Aberration in the Heartland of the Real: The Secret Lives of Timothy McVeigh

by Wendy S. Painting

other deadly pathogens to Iraq between 1985 and 1989.

A similar investigation by a House Oversight Committee in 1996 led to revelations that for several days, U.S. soldiers, in an attempt to destroy them, blew up munitions held in a storage bunker called “Bunker 73” in Khamisiya, 25 miles from the city of Basra. The munitions, mostly rockets, contained the nerve agent Sarin, mustard gas and other possible biological agents. In doing so, they released a cloud of (among other things) seven tons of Sarin into the air that, when carried by the winds, exposed untold numbers of people. Not knowing the bunkers contained rockets filled with sarin, they did not wear protective gear and when chemical alarms went off alerting them to the danger, officers told troops they were faulty and ordered them to disconnect the alarms.

While the number of Iraqis exposed to and affected by the Sarin release remains unknown, over the years the official number of U.S. soldiers exposed continued to grow. At first, the DOD insisted no troops were exposed. In September 1996, the Pentagon issued a statement that 5,000 U.S. soldiers were exposed. By October 1996, after the Pentagon set up an information hotline, the number grew to 15,000. A retired Army general, whose troops had been camped within 15 miles of Bunker 73, put the number at 24,000 and expressed concern, as his soldiers had not worn gas masks. Newsday estimated the number at 29,000. As of 2013, the Pentagon’s estimate of how many U.S. soldiers could have been exposed to the toxins released at Khamisiya alone, reached 100,000.

Years later, the Defense Department revealed that the Pentagon’s Nuclear Biological and Chemical Warfare logs, which tracked the chemical alarms, had mysteriously gone missing; a circumstance one military officer compared to “the 18-minute gap on the Nixon Watergate tapes.”

As of 2015, the estimated of the number of all U.S. soldiers exposed to nerve gas and other chemical

agents is over 200,000.108

The realities of the Gulf War and later attempts to determine the truth were further complicated because, immediately after Iraq invaded Kuwait, the Defense Department sought and obtained approval by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) to administer a cocktail of experimental drugs to troops without their informed consent, claiming that to obtain such consent was simply unfeasible. The known experimental drugs administered included pretreatments and vaccines meant to counter the effects of chemical and biological weapons. At the time, the FDA had previously barred the use of two of them, botulinum toxoid and Pyridostigmine Bromide (BP), on civilian populations and botulinum, specifically, remains unapproved by the FDA for civilian use because of its adverse side effects. Further, the doses administered to soldiers during the Gulf War were estimated based on previous tests on (actual) guinea pigs and the effects of the combined use of all the drugs had not been tested. For several days prior to the start of the ground war and throughout its duration, commanders ordered soldiers to take anti-nerve gas and anti-anthrax agents as well as BP pills, the latter meant to enhance the ...

Right on the box it said “for test purposes only, not for human use!.”

According to FBI records in the Jones Collection, as early as July 1995, an Inspector General from the New York State Military Affairs Office with the rank of major provided the FBI and the Army’s Criminal Intelligence Division (CID) in Fort Sill, Oklahoma with some of the records. When he did so, the Major advised the FBI that the “documents can only be used for Government purpose and are covered by the Privacy Act.” On March 12, 1996, the Jones Team’s military records expert visited Ft. Riley, but upon his return notified the team that he “was not able to look at division files for the Desert Storm period as these records had been sent to the Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in Washington, DC – at their request!” Two days later, when the legal team contacted Captain Rodriguez (formerly Lt.) to discuss “certain aspects of Tim’s records,” he declined, explaining that two FBI agents instructed him not to discuss his knowledge of McVeigh or the contents of the records with anyone – especially the defense team.

Soon after McVeigh’s arrest, the FBI confiscated COHORT Ray Barns’ army photos and his service-related records, and, in 2010, Barns emphasized that, despite promises to return them, the FBI had yet to do so. Further, in September 1995, the FBI attempted to obtain Barns’ extensive post-Gulf medical records, and ultimately issued a Grand Jury subpoena for them. Barns was not alone. The FBI confiscated and misplaced or destroyed vital military records, photos and other service-related mementos of several men in the COHORT unit.

The article described the region as “among the most polluted on the planet – so toxic that merely to live, eat and sleep (never mind to fight) in these zones is to risk

neurological problems.

“Our government,” he said, “is the potent, the omnipresent teacher. For good or ill, it teaches the whole people by its example”

Oklahoma City.… Who are the true barbarians?” 121 In a letter written to Gore Vidal in April 2001, months before his execution, McVeigh explained further:

The rate of attrition is high and over half of those who attempt the SFAS do not complete the course. Although those attending the SFAS course have been selected to do so based, among other things, on their exemplary physical condition, at the conclusion of the course, many are in a state of total starvation, enhanced exhaustion and near madness, some even experience repeated realistic hallucinations and most have shed over twenty pounds.

like many combat veterans who “stumble home” without a sense of danger or purpose and “lose themselves forever.”

the Sacks Sentence Completion Test (SSCT) and the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory (MMPI).

claims about having been implanted with a microchip while in the Army.

Guilty Agent and Experimental variety although, as seen in the Jones Collection, McVeigh articulated variations of this story to others earlier.

The 400 new recruits had all taken a number of “intelligence, psychological, adeptness and a whole battery of other tests.” Although not specifying exactly when, he said that, one day, SFAS officers called ten E-5 Sergeants with Secret Clearances, including himself, out of formation, separated them from the others and made them “feel special” by telling them that they had been “handpicked” based on their test results, “intelligence [and] physical makeup.” After receiving a classified “intelligence briefing,” they were asked to “volunteer” for a special covert assignment in which they would act as “military consultants” to domestic and international civilian police and intelligence agencies. Although the exact nature and extent of the assignment remained undisclosed until they accepted the mission, it could involve a number of unsavory tasks including drug smuggling and assassinations.

the entire family now believed he was mentally disturbed, but assured her this was an act, all “part of the game.”

Whether told in deception or delusion, or true, partially true, or wholly fabricated, McVeigh’s stories sound similar to the popular 1980s television series, The A-Team, the “crack commando unit” framed for a bank robbery and, having escaped, must live “underground” on the run and hunted by the Army. His defense team was unable to make heads or tails of such claims but did not think they had been written disingenuously and Jones Team attorney Rob Nigh, referring to the letters noted, “If Tim is lying, he’s one good liar.”

Even if McVeigh made up the story, his mother and sister seemed to believe it, as evidenced by FBI recordings of their conversations obtained through bugs hidden in a motel room furnished by the FBI “for their protection” shortly after McVeigh’s arrest, as well as telephone wiretaps of the McVeigh family’s incoming and outgoing phone calls.

“He had been operating within the confines of the United States government when he did what he did … [having been] recruited by the government while serving a 4-5 month period in the National Guard … [his] duties were to search for neo-Nazi’s and other problem troops within the National Guard.”

While at the SFAS, McVeigh encountered a high-ranking official whom he referred to only as “The Major,” a man he said had befriended him during the Gulf War. The Major, who McVeigh said was dressed in civilian clothing and had an unkempt appearance in general, pulled him aside and told him he was currently working for the Department of Defense on ultra-secret, need-to-know “Black Ops,” whose agenda was “primarily domestic intelligence gathering and internal threat evaluations with an emphasis on direct counter action operations.” The Major then described a right-wing militancy spreading rapidly throughout the United States that threatened to rip the country apart. He offered McVeigh a position in a secret unit, adding that he would be working alone

“The Bourne Scenario,”

and keeping his mouth shut.134 In 2007, Terry Nichols signed an affidavit stating that, prior to the bombing, McVeigh confided that a high-ranking FBI agent had recruited him to participate in undercover operations and at some point had instructed McVeigh to participate in the bombing. Nichols said McVeigh became visibly enraged during their conversation and ranted about how his “handler” changed the original target of the planned bombing, directing him to bomb the Murrah instead.

While the court sealed Nichols’ 2007 affidavit and supporting documents, in them he disclosed the identities of other alleged government informants and conspirators within the bombing plot and wrote that they were being protected by [the FBI/government] “in a cover-up to escape its responsibility for the loss of life in Oklahoma.”

indifference to his arrest may simply have been indicative of his understanding that he was working for a government agency.”

The more he thought about it, the worse he felt about the killing he had done for the American government,” and stressed that the real reason for his disillusionment was “the lies he heard in the Persian Gulf.”

According to Lt. Col. Grossman, the intensity, trauma and guilt soldiers suffer post-combat “inevitably result in a web of forgetfulness, deception and lies.” This traumatic personal matrix reflects cultural and institutional practices of forgetting inconvenient truths and is exacerbated by the eventual understanding that history is written by victors. This combined with the soldiers’ simultaneous yet “unconscious cover-up” of the reality of their own combat actions, results in a larger socio-cultural “conspiracy of silence” about the realities of war.

Killing comes with a price, and societies must learn that their soldiers will have to spend the rest of their lives living with that they have done.… Mass murder and execution can be sources of mass empowerment.… Each soldier who actively or passively participated in [mass executions] is faced with a stark choice…the soldier can resist the incredibly powerful array of forces that call for him to kill [or] can bow before the social and psychological forces that demand that he kill, and in doing so he will be strangely empowered.… He must believe that not only is this atrocity right, but it is proof that he is morally, socially, and culturally superior to those whom he has killed. It is the ultimate act of denial of their humanity … his mental health is totally invested in believing that what he has done is good and right … the worst part is that when you institute and execute a policy of atrocity, you and your society must live with what you have done.138

He read lots of books about the JFK assassination” and believed it was a conspiracy.

railed continuously about how the CIA, FBI and big business were getting out of control.

The atmosphere at Ft. Riley following the period immediately after the Gulf War was markedly desperate. Soldier morale was low and many considered their posting at Fort Riley as a “career ender” due, in part, to increased budget cuts and downsizing. Suicides and murder rates at the base continued to increase. Many shared the growing feeling that the government had left them by the wayside. Army intelligence officials noted that the

growing number of disgruntled soldiers at Ft. Riley offered extremist ideologues a chance to expand their ranks. The “Commander” of the Kansas Citizen Militia agreed, admitting his group specifically recruited military personnel, explaining “these young men go into the military for all the right reasons, to protect the country, but they are watching themselves being turned into policemen for the wealthy interests of the few. They know it. We know it. That’s why they are coming to us.”

others.” Yet there was something else going on, something unexplored in all published accounts that may provide clues and context about his decision to leave the Army. Absent in the many letters McVeigh wrote Steve, as well as in the transcripts of FBI and defense team interviews with other soldiers, is any mention of his continued medical visits. From the time he returned from the Gulf in April until leaving the Army in

Jones Team noticed or discussed the frequency of his medical visits while in the Army. It

McVeigh visited the dentist several times.

Doctors noted he had small protruding pieces of bone sticking out in his mouth, which was was infected, and the “bone chips” caused him continuous pain.

After leaving the Army, McVeigh continued to visit private dentists throughout the country, including just days before the bombing. Often these visits occurred in mysterious circumstances. In a “Radiological Request Report” dated December 5, 1991, the attending doctor noted McVeigh’s upper gastrointestinal difficulties that included his retention of gaseous secretions and the possibility of duodenitis, an inflammation of the intestine commonly caused by viral infection, bacteria, and often resulting in an ulcer.

confided his belief that he had a “computer chip in his backside.”

McVeigh responded that the military had “done things” to him and said, “I think they’ve brainwashed me or injected me with something.”

The reason noted for his separation: “the early transition program…for the convenience of the government.”

New York State Army National Guard based in Tonawanda, New York, to begin immediately upon leaving Ft. Riley.

On February 4, 1991, three thousand, five hundred people congregated around the White House to show support for the war and counter the growing numbers of anti-war protestors. According to Douglass Kellner, a critical component of the U.S. Gulf War propaganda machine involved the press pool system and the systematic exclusion of anti-war demonstrations or even dissenting opinions in news coverage. A study by media watchdog group FAIR found that only 29 of the 2,855 minutes of television coverage from August 8 to January 3, addressed opposition to U.S. military intervention in the Gulf. When the anti-war movement did receive coverage, it tended to be negative, depicted them as mobs of unruly anti-American terrorist sympathizers. Still, Kellner says that the night before the war began, 50% of Americans were opposed to it (New York Times. Jan. 26, 1991; Pantagraph Jan. 27, 1991; New York Times Feb. 4, 1991, A, F; Guardian Jan. 21, 1991; Wall Street Journal “Jan.22, 1991; Simpson 212; Kellner

During the last weeks of January, as Iraqi troops continued their advance into Kuwait, U.S. Marines fired artillery, mortar rounds and TOW missiles at them and their bunkers. In the parlance of the day, Iraqi forces became “bogged down” on January 29, 1991, when a Kuwait radio stationed owned by the CIA encouraged a Shi’ite uprising in Saudi Arabia – diverting the attention, resources, and manpower of the Iraq Army to quell the uprising (New York Times, Feb. 4 1991; Kellner 2004:9).

During Operations Desert Shield and Storm, FMC Corp. , the manufacturer of the Bradley, was one of the largest U.S. defense contractors in the Gulf, contracted to supply defense systems and industrial chemicals to clients around the world, replace and supply damaged oil production equipment in Kuwait, petroleum equipment plants in Saudi Arabia, and oil production facilities in Iran. In 1985, after Col. James Burton, a testing supervisor in the Pentagons office of Research and Engineering filed an internal complaint, Congress leveled heavy criticism against the Bradleys, claiming the Army skewed the results of simulated combat testing of the vehicle, although the Army denied this. Col. Burton, although commended by Congress for speaking out, was subsequently transferred to Alaska, ultimately leading to his decision to retire early. In early 1989, Saudi Arabia agreed to purchase 200 Bradley’s for an estimated $550 million dollars, to be received by early 1991. On February 11, 1991, The Wall Street Journal quoted one FMC executive as saying that while the companies’ profits had taken a turn for the worse, allied bombs and Iraq’s scorched earth policy promised to raise them and informed reporters of FMC’s willingness to provide Kuwait with the equipment they may need if they successfully regained control of their country. In 1992, FMC began building a newer type of Bradley, designed for electronic warfare and outfitted with radio and radar transmission and interception capabil...

federal jury’s verdict against FMC Corporation, who had been contracted with manufacturing and supplying the Bradley’s to the Army. The jury found that FMC had misled the Army about the safety of the vehicle. The suit had begun in 1986 when former FMC whistle blower Henry Boisvert, complained that the vehicles had not passed all the tests FMC claimed they had. (See: Washington Post “Army Says 12 Bradleys Sank” April 27, 1987, Sandy Johnson; Wall Street Journal. “Crisis Management: FMC Moves to Keep Clients Like the Army Supplied During War—Maker of Armored Vehicles, Oil Field Gear Also Eyes Post Conflict Contracts—Salesman Frets About Scuds” Feb. 11, 1991, Robert Johnson; Washington Post “Gulf War Leaves Environment Severely Wounded” March 2, 1991, Thomas W. Lippman; San Francisco Chronicle. “FMC Unveils New Bradley Fighting Vehicle” Jan. 23, 1992, Don Clark; San Francisco Chronicle. “$125 Million Verdict in Bradley Fighting Vehicle Suit” April 15, 1998, Manny Fernandez).

On January 30, 1991, eleven U.S. Marines died after an American Maverick missile hit their personnel carrier. The Marines had been part of a forward reconnaissance patrol engaged in combat with Iraqi troops west of Khafji. Such events, said CENTCOM Chief of Staff, Major General Robert Johnston, were unfortunate, but normal, occurrences in war. A growing number of journalists alleged that, during the daily Pentagon press briefings (the only sanctioned source of information for them), inaccurate or wholly falsified information was being given to them. One example of this were the initial claims of military spokespeople that U.S. Marines had not played significant roles in the Khafji attacks. As journalists were not allowed there by the Pentagon, it was left to maverick reporters and photographers who had breached the Pentagons’ policy and gone there independently. On February 2, another U.S. Marine was killed by bombs dropped by American planes, who had confused the U.S. convoy with an Iraqi one. On February 4, 1991, that ‘mechanical failures’ caused an American B-52 to crash over the Indian Ocean. One AH-1 Cobra and one UH-1 Marine Corp helicopters accidently crashed over Saudi Arabia, killing the six passengers inside them.