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Kindle Notes & Highlights
by
Jim Mattis
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June 18 - August 11, 2019
the Hamiltonian school put economics first and foremost. It sought the promotion of the American enterprise at home and abroad and supported the rights of American merchants and investors. Today, this tradition sees free trade and the preservation of free trade as critical.
United States had a practical and moral duty to spread its values throughout the world. For Wilsonians, American interests required other countries to accept basic American values and conduct their foreign and domestic affairs accordingly.
the Jeffersonian school sought to protect American democracy but to avoid imposing American values on other countries.
The fourth, Jacksonian, tradition represented a populist culture of “honor, independence, courage, and military pride,” that later translated into “unwavering popular support for the bloody and dangerous Cold War.”[8] Today, the American public’s support for the pursuit of “total victory” (55.8 percent of those polled) and the use of quick and massive force (58.5 percent), as opposed to gradual escalation, evokes this Jacksonian tradition (CM1T 79). So too does the overwhelming public support for increasing or maintaining spending levels on military pay, operations and training, construction,
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Instead of discussions to clarify who US forces were fighting and how the United States intended to apply national power to defeat those enemies and achieve sustainable outcomes, public debate focused on the means—such as the numbers of troops committed. For example, during the war in Iraq there was continuous debate over means and resources but little discussion of the elements of the strategy, such as, how to move Iraq’s increasingly polarized communities toward political accommodation; how to build capable and legitimate Iraqi security forces; how to reduce insurgent freedom of movement;
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Means are eclipsing ends even in presidential requests to Congress
American public opinion is changeable and is receptive to strong and clearly articulated statements by political and military leaders.
Winston Churchill famously said, “there is no public opinion, just published opinion,”
The degree to which the public is informed could in turn influence the degree or nature of the public’s influence over the making of wartime strategy.
the American public will support military operations if it understands the approach and thinks that a particular approach is working. The public is willing to show faith in America’s leaders, but the White House and the Pentagon must communicate clearly and consistently about the strategy—and its requirements—necessary to uphold the strategic interests of the United States in wartime.
First, Kohn gave a brief but powerful account of the “consequences of growth” in the size and permanence of the professional US military from World War II to the creation of the all-volunteer force of the post-Vietnam era, resulting in a kind of military “clientism.”
Second, Kohn pointed to a problem not well understood—or much considered—even now: the “reforms” of the 1985 Goldwater-Nichols Act, and particularly the centralization of power around the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) chairman had created additional civil-military obstacles;
Finally, Kohn’s article was an unstated but incisive critique of Huntington’s model of separate civilian and military spheres of competence and his theory of “objective” control by promoting an ethos of military “professionalism.” Proper “civilian control is not a fact but a process,”
The durability of the theory has had consequences: Huntington’s “institutional approach”—that is, the granting of an autonomous, “professional” sphere of competence to the military—“continues to frame analyses of democratic control over the military.”
“The civilian principal establishes a military agent to provide the security function for the state, but then must take pains to ensure that the military agent continues to do the civilian’s bidding. Given the adverse selection and moral hazard problems endemic in any agency relationship, but particularly acute in the civil-military context, civilian oversight of the military is crucial.”
History shows,” he writes, “that the military is not as ‘right’ in civil-military disputes as the military triumphalists might suppose. . . . But even when the military is right, democratic theory intervenes and insists that it submit to the civilian leadership that the polity has chosen. . . . The republic would be better served even by foolish working than by enlightened shirking.”
As Cohen then rightly argues, the Clausewitzian definition of the nature of war—now such a commonplace in both American military and civilian elite understandings—is directly at odds with the Huntingtonian assertion of military “professionalism” and the acknowledgement of a separate sphere of military competence.
But there can be in Clausewitz’s view no arbitrary line dividing civilian and military responsibility, no neat way of carving off a distinct sphere of military action.[18]
Kohn, Feaver, and Cohen alike attack the idea of separate and fixed spheres of civilian and military competence, see the actual practice of civil-military interaction as a messy process fraught with uncertainty even while retaining a hierarchical structure, and reject the notion of civilian control through professional autonomy.
only 8.3 percent of Americans currently work with someone actively serving in the military
Asked whether “you or a member of your immediate family served in the military after 1991”—the end of the cold war—77 percent of the general population and 82 percent of elites said no (CM2T 1). The equivalent post-9/11 numbers were 80 percent for the general population and more than 86 percent of elites
Compared with other countries, the United States diagnoses PTSD in its military at very high rates. Estimates run between 20 percent and 30 percent; by way of contrast, the Danish military in Afghanistan—which saw as much combat per capita as any contingent—has a PTSD diagnosis rate of 2 percent.
The current divide also reflects a second, underlying problem: a failure to come to grips with the Clausewitzian nature of war as a continuation of politics by violent means.
Some 45 percent of Americans believe that the president’s top priority should be the economy.
“The officer in the constabulary force,” Janowitz claimed, “is particularly attuned to withstand the pressures of constant alerts and tension. He is sensitive to the political and social impact of the military establishment on international security affairs. He is subject to civilian control, not only because of the ‘rule of law’ and tradition, but also because of self-imposed professional standards and meaningful integration into civilian values.”[57] In other words, Janowitz did not expect to extract the political dimension from warfare or the use of armed force or relegate the statesman and
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Officer education in politico-military affairs should start in the academy where tactical training must be related to the requirements of international relations, and continue at higher levels of education and professional experience.”
Only 10.9 percent believe that political leaders share society’s values while 70.9 percent believe that they do not
concluded The Professional Soldier with a warning that sounds a very current note: “To deny or destroy the difference between the military and the civilian cannot produce genuine similarity, but runs the risk of creating new forms of tension and unanticipated militarism.”
It seems plausible that the very liberal view, were it widespread throughout the US population, might indicate a gathering problem for civil-military relations.
Of the total sample, 4.8 percent described themselves that way, as against 16.4 percent “liberal,” 30.7 percent “moderate,” 30.3 percent “conservative,” and 10.1 percent “very conservative” (7.6 percent did not know).
the “very conservative” view is much closer to the view of the sample as a whole than the “very liberal” view.
while a few students passionately opposed inviting ROTC back, most students did not share their zeal, and most of the discussion among the faculty and administration focused not on whether to invite the services back, but on how to make it work.
The shift in opinions towards the military in the Stanford case highlights the need to update our understanding of how millennials view the military.
As of 2011, the number of countries with some form of US military presence was up to nearly 150.
And yet there is an inherent contradiction in the lives of millennials: despite growing up in an age of continuous war, this generation is broadly unfamiliar with the military, its culture, its basic structure, and its function.
millennials generally trust the military and its people. Though they disagree with a number of specific policies, the military leadership is viewed far more favorably by millennials than political leaders are.
millennials are not knowledgeable about the military’s basic characteristics.
One of the primary conclusions we draw from the YouGov data is that millennials exhibit some skepticism about the US military as an institution while showing notable respect for men and women in uniform.
Though millennials are substantially more progressive on these issues than the military as an institution, the data suggest that their faith in the military as basically fair is resilient, even in the face of policies that run counter to their principles.
Nearly half of millennials believe that military leaders share the values of the American people, compared to only 12.5 percent who believe that political leaders do
The biggest and most important takeaway, therefore, was this: if there is indeed a millennial-military divide, the key to closing it is not in forcing millennials to learn more facts about the military or in studying American military history. Rather, it is in enabling interpersonal connections between young people and their peers in the military—connections that can inspire interest and important discussions about military and civilian values and the differences and commonalities between both groups.
It has been said that 1 percent of our citizens serve and go to war while 99 percent go to the mall. The YouGov poll confirms the disconnect: only 15.6 percent of Americans have served or had an immediate family member serve since 9/11
There are two primary reasons why America needs to connect civilians and military. First, a strong connection is vital to the safety of our troops, the success of their missions, and, more broadly, national security. Second, a strong connection leads to a better-informed public, which is the foundation for better-informed policy, stronger political will, and more effective American engagement in the world.
With a $500 billion Department of Defense annual budget, the idea that relatively small-scale private assistance can contribute to mission success is counterintuitive. But the unconventional threats America faces place a premium on speed, flexibility, and innovation. And that is where the resources and brainpower of our citizens—unfettered by bureaucracy and the inevitable restrictions on the use of taxpayer funds—can have an off-scale impact. Civilian support is akin to venture capital: risk tolerant, responsive, and able to help military personnel capitalize on windows of opportunity.
A well-informed public is ultimately the best hope for well-informed policy and the political will needed to persist and prevail.
In contrast, after 9/11, President Bush told Americans to get on with their lives as normal and go shopping. This was neither a way to directly help the military, nor was it meaningful. While there was logic to it—our national security ultimately depends on the health of our economy—it failed to create a connection between Americans and the military or the mission.
The connection created when civilians help the military also leads to a better-informed public and, ultimately, to the better-informed policy and political will America needs to maintain its leadership and influence abroad.
In our judgment and that of the authors contributing to this volume, the relationship between America’s military and its civilian society is fundamentally strong and healthy. Coming from varied areas of expertise and different political viewpoints, none of us saw cause for concern. We believe this to be a huge success for a democratic country fighting its fifteenth year of war with an all-volunteer force that was never designed to sustain that burden.
We have become persuaded by our colleagues in this project, however, that public ignorance about the military is problematic. It contributes to strategic incoherence, encouraging politicians to consider their strategic choices hemmed in by public opposition and to shift responsibility for winning policy arguments onto the military; impedes sustained support for the war effort; permits the imposition of social policies that erode battlefield lethality; fosters a sense of victimization towards veterans that skews defense spending toward pay and benefits; and distances veterans from our broader
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Our impression from the initial survey that a wide gulf existed between elites and the general public on military issues was not borne out.
