung, often illiterate electorate has been brought out convincingly more than once. The most striking was the unseating of the Congress Party, and Indira Gandhi personally, after the Emergency excesses in 1977; bringing her back to power in 1980 when the Janata government had discredited itself; unseating of state governments time and again, leading to the recognition of the anti-incumbency factor; throwing out the National Democratic Alliance (NDA) government in 2004 in spite of its ‘India Shining’ claims; and finally inflicting a humiliating defeat on the United Progressive Alliance (UPA) in April-May 2014, and giving the BJP a clear majority on its own. Nehru’s vision has borne fruit time and again and India must be eternally grateful to him for it.

Nehru’s progressive thinking seems to have been deliberately sidelined by his Congress Party for the sake of vote-bank politics. Nehru had said, ‘Personally…I am opposed to the idea of political or economic rights being given to an individual or a group on the basis of religion.’ Rather than adopting economic backwardness as a criterion, the Congress Party had, in its election manifesto for the Lok Sabha elections in 2014, promised reservation on the basis of religion, so far as the Muslims were concerned.

Towards the end of Nehru’s term as prime minister, even Nehru’s trusted colleague and admirer, S.K. Dey, had become critical of the undue expansion of the Planning Commission. Dey has noted: All government organisations, it is well known, tend to expand with time. The Planning Commission having started from the southern wing and part of northern wing of the Rashtrapati Bhavan, was expected to accommodate itself originally on a floor area of about 25,000 sq. ft. in a special building to be constructed for them. But it expanded at such a fantastic pace that the Commission gave itself a new building—the Yojana Bhavan—with a floor area of nearly 68,000 sq. ft. Even this was not enough. The Commission had already spilled over into other areas in the city… As the central Ministries began to rebel against the Commission as an interloper organisation, the state governments began to bully it. (Dey 1969; pp.92–3)

The fears expressed by the then Finance Minister John Mathai about the Planning Commission encroaching on the role of the finance ministry have turned out to be true. The political resentment against the Planning Commission reached its peak during the regime of Nehru’s grandson, Rajiv Gandhi, who called the Planning Commission members a ‘pack of jokers’. It is time the ‘holy cow’ that is the Planning Commission is put to pasture. I hope the Modi government will take the bold step of jettisoning this Nehruvian political baggage.

In any evaluation of Nehru, it will be necessary to take a balanced view, keeping in view both the positives and the negatives of the Nehru era. Personally, I believe that, on balance, Nehru’s contribution to building modern India is much more than his failures on some fronts. India would not have been what it is today, an emerging world power, without the vision, statesmanship, scientific outlook and unbelievable endeavours of Jawaharlal Nehru.

Nehru’s failures were largely because of his own shortcomings, his excessive civilities, his inability to build a team of advisors, and generally an air of superiority in his dealings.

While matters pertaining to over 540 princely states were handled by the States Ministry under Vallabhbhai Patel’s leadership, Nehru kept the Kashmir question exclusively with himself. So much so that he appointed a junior minister, Gopalaswami Ayyangar, to handle it in the United Nations (UNO) and Parliament, under his personal supervision.

It is interesting to note that Shyamaprasad Mookerjee, the then tallest Jan Sangh leader and a member of the first Nehru cabinet, had admitted in Parliament in August 1952 that he was: A party when the decision was taken to refer the Kashmir issue to the U.N.O. That is an obvious fact. I have no right and do not wish to disclose the extraordinary circumstances under which that decision was taken and the great expectations which the Government of India had on that occasion, but it is a matter of common knowledge that we have not got fair treatment from the United Nations which we had expected.

It is important to note that Article 370 was only a transitional arrangement till the state acceded to India fully. (Annexure III) But, due to the intransigence of the state leaders, this has become almost a permanent feature of the Constitution.

Sheikh Abdullah is reported to have declared in the Constituent Assembly of Kashmir in 1952: ‘We are a hundred per cent sovereign body. No country can put spokes in the wheel of our progress. Neither the Indian Parliament nor any other Parliament outside the state has any jurisdiction over our state.’ (Mukherjee 2007; pp. 247, 250)

The tangle of Article 370 could have been solved in the early years by Nehru but he dragged his feet and failed to address the problem firmly and decisively. Even the question of a separate flag for the state was pushed under the carpet as one of sentiment. The suggestion made by Vallabhbhai Patel, to resettle the refugees from West Pakistan in Kashmir state, was ignored. Nehru’s approach to the Kashmir issue was guided by sentimentality and clearly lacked foresight.

The Government of India negotiated a settlement in regard to his privy purse and other matters. Sheikh Abdullah refused to honour the agreement and the Government of India are still [till its abolition in 1971] paying the privy purse from their own coffers. (Menon 1956; p.486) There is no evidence to show that Nehru tried to persuade Sheikh Abdullah not to adopt such an unreasonable attitude.

In April 1952, when Gopalaswami Ayyangar wanted to bring about a measure of financial integration between India and Kashmir by extending the jurisdiction of the CAG to the state, Sheikh Abdullah made a highly provocative speech at Ranbirsinghpura saying: ‘Kashmir’s accession to India will have to be of a restricted nature’ and described arguments in favour of the full application of the Indian Constitution to Kashmir as ‘unrealistic, childish and savouring of lunacy.’ In another speech two weeks later, he said, ‘It would be better to die than submit to the taunt that India was our bread-giver.

Narendra Singh Sarila has brought out the ‘great game’ of Britain to eventually accede J&K to Pakistan. On 16 October 1947, a top secret appreciation was prepared in the Commonwealth Relations Office. This was done a week before the Pakistani invasion of J&K: ‘If war developed (and even Gandhi has hinted at this possibility)…it is likely to unite India [and] to bring about the downfall of Pakistan. Before Pakistan was finally liquidated it seems probable that frontier tribes of Afghanistan would enter the struggle and it is not impossible that Soviet Russia might play a part. The effect of the disappearance of Pakistan on the Middle East would be very considerable… In neither case would the object of HMG [His Majesty’s Government] be achieved.’

On 20 February 1948, Nehru wrote to Krishna Menon, the Indian High Commissioner in UK as follows: ‘Even Mountbatten has “hinted at partition of Kashmir,” Jammu for India and the rest including lovely Vale of Kashmir to Pakistan. This is totally unacceptable to us… Although if the worst comes to the worst I am prepared to accept Poonch and Gilgit being partitioned off.’

After the tribal invasion began, Mountbatten’s metamorphosis was significant. From being ‘almost neutral’ with even a slight pro-India edge, by the end of October, following the directions received from London, he began to tilt towards Pakistan.

On 22 December 1947 Nehru handed over a letter to Liaquat Ali Khan formally asking the government of Pakistan ‘to deny all help to the raiders.’ This letter created serious concern in London.

The account given by Dharma Vira, who was joint secretary to cabinet, bears out Mountbatten’s role. There was every reason to believe that if the [army] operations had continued for a few days more, the entire area of Kashmir would have been liberated. Lord Mountbatten, however, did not like an open armed conflict between the members of the British Commonwealth of Nations. He advised Nehru to agree to a cease-fire and to take the case of aggression on a territory which through accession was Indian, to the United Nations. Sardar Patel was opposed to this advice. He was of the opinion that as the Pakistan forces were already on the run there was no point in our stopping the operations abruptly and complaining to the United Nations.

According to the biographer of General K.M. Cariappa, Cariappa had to fight ‘two enemies, Army Headquarters headed by Roy Bucher, and the Pakistan Army headed by Masservy.’ The role played by Mountbatten in this regard is shocking.

It is unfortunate that Nehru, who was under such a spell of Mountbatten, failed to protect India’s security interests.

on 22 December 1947. The US official reported to Washington that Patrick had described the situation as follows: ‘An ultimatum…the seriousness of which can hardly be exaggerated. India was likely to attack Pakistan simultaneously with filing the complaint with the Security Council… Government of India (GOI)…is driven to its rash course by Nehru’s “Brahmin logic”, which argues that now Kashmir has adhered (sic) to GOI it is part of India.’

Patel had written about his assessment of the Chinese strategy: Recent and bitter history also tells us that Communism is no shield against imperialism and that communists are as good or as bad as imperialists as any other. Chinese ambitions in this respect not only cover the Himalayan slopes on our side but also include important parts of Assam. They have their ambitions in Burma also. Burma has the added difficulty that it has no McMahon line round which to build up even the semblance of an agreement. Chinese irredentism and communist imperialism are different from the expansionism and imperialism of the Western Powers. The former has a cloak of ideology which makes it ten times more dangerous. In the guise of ideological expansion lie concealed racial, national and historical claims. The danger from the north and north-east, therefore, becomes both communist and imperialist.

China with Pakistan on 2 March 1963 by which part of Kashmir’s northern territory was handed over by Pakistan to China and accepted by China, in spite of the fact that China had, as early as 16 March 1956, recognized Kashmir’s accession to India. (Rao 1963; p.188) Pakistan had thus no right to hand over the said area to China.

Mehta has further stated: ‘In hindsight, the People’s Republic may well have been irked at India being considered the natural leader of the non-aligned and Afro-Asian nations. In 1955 even Churchill hailed Nehru as the “Light of Asia” and so underlined India’s then international standing despite our part [sic] record of sturdy anti-imperialism.

It is often held against Nehru that by granting asylum to Dalai Lama, India unnecessarily incurred the wrath of China. But, it can be seen from the account given by Jagat Mehta that ‘way back in 1952, the Chinese Premier had told Ambassador Pannikar that should the contingency arise of the Dalai Lama seeking asylum in India, it would be understandable if it was not refused.’

President Ayub’s offer publicly extended in April 1959 of joint defence of the subcontinent against the threat of China. To Nehru, the idea of India finding common ground against China with an ally of the West in the containment strategy was unthinkable.

In the face of distrust and suspicions of secrecy, Nehru (a democrat at heart) announced that all notes and papers exchanged in the previous five years which pertained to relations with China would be released in official ‘White Papers.’ The decision was spontaneously taken, without reflection and without internal consultations and, in effect, it compromised confidentiality, which is an essential ingredient of diplomacy and intergovernment exchange… The commitment that every diplomatic document exchanged would be made public, inhibited our relations with China for years. (Mehta 2006; pp.73–4)

Francis Watson, in Frontiers of China, provides a possible clue for the unsubstantiated claims made by China in Himalayas. ‘He avers that China’s historical notions of natural frontiers reflect a preference for looking down on a neighbour from the frontier. This would explain why the Ching dynasty and even the 1954 map of the People’s Republic showed Nepal, Bhutan, Sikkim, northern Burma, half of Vietnam and of course NEFA (Arunachal) as part of the domain of China.’